Nationalism and Internationalism

HERBERT ADAMS GIBBONS

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

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NATIONALISM AND INTERNATIONALISM

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NATIONALISM AND INTERNATIONALISM

By

HERBERT ADAMS GIBBONS

Ph.D., Litt.D., F.R. Hist.S.

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To

JAMES KERNEY

WHO, BY SEEING THE WORLD AS IT IS,
HELPS TO MAKE IT BETTER

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FOREWORD

In 1927, I went from Paris in midsummer to Green Acre, Maine, to keep an engagement made many months before to deliver six lectures on nationalism and internationalism. The day after the last lecture I sailed back to France. It was a long trip just for one week. But I felt amply repaid. I had before me an audience that was deeply interested in international relations—an audience that wanted facts, not propaganda or preaching. Many of my hearers were arden believers in the gospel of the brotherhood of man. They looked for the coming of world unity, not by any miracle, but by education. They bore with me each day much longer than an hour. Afterward, when I looked over the transcript of the lectures (they had been delivered without manuscript), I felt even more appreciative than I had at the time of their interest in my subject—an interest which, I fear, inspired me to too great length.

Not until I reached Green Acre did I realize that mine was the signal privilege and honor to give the first lecture course of the first season of the Institute of World Unity.

At the request of Dr. John Herman Randall, Director of the World Unity Foundation, and Mr. Horace

Holley, managing editor of *World-Unity*, the lectures have been revised for publication in book form. I can only hope that the wider circle to which they now go will be as indulgent as the members of the Institute.

There is no phenomenon more noticeable in the intellectual and political world today than the will to world unity. The messages of prophets and the dreams of idealists have become the formulae of statesmen in international discourse and the theses of students of world politics. That it is possible for all the nations of the world to live in harmony is now the accepted starting point of treaty negotiations, of economic schemes, of bankers contracts. We assume that there can be peace and goodwill. We strive to make permanent the successes already achieved in this direction. Thoughtful men of all nations are working for the same end. We do not hear the word "impracticable" nearly so often as we used to.

But statesmen and writers and preachers can make little real headway in the democracies that now rule the most powerful nations unless there is awakened the enlightened conscience of the mass of the people. Education alone will accomplish this. We need more light on the causes of wars and racial and national rivalries, on the necessities of the various nations in their international relations, on the problems confronting those who govern when they look beyond their own borders. History, geography, sociology, political economy, political science—all these branches of learning are involved—or rather contribute their part—in the study of

the means toward world unity. Biology, anthropology and geology are called upon for aid in getting at the heart of the barriers that have been and are being raised against world unity. None can cover the whole field. But most important of all is to begin with the study of concrete current questions that affect friendly understanding among the nations.

HERBERT ADAMS GIBBONS

Paris, France

NATIONALISM AND INTERNATIONALISM

I

NATIONALISM BEFORE 1789

NATIONALISM has a wide connotation. In the concrete, it may be taken to mean some particular ways of manifesting national spirit; in the abstract, all ways together. It has been defined as the sum of national aspirations. In this sense the ideas controlling the life and actions of a nation would be its nationalism. Nationalism is sometimes almost synonymous with patriotism: devotion to the nation is nationalism.

Consciousness of a solidarity of privileges and obligations with all others living under the same political unit should be the logical definition of nationalism. But such a definition assumes that "political unit" and "nation" are one and the same thing. In New World countries, whose history dates from 1789, the nation and political unit may be identical. In Europe and Asia, with their heritage of centuries of history constantly changing frontiers, what constitutes a nation is as difficult to determine in the twentieth century as it was in the eighteenth. That is why nationalism, as it is commonly understood, has often proved disruptive to the political unit.

The historian, therefore, and not the psychologist or the sociologist, is the specialist to be consulted first in the study of nationalism. Your psychologist would be likely to explain nationalism in terms of the mob. Ask the sociologist, and he will trace the evolution of society as it has banded itself together for mutual protection and prosperity, considering all stages as inspired by the same motives—to him nationalism is the term to use when the group becomes large. The historian thinks immediately of the many kinds of nationalism there are, of the different ways in which the adjective "national" can be used, and his method of telling about nationalism is to give an historical interpretation of conceptions of what constitutes a nation.

Originally, as is evident from the etymology, a nation meant an ethnic family. One was born into membership in a nation by being born of a certain racial stock. At one time all the inhabitants of a given region were of the same stock, spoke the same language, and had the same religious and cultural background. In the course of time they grew in numbers and were either scattered by their own migratory instinct or lust for conquest or through the invasion of their country by a race stronger than themselves. Both conquerors and conquered kept the ethnic conception of nationality.

Identifying race with nation, to which you belong by right of blood, has, of course, persisted to the present time; and in the course of these chapters we shall speak of irredentism, Zionism, Hellenism, and other twentieth

century ethnic manifestations of nationalism. But in modern times—and here is the important distinction between national and nation in the old sense and the new—in modern times, geographical limits rather than blood, or fully as much as blood, began to determine where one's social interests lay. A nation began to mean people living in a fixed territory, under one political sovereignty, allegiance to which they accepted. That is the nation of the present day, as international law and diplomatic usage understand it. Nation, national, nationality, nationalism, all refer, juridically, to people living within fixed boundaries, recognized as fixed by the nations they limit and the world at large. It makes no difference what racial stock they belong to. People living within these definite political frontiers are supposed to have some social reason for being together. From the fact of the place of their residence they are assumed to have accepted a common sovereignty, and to be living under that sovereignty loyally, sharing whatever privileges or obligations it implies.

There are still some places in the world—Morocco is an example—where you have on the map definite geographical limits, and yet you have no Moroccan nation. That is why French and Spanish have faced a peculiarly difficult problem in the extension of their political control. The Sultan rules over tribes, not over territories. There are two kinds of tribes: the Makhzen, who recognize the authority of the Sultan; and the Siba, who do not. Now the French found that they could not occupy a region, and call upon its inhabitants

to obey them, simply because the Sultan had signed a protectorate agreement. The Makhzen and the Siba were all mixed up; and in the occupied regions would be Siba who had never been under administrative control of any central government.

It is that way still in parts of Arabia. It was that way in the old Ottoman Empire, where the conception of the nation was both ethnic and religious for non-Mohammedans. There were no Ottomans, or Osmanli, in Turkey, although the Young Turks tried to have it so. There were Turks, Armenians, of three sects; Greeks, and others, who had a large degree of autonomy within their own *millets,* or nations. The people of the Ottoman Empire had not yet arrived at the idea of nationhood when the World War broke out.

When we are discussing national movements, here, there, and everywhere in the world, we have to distinguish between (1) national movements that began as ethnic aspirations of a group, whose bonds were racial, linguistic, and cultural; and (2) the devotion of people living in a certain definite territory to their common country, their willingness to live and die for it, and what they express in their life and their aspirations. The first is the old type of nationalism, still largely prevalent in Central and Eastern Europe and the Near East. The second is the new nationalism, shaped by economic and primary educational influences, which has found its most fruitful ground in the United States, its best expression in Great Britain, its most notable

achievement in France, and its strongest recent development in Germany and Italy.

When did nations, in the modern sense of the word, arise in Europe? Only when wholesale migrations of races ceased. That is easily seen. Present-day European nationalism, of whatever form, was impossible in ancient or medieval times.

The first great unifying force in Europe was the Roman Empire, which spread its political control, as Europe of the twentieth century has done, to North Africa and the Near East. The Roman Empire imposed its sovereignty upon all the peoples within reach of its armies. No effort was made, beyond the limits of the Italian peninsula, to amalgamate these peoples and organize them for common interests during the heyday of the Empire. Roman citizenship, beyond the home of the conquering race, was a legal title, conferred by law and not a birthright. One was not a Roman because he lived in a certain definite place. Paul of Tarsus said, "I am a Roman." He had citizenship, which gave him protection. He could state, "I appeal to Caesar," and insist upon being judged in Rome simply because his father, a Jew who had never been anywhere near Rome, had purchased Roman citizenship or had had it conferred upon him for services rendered to the empire.

In the beginning of the Middle Ages races from the East swarmed over Europe, one horde after another, Tartars, Goths, Visigoths, Huns, and Arabs. Scandinavians came down from the North. Angles and

Saxons moved into England. Normans and Franks came to France. Lombards crossed the Alps into North Italy.

The migratory races were nations (in the ethnic sense of the word) on the march. The older races among whom they came, whose sovereignty they destroyed, and with whom they amalgamated, did possess regional nationhood. But it was only within very narrow limits. The conception of a nation, in the modern sense, began only when the migration of races ceased, and Europe was no longer at the mercy of nomadic tribes. Then common racial characteristics and common languages spread over a large extent of territory, began to develop, and increasingly larger units became aware of common social and material interests.

The first step in nationalism was the growth of the feeling of belonging to the land, which took generations. When a man could say: "This is my own, my native land," and believe that if he were driven from it he could no more live than a fish could live out of water, the first step in building a nation had been taken. The native stock thus created developed common racial characteristics because of intermarriage and because of the language born of constant contact of dialects. It was the transition from nomadic to static. Nomads ceased wandering, settled definitely, and remained where they were. In the course of this long process earlier static populations were either exterminated or amalgamated.

The tribes that remained nomadic the longest were those who put their stamp definitely upon the races which form what we call today nations. Take the French and English, for instance. The Romano-Gallic stock furnished most of the blood, in all probability, and certainly the culture, of modern France. But the French take their name from the Franks who were the last of the nomadic peoples to come out of Germany. And one of the principal sectional peoples of France are the Burgundians, also one of the later nomadic tribes.

The same thing happened in England. The inhabitants of the British Isles found by the Romans were Celts for the most part. These Celts, similar to the Gauls in adaptability to Roman civilization, took their laws and religion and language (in part), from the Romans. Then came successive migrations of the nomadic peoples. The Angles and Saxons drove the Britons back into Wales and Scotland, and across the sea into Ireland. They settled on the land and gave their stamp and their name to the English race. Like the Franks, the Angles came out of the forests of Germany. A migratory stock, they were more numerous than the Franks, and they met with more resistance from the islanders. The result was the extermination or expulsion of the Britons from a large part of England, and the transplanting of a new race rather than the amalgamation of numerically inferior conquerors with the conquered. The later Normans brought only

a ruling class and a cultural influence on the language. Anglo-Saxon have the English remained.

As the result of the transition from nomadic to static, especially where the earlier settled races were not exterminated, the two basic factors in nationality existed immediately. Possession of the land by right of conquest passed from father to son. The ruling race retained the ethnic conception of the nation for a long time. We have an example in the United States of this purely ethnic claim, which is a sign of youth, in the recent Nordic propaganda, which seems to infer that good citizens are only those of a certain ethnic stock, who have an inherited right to the country. Opposed to the ethnic conception of the nation, is the geographical conception, in which the conquered had to take refuge. They were born on the land, and, being native born, they were automatically an integral part of the nation that was evolving.

So we have the two qualifications for belonging to a nation. *Jus patris* is blood birthright. *Jus soli* is birthright accruing from the place of birth.

International lawyers are interested in these two conceptions because of their bearing upon citizenship. Most states recognize both bases for membership in the nation, but some lay greater stress upon *droit de terre* than *droit de père*. France, for instance, claims every child born on French soil. For the child of foreign-born parents to escape French nationality, a definite act of renunciation on reaching majority is required. This privilege is accorded only the children of *foreign-*

born parents. A man may be himself a foreigner, having renounced his French citizenship, but if he is not foreign-born, no matter what his nationality, his offspring, if born on French soil, is irrevocably French. It is the same with other nations in which military service is obligatory.

The *droit de terre* has been tested over and over again in American courts. Chinese and Japanese are barred from becoming citizens of the United States. But their children, born under the American flag, are Americans. No matter what the racial origin, the child born in the United States is an American. Racial stock or the juridical position of parents do not transcend the "right of the soil."

The historian, on the other hand, sees in the double basis of nationality the source of confusion and of troubles which have provoked wars in the past and may do so again in the future. Because one can regard a nation either in the ethnic or the geographical sense, nationalism demands our most careful attention. It plays a large part in contemporary history. The peace settlement after the World War, which was supposed to take into account the exigencies of nationalism, may have been as reasonable a compromise as could have been expected. Some have contended with much earnestness that it was. For all that, as we shall see later, the same moot questions remained unsolved.

Tracing the evolution of Europe from feudalism to nationalism is not within the compass of these pages. We can pause only to recommend two brilliant books.

Although written a long time ago, they remain inspiring guides to the general reader. So clear and simple are these books that a school child can understand them. So graphic and vivid is their style that they hold one like a romance. We recommend first of all Hallam's "The Middle Ages." After that has been read, giving the general background, we urge you to continue with "The Origins of Contemporary France," by Taine. Taine's great work, incisive and inspiring, deals mostly with France. But the phenomenon of the breaking up of the feudal system and the birth of a large political unit, covering a clearly defined region, is the same in all European countries which could be called nations in embryo, in the strictly modern sense of the word.

In six chapters we can not trace the history of the development of nationalism. So vast a subject could not be crowded into one brief volume; nor would we want to do so. The lay mind can get the record of the centuries from any good general history or text-book. We must confine ourselves to a background outline, with brief illustrations, that will enable us to understand the nationalistic tendencies of our own day and help us to work constructively for the acceptance by all nations of the glorious idea of the brotherhood of man. I can be only an interpreter, only a suggestive critic. I can only hope to stimulate you to serious thinking, and inspire you to do reading on your own account in this fascinating field.

The French reconquered a little corner of Alsace in

1914, and held it throughout the whole period of the World War, as a sort of prop for French morale, while the fate of Alsace was still to be determined by the verdict of battles. The five years gave the French an opportunity to teach the children of Thann and Masevaux to regard France as their country. It was interesting to go to the schools and see how this was being done. Especially after the United States entered the war, I used to take distinguished visitors there in the course of the work to which I was assigned. I remember going to a school one day with an eminent Frenchman and an English officer. It happened that we went into a history class, taught by a French soldier in uniform. It did not take us long to see that he was a radical and anti-clerical. But he was for all that fulfilling the French purpose of sowing the seed for the return to France, when he said, "The idea of nationality was born in Europe with the French Revolution." My French friend could not contain himself. "Nonsense, nonsense!" he cried; "we had the idea of nationality long before that." He jumped up and started to tell the children how France was a nation in the days of Joan of Arc.

The soldier was correct, from his point of view. He was teaching what he had been taught in the lay schools of France; and many modern historians support the contention that there was no sense of nationality before the French Revolution. It is seriously argued, in fact, that in order to study nationalism it is a waste of time to go farther back than 1789. National

movements, it is asserted, arose during the memorable years that followed the storming of the Bastille, and that the gospel of nationalism was spread over Europe by Napoleon's armies. Once I told this story to an American historian. He declared that the soldier had been right. Nationalism, he said, followed the beginning of the transformation of Europe through industrialism and was made possible by revolutionary changes in popular education and means of communication.

We are of the opinion, however, that there was much reason for the protest of the Frenchman who did not want the schoolmaster to talk that way to Alsatian children. Too many people read and expound history with the idea of buttressing a doctrine of which they are the exponents. One can always find arguments to sustain his thesis. My honest old friend would stand for no misrepresentation of the glorious history of France in order to demonstrate, for a special reason, that Alsace-Lorraine, a province of dynastic France, was born into the conception of the nation at the same time as the other parts of the country. What if Rouget de Lisle did write the *Marseillaise* in Strasbourg? Things often exist long before they are consciously felt and defined. It may be true that before the French Revolution there was no conscious feeling, on the part of all the people, of nationalism in the sense that we understand it today and as it was defined at the beginning of this chapter. None the less it existed. None the less it was the motive force behind much in inter-

national relations that has commonly been put down to religious feeling and the will or whims of kings.

After the dissolution of the Roman Empire the Catholic Church was virtually the sole force for unity that Europe possessed. This continued to be true throughout the Dark Ages. What was called the civilized world, before 400 A. D., had been for a period of from four to six centuries under the influence and domination of the Roman Empire. What existed after that as a world organization with an international influence? Only the Roman Church; and it continued to be so for over one thousand years. In the course of those centuries, the Church played an active part in all the conflicts between growing and changing European political organisms. Its missionaries were the pioneers in bringing light and culture and contact with the outside world to all parts of Central, Northern, and Western Europe. These same missionaries were the first to go out to other continents, and they were largely the inspirers of what was accomplished by lay explorers.

The existence of the schismatic Greek Church kept Eastern Europe outside the influence of the cultural and political forces that created modern European society. You can draw a line today from the Baltic Sea to the Adriatic, showing the limits of the Catholic Church's influence and sway. Until the agents of Napoleon crossed that line, Eastern Europe did not gain a knowledge of and come into contact with the conception of the state that had been forming for centuries through the political experience of the rest of

Europe. All the colonists who went to America for three centuries after Columbus came from west of the line, and were applying the Occidental European theories of the state in building up American political institutions.

It was in Roman Catholic Europe that nationalism was born. One of the principal factors that gave birth to nationalism and fostered it was the revolt against the Church's assumption of universal authority. Is it a paradox to say that the Roman Church after bringing and keeping Europe together, by continuing the same policy ended in dividing Europe? I think not, if we realize that the unifying agency, beneficial at one period, could not possibly be tolerated, once feudalism was dead.

We can not read Von Ranke's "History of the Papacy," an illuminating as well as scholarly work, without realizing the contribution of the Papacy to nationalism, long before 1789.

The Reformation put into the hands of secular states the responsibility for the maintenance of the existing social order and for the cultural life of the country which had been for a thousand years the work of the Church. The attempts of the Church to reassert its authority completely changed in one hundred and fifty years the attitude of peoples toward peoples, of peoples toward rulers, of ruling classes toward rulers, and, within another century, of even Catholic rulers toward the Pope.

Now I do not mean Reformation in the sense that

many Protestants speak of it—as a religious movement, reviving and purifying the Christian faith. On its religious side the significance of the Reformation and its importance have been much exaggerated. It was not Luther's preaching that found him his powerful friends. The Hussite movement must not be interpreted as a sudden universal conversion of the Bohemians to "communion in two kinds," but as the finding of a leader and an occasion to challenge a foreign oppressor. The followers of Zwingli were more inspired by nationalist than by religious considerations. The great mind of the Reformation, Calvin, was a political genius. His theories for the government of the church that was to replace Rome are the foundation of the modern state, as we have it today. Calvin was the precursor of nationalism.

The reformers of the fifteenth century, in their heresies, were nothing new. What they taught many before them had taught. But they came on the scene at a moment when rulers and statesmen were ready, for a variety of motives, to challenge the supreme authority of the Pope, and to try to destroy the influence of the Vatican in international affairs. When Henry VIII seceded from the Catholic Church, and made England Protestant, the question of his divorce was only an occasion for the assertion of the power of the sovereign, as opposed to the authority of the Pope. If that pretext had not existed, some other would have been found. The national in place of the international church, in an

island kingdom, gave England a lead on other countries in the development of nationalism.

France did not leave the Roman Church; although the mother of Calvin, France did not become Protestant; but no country has struggled more continuously and energetically against papal prerogatives than France, and because of the struggle, nationalism gained tremendously. We see, then, that the nationalism gradually coming out of the Reformation was not a matter of being converted to Protestantism. Opposition to the power that the Papacy had acquired in a thousand years, and to the way that power was used, was not a matter of religious conviction.

Resistance to the Church was inevitable when European states began to get the sense of nationality. It could not have been otherwise: for the Church's conception of allegiance was international rather than national.

Defiance of the Church's assumption of authority transcending that of the secular government was the first of three factors operating in European countries to develop them into nations in the modern sense. The second factor was the destruction of the feudal conception of allegiance. The third factor was resistance to the dynastic conception of allegiance.

The Catholic conception of papal authority, the revolt against which brought into existence the modern state, clothes the Vicar of God with temporal as well as spiritual authority, transcending any other authority set up anywhere in the world under any conditions.

The Pope can issue an order to the ruler of a country. Should the ruler refuse to obey it, not only can his kingdom be laid under interdict, but a papal decree can release the subjects of the offending sovereign from their oath of allegiance. Under ordinary circumstances, one could not conceive of the Pope using this power. It should be reserved—and for centuries was reserved—for punishment of moral obliquity or delinquency. But as political organisms grew, the Popes, as temporal sovereigns, in order to improve their political positions in Italy, sometimes yielded to the temptation of making alliances with a certain ruler against another. Then the abuse of the Pope's power became intolerable.

After the Reformation, when some rulers became heretics, the Pope would not only proclaim his subjects freed from their oath of allegiance, but would instigate the invasion of the offending country by armies of another. It was like the proclamation of a crusade or a holy war. For instance, Spain's Armada sailed against England with the Pope's blessing. Rome helped the Guises get Spanish support in France against Protestant Henry of Navarre.

These were the things that brought about the revolt against papal authority, and that led to a modification of the relations between the Vatican and sovereigns who were able to assert successfully exclusive authority in their own countries over their own subjects.

Resistance to the Roman Church, we see, aided the growth of nationalism, which in turn has raised barriers to separate the peoples of Europe one from the

others. It was certainly not the intention of the Church that this should be the result of the operation of a theory which originally tended to democratize mankind. The Church has always maintained that its inheritance from Imperial Rome was a call to universal brotherhood. The Papacy, we are told, was trying to interpret and carry on to future generations throughout the world the conception of a democratic and universal state. Internationalism, not the extreme nationalism of today which is an enemy to the idea of the brotherhood of man, was what the Roman Church wanted to establish.

Since the disasters of the period from Luther's theses to the French Revolution, the Roman Catholic Church has abandoned the effort to preserve the ideal of universal brotherhood through insistance upon the transcendent temporal authority of the Papacy. But the Church has not ceased to preach the subordination of national hatreds and rivalries, even in time of war, to the common good of humanity. The Pope stood for peace during the World War, and for moderation afterward. The tremendous power of the greatest international organization in the world is being exercised for the triumph of the international ideal.

The second factor, the destruction of the feudal conception of allegiance, was the way out of the Middle Ages. As long as the call for allegiance to a feudal lord was stronger than the call for allegiance to the monarch of the nation, the international anarchy, which had

been reigning in Europe ever since the dissolution of the Roman Empire, could not but be perpetuated. The abolition of feudalism was a *sine quâ non* to the beginning of nationalism.

The third factor, resistance to the dynastic conception of allegiance, gave nationalism its first oppressed minorities, and in a number of cases started unrest among border peoples which has lasted to this day. Of course, the idea of political organism prevalent in Europe for centuries, i.e., that people owed allegiance to a dynasty, even if they were not naturally a part of the same general region, was gradually abandoned. It could not withstand either nationalist or economic forces, the latter growing more potent with each successive decade of the industrial era.

But it has been succeeded by the factor of refusal to be reconciled to accidental allegiance. The division of Poland, not only at the time of the three partitions, but more strongly since, led to internal European troubles and manifestations of nationalism, until recently futile, that threatened to precipitate great wars. Belgium, before she became a nation, was an example of dynastic, and then accidental, allegiance. Alsace-Lorraine, from the time of Louis XIV, furnished another example. The outstanding illustration of resistance to dynastic allegiance is, of course, the Netherlands. If you have never done so, please do read Motley's "Rise of The Dutch Republic," and Dumas Fils' "The Black Tulip." One may wonder why I group books so different. After you

have read them together, you will understand that there was nationalism in Europe before the French Revolution.

Now we are going to use France as an illustration of the period before 1789, because during those centuries the French were the dominant people of Europe, in culture, numbers, and power. France has a unique geographical position, with access to the sea on the West to the Atlantic and on the South to the Mediterranean. With Flanders on the North, and the states of the Holy Roman Empire, Switzerland and Piedmont on the East, France could not escape being always involved in the internal territorial problems of Europe. Americans have fallen into the habit of berating France for her militarism and her many past wars and her present large army. We think of what a wonderful people we are with a hundred years of unbroken peace along two thousand miles of Canadian frontier. We forget that we are ten times as numerous as the friendly people of the same blood and background across that border. We forget, too, the centuries of troubled history along the borders of France.

The unique position of France and the fact that she illustrates all three of the factors mentioned above that helped to develop nationalism, makes her the country *par excellence* to study for the period before 1789.

It was geography that confronted France with far more difficult problems than those of the only other countries of Europe that developed a sense of nationality before the Revolution. The countries were:

England, Spain, Portugal, Holland, and Scandinavian states.

England was an island. Because she was cut off from direct territorial contact with the continent of Europe, she was able to develop into a nation without interference. All she needed was sea power. That the mastery of the sea was, and would remain, in her hands, she demonstrated from the time of the Armada. For sea power her geographical position was ideal, with ports on every side, looking to the four points of the compass, not having to pass through the territories of other states or waters controlled by them.

Spain also had free access to the outside world, and a Mediterranean as well as an Atlantic coast. The Pyrenees separated her from the rest of Europe. By land, France was the only European country that could attack her until Portugal became the ally of England. No other European states were potential enemies, except those of her own choice and making. Spain was able, therefore, to attain national unity early, and to spread out her activities over the world, as England did. Portugal was in the same advantageous position.

Holland, as we have seen, was the victim of accidental allegiance before she asserted her independence of the Holy Roman Empire and Spain. Then she became a little country in the lowlands of the Rhine delta, protected by dykes from the North Sea. France and the German states and the Hapsburgs (accidental allegiance again) had common frontiers with her on land. Like England, Spain, and Portugal,—and to a

certain extent France—, Holland's free access to the Atlantic enabled her to share in the exploitation of the extra-European world. She developed a mercantile marine and rich colonies, and, like the other Atlantic coast states, she clashed with England on sea, and lost most of her colonies to England.

The Scandinavian countries were geographically separated from the European convulsions of the fifteenth to the eighteenth centuries. Their contact with Europe was by their own initiative, Norwegians and Danes seeking the South in the Middle Ages, and Sweden challenging Russia in going as far afield as Turkey at the beginning of the eighteenth century, after having lost her hold on the Prussian coast of the Baltic. Norway and Sweden had an excellent opportunity to develop a sense of nationality. Denmark, on a peninsula, entered into the European maelstrom only through her southern border provinces. But the question of Schleswig and Holstein affected the Germanic states more than it did her. Even as late as the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 the re-allotment of these two provinces to Denmark was not of as much importance to the satisfaction of her national feeling as it was to the desire of the enemies of Germany to weaken her Baltic position.

France had all the problems of the other Occidental countries we have named—the countries that had free access to the Atlantic Ocean—and also the problem of developing her national life in the midst of the religious and dynastic wars of Central Europe. France emerged

from the feudal period with greater handicaps in her progress toward unified national life than those which England and the other Atlantic coast states were facing.

The unification of England, of course, was not accomplished quickly. Her kings of Essex, Wessex, and Sussex had fought one another lustily in the earlier Saxon period. Then came the Danish invasion—and the Norman conquest. With England unified, there remained Wales, Scotland, and Ireland to deal with. Wales succumbed early to force of numbers. But the Welsh preserved their language. The Irish problem was not solved until contemporary times. The English of the north fought for centuries along the Scottish border, before the United Kingdom was formed. But the great bulk of the inhabitants of the British Isles lived in England, and they did develop their national life, from the beginning of the modern period, without interference from continental Europe.

France at the close of the feudal period was a country all cut up and divided. The larger feudal lords had increased their dominions by destroying their vassals, but they in turn were vassals of other monarchs than the King of France. Aquitania belonged to England, and Burgundy to Austria, through marriage. Parts of southern France belonged to Spain. Brittany was a buffer state between France and England, able to maintain a virtual independence. The English kings laid claim to Normandy, almost up to the Ile-de-France. After the feudal lords came the foreign dynasties. The people of France, vaguely feeling solidarity of interests

through cultural and economic development, began to undergo the influence of geography, once the feudal system weakened. Cities first, and then the countryside, looked toward the monarchy, the only central authority in France, as a means, first of getting rid of the oppression of the feudal lords, and then against the rule of foreigners, who put up arbitrarily artificial barriers, separating them from those with whom they would naturally have a feeling of kinship and community of commercial interests.

Many of you go to France. Some of you go every year. You all stay too much in Paris. Rent a car and get out into the country. Besides your automobile map, take with you a large map of France, as it was at the beginning of the fourteenth century, and an historical atlas of Europe, showing the changes up to the French Revolution. You will be astonished and fascinated if only you go over the country in the evening at your hotel by map through successive centuries that you have covered during the day. Better than any lectures or books will this experience enable you to grasp the problems of France during the periods of religious and dynastic wars. Nothing I could say would give you so clear and convincing an idea of the existence of nationalism in France and its development from Joan of Arc to Charlotte Corday.

We can trace the beginning of French nationalism back to the Hundred Years War, which ended with the lifting of the siege of Orleans, the coronation of Charles VII of France, and the martyrdom of Joan of

Arc at Rouen. The expulsion—or withdrawal—of the English from the continent, and their abandonment of Normandy, helped the progress of the national idea in England as well as in France. England had been wavering between the national and dynastic conception of the state for a hundred years. Although great battles had been won on the continent, Crécy, Poitiers and Agincourt, the English were always asserting their authority over an unreconciled people. When Joan of Arc rallied the French to an epic effort, she rendered the English a tremendous service. Free of continental ambitions, they were ready to start during the next century on their career as a colonial and world power.

Can we not see Joan of Arc leaving Domrémy, inspired by her mission, travelling far from her own home—travel at that time was not a trivial thing, with roads even lacking—going all the way to Orleans, overcoming the prejudices of sex, raising the siege of Orleans, returning to Rheims for the crowning of Charles VII, then making herself the embodiment of the spirit of a country that was only just being born, and sealing with her life in the market place of Rouen the miraculous feat? It is no wonder that the French hold this slip of a girl in undying reverence. Her canonization after centuries indicates the conviction that she was inspired of God in her work of bringing together the people of France and giving them the ideal of nationhood. She pointed out the only way that France could become a united nation, through attachment to one sovereign.

The next step in the development of French nationalism was the test of the monarchy as a unifying force that came through the internal religious wars. It would take more space than we have at our disposal to explain the ins and outs of the period of confusion that began with the later Valois kings and did not end until Richelieu entered La Rochelle. Many noble families embraced Protestantism, which made great headway also with the well-to-do merchant and artisan classes of the cities. These classes had been the least disposed to look with favor upon the strengthening of the central monarchy. The grievance of anti-nationalism, of disloyalty to the king, is one of the principal points made by pamphleteers in the employ of the Guises during the decade before the accession of Henry IV. Treason, not heresy, was given as the justification for St. Bartholomew, which was defended as an execution of rebels. But when a Protestant became king in 1589, his Catholic opponents introduced a Spanish army into the country. The Battle of Ivry was a test of the growing nationalism. Catholics, who deplored Henry IV's Protestantism, rallied loyally around their sovereign against his Catholic opponents, who had invoked the aid of outsiders in order to advance their own personal interests. Henry IV had the support of all who saw the menace to France in having foreign armies fighting in a French civil war.

In 1908, when I was a youngster and had just been married, my bride and I were working in the Bodleian Library on the development of Gallicanism in France

in the seventeenth century. At Oxford we unearthed a series of pamphlets of the period of Henry IV's struggle for the throne of France. It was clear that the Guises were ignoring the instinct of nationality that was growing among the people. At the end of the sixteenth century the French were already saying to themselves: "The country belongs to us and not to the foreigners," and "The salvation of the king is the salvation of the people." Nationalism, incipient perhaps but none the less nationalism, made it possible for Henry to found the Bourbon dynasty. He became Catholic later, because, as he put it, Paris was worth a mass. His desire was to unify the nation, and do away with the civil strife.

The Edict of Nantes was proof that political appeasement was able to lessen the fire of religious hatred, just as the acceptance of Henry IV demonstrated the dominance of the national instinct over religious divisions.

After the assassination of Henry IV in 1610, came Louis XIII and Louis XIV, whose reigns covered the incredible period of more than a century. If Louis XIV was called properly Le Grand Monarque, when he was the most powerful sovereign in Europe, it was due to the work that was done by Henry IV, and by Cardinals Mazarin and Richelieu. It only needed internal peace and a strong central monarchy to give the people living between the Alps and the Atlantic Ocean and Flanders and the Pyrenees and Mediterranean the premier position in Europe. When Louis XIV reached his majority,

with a united country behind him, he could flatly refuse to the Pope even the privilege of controlling the Church in France, and he could go out triumphantly to impose the will of France upon all her neighbors. He could even tell an English king what to do.

But in the expansion of France eastward, Louis XIV entered Germanic Europe, exhausted by the Thirty Years War. His extension of France's frontiers into German-speaking countries at that time could only be permanent if France remained the greatest power in Europe.

France's overseas expansion was continued under Louis XV. The colonial empire in America disappeared on the Heights of Abraham at Quebec in Wolfe's victory over Montcalm, when both those generals died. The treaty concluded several years later, in 1763, was as much of a turning point to France, a blessing in disguise in the evolution of her nationalism, as the miracles performed by Joan of Arc were to England's nationalism. After having been driven out of France, the English turned their minds to the outside world and thus developed their great empire. After having been driven out of the New World, the French turned to the laying of solid bases under their national life. Comparatively speaking, they were the educated people of Europe. Frederick the Great of Prussia bore eloquent testimony to this fact. The French language was more than the language of diplomacy and international intercourse: it was the language of the philosophers (witness Leibnitz) and of the greatest thinkers

of the eighteenth century along the lines of government and social institutions.

It may be true that the vast majority of the French people were illiterate and ignorant of anything outside their immediate contacts. So it was at that time with all other peoples. The fact remains that France had an intelligentsia more numerous, more active, more imbued with genius, more able to pass frontiers and impress itself upon the world, than that of any other country. Voltaire and Rousseau belong to the world. Diderot's *"Encyclopédie"* was the *vade mecum* of educated men the world over. Montesquieu's wit and incisive criticism influenced the thinking of all who wrote in every country. Above all eighteenth century factors in the evolution of nationalism stood forth his monumental *"Esprit des Lois."* As effective nationalism could only be accomplished by giving the people a voice in government, an essay on the practical separation of governmental powers was essential. This Montesquieu furnished. Thereby he became, in a very real sense, the father of the American Constitution and of the Bill of the Rights of Man, which expressed the constructive purpose of the French Revolution.

Of course, radical writers and thinkers believe that only when insistance upon political rights for the common people triumphed, that is to say, in 1789, did nationalism begin. Impatience of the embryonic is typical of all radicals. They want their goal to be realized without following the path. They conceive of their theories as capable of birth, full grown and

ready to work, just as Minerva, clad in armor, came out of the brain of Jupiter. But others, interested in processes and viewing everything in this life as a long and patient growth, will have borne gladly with me, I hope, through this brief tracing of nationalism before that portentous day when the Bastille was stormed.

II

NATIONALISM VERSUS INTERNATIONALISM FROM 1789 to 1815

BEFORE we take up the period of cataclysm, profound in its immediate effects and more profound in its influence on the nineteenth century, we shall recapitulate what has been said on nationalism before 1789.

Some historians do not believe in the existence of nationalism before the French Revolution. But it is possible to work out interestingly and profitably the evolution of nationalism from the Middle Ages to the end of the eighteenth century. We have endeavored to show that the early idea of the word nation was simply the ethnic group. One was born into a nation, membership in which was exclusively a blood right. But as time went on, and Europe came to the end of the migratory period, nomadic civilization changed to static. Definite geographical limits were determined by rulers, and were either embodied in treaties or were tacitly accepted by peoples. Added to the blood right, therefore, membership in a nation was obtained by being born within those limits. The geographical basis of nationality was superimposed upon the ethnic basis. The national idea was for this reason more quickly developed in countries that had access to the sea than

in those of the interior of Europe that were fought over back and forth by various races.

The evolution of nations was opposed by the Church with its concepts of universal authority and universal allegiance; and by the feudal idea, followed by the dynastic idea, that made allegiance a matter, first of all, of loyalty to a local lord, and, later, to a dynasty that might not be within the geographical limits of a nation to which the particular region in question would, for geographical and economic reasons, have a natural allegiance. We illustrated these phenomena by tracing the development of France. In the generation previous to 1789, France, thrown out of America, intensified her internal political development. The national idea began to loom more importantly upon the horizon with the insistence upon the rights of the people.

It was natural that democratic principles should first be declared and insisted upon by peoples who had long enjoyed national unity. These peoples were not threatened in their security by outside nations. Their institutions had developed for a long time under one sovereignty. Privileges far greater than those of subjects of less fortunate countries were enjoyed throughout the world. The long expanse of the ocean, beyond which were new lands to find and conquer and colonize, widened their horizon. It is natural, I repeat, that the English and French, being dominant peoples, should have had time and thought for their internal political development. The insular position of England, and the satisfactory end of the long wars with

Scotland and Ireland, enabled the English to develop representative forms of government before any continental people had them.

The nations of Anglo-Saxon origin have a curious self-satisfaction in the notion that they know how to do things much better than other nations, and that they have an inherent genius for self-government. Rudyard Kipling has been the great apostle in this generation of the complacency of that type of Englishman, who says: "Well, we have long understood the art of self-government, of which we have been the first and leading exponents; we are the first apostles of nationalism; we have successfully insisted upon our freedom from dynastic ties with the continent; and we have never allowed other nations to intervene in our internal affairs. Queen Mary, married to Philip of Spain, did not let her consort to have any rights over England. Queen Elizabeth destroyed the Spanish Armada. We won the mastery of the seas. Thank God, we are not as other people are." The Americans, in their later national life, came to have the same feeling of self-satisfaction over their achievements.

But when a person or nation possesses something, or has accomplished something, better than another person or nation, is it necessarily due to inherent superior ability or genius? Much of what an individual is, is due to health and superior environment and opportunity: much of what a nation is, is due to fortunate geographical location. English and Germans are of the same stock, and had the same original back-

ground of blood and culture. Germans did not develop a common nation and institutions of self-government until the nineteenth century. Why? Because of inherent inferiority to their English cousins? No, but because of their geographical position in the center of Europe, fought over and invaded from the East, the West, and the South, with no borders fixed by nature, and confronted with all sorts of monarchical and dynastic troubles in their evolution. The case is the same with the Italian people: they arrived late at national unity. The earlier nationalism of the English, and their expansion throughout the world, are largely explained by their geographical position. The same is true of the other Atlantic coast states of Europe.

England and Scotland were united under James I. The Cromwellian period helped greatly to advance self-government. The Revolution of 1689, which brought William of Orange and his wife Mary, sister of James II, to the throne, made Great Britain a nation in the modern sense of the word. But this event did not profoundly affect the peoples of Europe. The successful rebellion against England in America antedated the French Revolution by more than a decade. But our history from 1776 to 1789 indicated the difficulty of establishing a common federal government for the thirteen small colonies of the same language and, generally speaking, common cultural and political background. It was not a case of the national consciousness of America, opposed to the British national consciousness, which led us to say, "We are free and independent

and by right ought to be," but a compromise evolved in the Continental Congresses of 1774 and 1776. There was a great deal of significance in that expression of Benjamin Franklin's, "If we don't hang together, we shall hang separately."

Only a superficial reading of history would give anyone reason to believe that the American Revolution was the precursor of nationalism in Europe, and that the Declaration of Independence inspired the Declaration of the Rights of Man. Thomas Jefferson never made any such claim. In common with other founders of the American Republic, he got his inspiration from France. And the French Revolution was due to causes that had been at work since before the discovery of America. If you go back into English or French history, or into the history of any European country, to trace the growth of nationalism, you will realize that the traditions of a European race are the heritage of centuries. They have not only to do with the blood, the common blood, of the people, and with the language and culture that had been regionally developed: they have also to do with the country itself, the land, the union of dutchies and principalities, and, back of that, of *petits pays*. Europeans have made a definite locality their *pays,* and attachment to the soil has been born and handed down through centuries.

The emigrants from European countries, who were the forefathers of the Americans of the present day, were those least affected by this feeling. Their nationalism, if it existed at all, was tenuous. That was

demonstrated by their breaking the ties with the past. How could we expect the United States to have developed in a couple of centuries, or less, a strong nationalism? In the ethnic sense, we are a combination of peoples of all Europe. The old native stock of the country has left us nothing but a few geographical names, no traditions or culture. We were migratory when we came; we have been nomadic ever since. The stock transplanted into New England, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, did not take long to start westward, sons to Ohio, grandsons to Indiana and Illinois, and the next generation to the far west, ending up, if they had acquired a competence, in Los Angeles.

We have taken France and 1789 as the starting point of nationalism, and not the United States and 1776. Americans really have nothing to do with nationalism at all. We may be the best exponents of modern nationalism in our present potential status. But when we say that, we are thinking of the ideal, and at the same time the most practicable, manifestation of what nationalism might mean to a nation, not what actually is. Nationalism is a European phenomenon, the logical growth and development of European civilization, and we shall try to show how it has spread from Europe to other continents.

Under three Louis of the Bourbon dynasty France enjoyed a long period of hegemony in Europe and success in colonial expansion. While the great majority of her people continued to be tillers of the soil, and drew all their sustenance from home, commerce and

industry gradually created a prosperous and numerous middle class. The bourgeois of port towns and of the larger centers of population along trade routes in the interior had in their hands before the middle of the eighteenth century a considerable portion of the liquid wealth of the country. This class became educated, and lawyers, notaries, physicians, bankers, and middlemen belonging to it came into close contact with the peasants. They suffered from the confused and archaic form of local government still persisting from feudal times. The government annoyed them in their business. They paid much too great a share of the taxes. The rich landed nobility always managed to get out of most of these taxes. The clergy were not only exempt, but exacted a tithe which everybody had to pay, whether he wanted to support the Church or not. Most important of all, the nobility denied to this new middle class not only economic but social equality.

Under Louis XVI commerce and industry increased, and the peasants worked as hard as they always had. But France's prestige in Europe and abroad decreased. Canada was lost to England in 1763, and, twenty years later, a new treaty was signed with England, after France's successful intervention in the American Revolution, which seemed to give France no advantages. The English, not the French, were leading in the exploitation of India. In foreign commerce Hollanders and Spaniards had advantages denied to citizens of the most powerful nation in Europe. This showed incredibly bad management. In former days the nobil-

ity had won the right of social privileges and exemption from heavy taxation because of services rendered the state. In former days the king lived in splendor out of revenues most of which came to him through a successful foreign policy, which was the result of the skill and work of the monarch and his ministers. But in the decades preceding the Revolution, the king and the nobility, equally with the clergy, had become parasites. The financial policy of the government, the extravagances of the Court, the arrogance of the nobility, had become intolerable to bourgeois and peasants alike. France was the most advanced country in Europe. Although primary education was not widely available, half the men and a quarter of the women in the country could write. Probably most of those who knew how to sign their names could read a little. The middle class of France, powerful everywhere, formed the largest literate body in the world.

On May 5, 1789, Louis XVI opened at Versailles the first session of the States General that had been held since 1614. The reason for convoking it had been to reconcile the people to increased taxes. The king's advisors had been aware, of course, of the unrest in the country, and the fact alone of the convocation of the almost forgotten feudal assembly indicated their knowledge of the necessity of appeasing the people. In fact, in the call for the election of the States General, the government had asked the people to send in their grievances and their suggestions for reforms. The response to this request, in documents known as the

cahiers, was overwhelming. Such an indictment of a régime by the people who lived under it had never before been known in history. Go to your public library, and ask for a collection of these *cahiers,* of which there are several English translations. They make fascinating reading. If you supplement the study of some of these with the perusal of Arthur Young's diary of his journey through France on the eve of the Revolution, you will have gone to original sources without much effort, and you will have gained an insight into the causes and conduct of the French Revolution that no history book could give you.

It was suicidal folly for the King of France to face twelve hundred elected representatives of his people, half of whom belonged to the Third Estate (those not nobles or clergy), and make no promises of reforms. Then to have Necker, the finance minister, follow him with a three hour speech on finances, the upshot of which was that the States General should express assent to increased taxation! The Third Estate, which represented nineteen-twentieths of France, convinced of the bad faith or ignorance of Louis XVI and his ministers, after six weeks of waiting declared itself to be a national assembly, and in the old tennis court that still stands its members took an oath not to disband until constitutional government had been won for France. Two and a half years of royal errors followed. After the destruction of the Bastille, Louis went to Paris, and signed the decrees that abolished the last traces of feudalism, game laws, tithes, and other things

complained of in the *cahiers,* including the old local administrative divisions which had so long hindered national unity. A mob from Paris compelled the royal family to return to the city, and wrung further reforms, such as the abolition of hereditary titles and the sale of Church property. Many nobles fled from the country. Louis XVI tried to follow them, but was captured and brought back to Paris.

These dramatic events led to an effort on the part of the Kings of Austria and Prussia, the former of whom was the brother of Marie-Antoinette, to declare that they would like to form a coalition to rescue the king and maintain the existing social order. England was not ready to coöperate. But all the neighbors of France encouraged the nobles who had left the country to return and lead a counter-revolution. Austria at that time was a neighbor of France through her control of Belgium. Her bitter hostility, and her instigation of counter-revolutionary movements, led the Convention, now the supreme authority in France, to declare war. Prussia joined Austria. The two powers promptly invaded France with the idea of capturing Paris and releasing the royal family. Many of the French nobility accompanied them.

Thus began the gigantic struggle that was to last until 1815, and give birth to nationalism throughout Europe. The French retaliated by executing their royal prisoners, and sending to the guillotine most of the nobles who had not fled. Revolutionary tribunals were set up all over France, and excesses more fright-

ful than those of the reign of terror in Paris were committed in Nantes and Lyons.

England, Spain, Holland, the smaller states of Germany, and Italy, frightened lest the revolutionary movement would spread to their countries, joined Austria and Prussia. It was Europe against France. But France was ready for the test, and demonstrated at Jemmapes first of all, and then on numerous fields of battle during the years to follow, that she was a nation —*la patrie* in a sense that had never been revealed before. In two years 750,000 volunteers had enrolled in the Republican armies under the tricolor. Considerably more than half of these soldiers came from provinces of France that were far from the menace of invasion. These soldiers did not fight for a feudal lord or a king; they did not fight for a religion; they did not fight for loot or pay during those first glorious years; they did not fight for their own little bit of soil; they fought for the defense of France as a whole and for the spread of the principles of the Revolution to other oppressed peoples.

The devotees of nationalism have something in common with newly-weds. They are not satisfied with being in a certain state themselves. Neophytes, they become propagandists; and proclaim the gospel of their happiness to all the world, and are disturbed if they do not see everybody following their example.

The new nationalism and the new gospel had to have a prophet, however. The seed had long been sown in the minds of the French by history, tradition,

and material evolution. It had been watered by the writings of brilliant men, especially Montesquieu and Rousseau. But Robespierre, more than any other one man, made the political protest a social revolution, and persuaded the people that the ideals of revolutionary France should be proclaimed throughout the world.

In the Versailles Assembly of 1789, Mirabeau was called the Torch of Provence, and Robespierre the Candle of Arras. A torch gives out a big light, sputtering noisily, for a short while. The flame of the candle is unostentatious, and cold. But it does not waver and it lasts as long as there is tallow to feed it. Mirabeau expressed the difference between Robespierre and himself, and explained the hold Robespierre was going to have upon Revolutionary France, when he said, "That man will go far—he believes everything he says."

For three years Robespierre did his great work among the people, insisting upon the necessity of a Revolution that would break with the past, and would establish the ideal state. But there had to be a clean sweep with the past, and a merciless extermination of all who stood for the old order, before France could lead the world to a future full of justice and good fortune for all. He expounded Rousseau's "Emile" in simple and lucid language. For three years he did not cease talking to the Jacobin Club about a France that demanded the devotion of all because it was founded upon the three cornerstones of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity. His formula for the Jacobins was: "Think

only of the good of the country and the interests of humanity."

The first stage of the new nationalism ended with the disappearance in the reign of terror of the great figures of the Revolution. After guillotining their King, they sent one another to the guillotine. When Robespierre's head fell, in July, 1794, the new France was without a commanding leader. But the enthusiasm he had inspired kept the movement going. Militant nationalism, triumphant over the invaders, annexed Belgium and Nice, and declared that the natural frontiers of France were the Alps and the Rhine. The armies were in good hands. But Paris floundered for a while. The new master gave the first glimpse of himself in 1795, when, at the age of twenty-five, as a young artillery officer, he was entrusted with the task of putting down an incipient insurrection.

During the First Directory the war with most of Europe continued. Only Prussia, Spain and Holland made peace with France. As general commanding the armies in Italy, Napoleon Bonaparte compelled Austria to sue for peace, and erected the Cisalpine Republic, the herald of United Italy. The new star sailed for Egypt in 1798. Upon his return, it was easy for him to become the commanding figure as First Consul, and then crown himself Emperor of the French in 1804.

It was only five years from the beginning of the French Revolution in the revolt of the Third Estate from the Versailles Assembly and the oath they took on the tennis court to the death of Robespierre; three

years from the death of Robespierre until General Bonaparte signed the treaty of Campo Formio with Austria; and seven years from this first successful campaign until Bonaparte became emperor of the French as Napoleon I. Let us pause a moment to consider the significance in the development of nationalism of those fifteen years.

The grievances put into the *cahiers* which the delegates of the three estates took to Versailles had grown up through centuries. They summed up the reasons why France wanted a change in régime and demanded representative government. The grievances were those of the centuries. The tangible expression of them was possible only when a large body of people in an autocratic state became intelligent and well-informed. The Revolution in its incipiency was marked by no violence and no bloodshed. Public opinion demanded constitutional guarantees for the liberty and security of the individual and for the equality, fiscal and judicial, of all Frenchmen. There was no sudden rebellion or uprising in Paris or elsewhere. The men who went to Versailles were willing to negotiate with Louis XVI for a constitution. They asked of their sovereign only what the English Constitution had given the people of Great Britain a hundred years before. At the beginning there was no attempt to assassinate Louis XVI or even to put him in prison. The voice of nationalism spoke to him. He did not understand it. He became frightened. He ran away. Foreigners invaded France to rescue him. The nobles came back

to their country with the foreigners. And there was a counter-revolution in the Vendée. It was then that Louis lost his life, and the guillotine began to work.

The conscious expression of national feeling, translated into the spontaneous action of Frenchmen hurrying to join Dumouriez and Hoche, was possible in 1792 where it would not have been in 1789. The people of France, during those three years, had gained precious rights, which the foreigners, egged on by the Royalists, were going to nip in the bud. Men were not anxious to join armies of their own free will and get themselves killed for the beautiful eyes of a king *(pour les yeux beaux d'un roi)* in a quarrel that they had had no part in making. In 1792 they said to themselves, "We have liberties now, which we shall defend; we have privileges now, that they want to take away from us; we have opportunities now, that the restoration of the old régime will cause to disappear." Mixed up with the idea of *la patrie* was the idea of *le patrimoine. Patria et patrimonium.* The two things go together, or nationalism is the unstable dream of fools. Even the prodigal son, going out from his father's house, had the sense to ask for that portion of the goods that belonged to him.

There is no use being born into a nation by right of family or being born into it by right of soil, if you are not born into something worthwhile and that is going to do you some good. Only when you have the idea that your citizenship is a benefit to you personally and to those you love, have you a genuine and

lasting conception of nationalism. The soldier defends his soil, his home, his loved ones, and, above all, the privileges that are his from belonging to *la patrie.* Why did the Roman proudly boast, *Civis romanus sum?* Kaiser Wilhelm II did not tell his German subjects that they could have pride in saying, *Ich bin ein deutscher Burgher,* until he had dilated upon the privileges of that status.

The Revolution of 1789 was an example set to the rest of continental Europe by nearly one-fourth of her population. The French demanded representative government, not accidentally or carried on the wave of some enthusiasm or impulsive mob psychology, but because there had gradually grown up the knowledge as to what a state in the management of whose affairs they had a voice would mean to them. And then there was the feeling, so eloquently expressed when the Third Estate changed itself into the National Assembly, that they had the power to insist upon their rights.

The Declaration of the Rights of Man was a document, however, not limited to rights for Frenchmen. Let us recall the formula of Robespierre: "Think only of the country and the interests of humanity." *And the interests of humanity!* He taught the Jacobins that the principles of the Revolution were of world-wide application. That Revolutionary ideas were not for France alone is the significance of the Jacobin movement, and it is the key to the history of the period from 1789 to 1815. In drawing up the Declaration of the Rights of Man, its framers were thinking not of

themselves and their homes alone, but of all Europe. They had instinctively the feeling that they could not stand against their lords, against their monarch, against the forces of autocracy which controlled the governmental machinery of other countries as well as their own, unless, after asserting the "rights" at home, they were able to cross national frontiers, carrying to these other countries the principles of the Rights of Man which they believed were necessary to their own political development.

Here is the difference between the French Revolution and the American Revolution. Here is the difference between the French Revolution and the English Revolution. The Declaration of the Rights of Man might be called a pan-European conception, no, more than that, a mondial conception. The French Revolution was the first revolution in the world's history that was intended to be world-wide. When they held the torch, the Jacobins thought not of Frenchmen only, but of a universal principle. Their nationalism was at its foundation internationalism. It was really a move toward human brotherhood. It was one of the early manifestations of the world unity of which we are thinking and talking today.

The element of selfishness is present in every altruistic motive. If we try to analyze our altruism, no matter toward whom or how it may be shown, we find selfishness. We want to do something for someone else, but at the same time, our eagerness to do for others, perhaps unconsciously but patently in most

cases, is prompted by the knowledge that our actions redound to our satisfaction or advantage.

Let me emphasize again that the leaders of the Revolution realized that the Rights of Man could not be read permanently into a constitution for France unless they were advocated, urged, and secured by other nations.

An analogy is in order here. The French do not like to have their Revolution compared with the Bolshevik Revolution. But whether we have to do with Europe, Asia, or any other part of the world, human nature is the same. Given certain factors, you get the same results. When the Russians developed their communistic doctrines, they felt, as the Jacobins felt, the urge to spread them throughout the world. Their leaders saw, as astutely as the French leaders saw, that they would not last in Russia unless other countries adopted them. So Soviet Russia calls her Revolution a world revolution. Our principal cause for hatred for present-day Russia is our fear of seeing upset the existing social order, which is a comfortable one for us. We resent any change that might be to our disadvantage. It was that way with the French nobles in 1791 and 1792. For that reason those that had fled the country started counter-revolutionary movements and came back with foreign armies, thus sending to the guillotine those of their own class who remained in France. You who read probably belong to the privileged class and order. So do I. We are afraid of the communistic doctrine, and we hate the Russians for

preaching it outside their own country. We say: "For God's sake, keep it to yourselves: don't export it!"

But a new philosophy of government either has to have universal acceptance, or it dies. A revolution touching the social order, or even one having to do merely with democratic evolution, has an international character, in whatever country it occurs. If the country be large and powerful, like Russia or France, its effect is felt everywhere.

Every revolution that France has experienced since 1789, has had an international repercussion. This was especially true of the Revolution of 1789, when it was as Europeans rather than Frenchmen that the idealists of 1789 proclaimed their great truths. They yearned for the acceptance by all Europeans of the principles of the Rights of Man. It was only a step from the pious wish to the determination, in the first flush of victories on the field of battle. Their gospel was a gospel for all Europe, and, by the Eternal, all Europe had to accept it!

At Philadelphia in 1776 we spoke for ourselves, in a struggle with a government of our own race and traditions across the sea in London. Ours was a family revolution. The limited scope of our vision is proved by the fact that when we proclaimed, "All men are born free and equal," we did not include the negroes in our midst. Since then we have not included Chinese and Japanese; and we have been disposed to qualify the statement in regard to Jews, Italians, and all other non-Nordics. The leaders of the French Revolution, in-

spired by Rousseau, thought in terms of men and not in terms of Frenchmen. They ardently believed that a new epoch was dawning for the whole world, and that they were contending for civilization against darkness, fighting the battles of others as well as of themselves, when they turned the tables on the invaders of France, and carried their flag and the Revolution across the Meuse, the Rhine, and the Alps—later into Eastern Europe and across the Pyrenees.

The French are like that. They have been like that since the days of the crusades. Their battle line is always the frontier of civilization.

This feeling, which might have been internationalism, was transformed into nationalism by the attempt of foreign nations to destroy the benefits of the Revolution. That magnificent soul-stirring demonstration of love for the fatherland, so well expressed in the *Marseillaise,* written at that time, was a feeling that France had never before experienced. All were ready to give themselves and their children. Young men who had no background at all suddenly became successful generals. You know the story.

Because of the events of these years, most liberal Frenchmen, most anti-clericals, think that the French nation was born on the field of Jemmapes. Perhaps you think so, too. Perhaps before that nationalism was only sporadically expressed. Whatever one may think of the period before the Revolution, it is certainly true that foreign invasion, menacing the new liberties,

brought the French people together and rallied them effectively around the ideal of the nation.

We have seen how, after the excesses of the Revolution, Napoleon gradually came into power. Triumphs in battle brought him the prestige that made possible changing the Republic into an Empire. But those seven years of growth through dazzling military achievement contained also achievements in the art of peace. Napoleon could never have reached the altar of Notre Dame by the sword alone. As few men in the world have known, he has known how to build up a state. At the end of the eighteenth century, if France needed a military genius to circumvent her many enemies, she needed also an organizing genius, to bring order out of chaos and to solve the many difficult problems of internal government arising from the iconoclasm of the decade. Napoleon, before he became emperor, proved himself the man among millions to be the architect of the new France. He built the governmental structure of the country, which still endures; he established the military districts, which still endure; he gave France her civil code; he created the Legion of Honor; he solved the financial problems arising from the assignats; he established civilian titles to Church property, and revived the national religion, by the Concordat with a prisoner Pope; and he gave France the greatest educational impetus in her history. Internally, France revived so quickly that the people felt they had the advantages of all the Rights of Man without continuing the democratic evolution in gov-

ernmental institutions that the Revolution had failed to give them.

Victories in the expansion of France from Lodi to Austerlitz won the people so wholly to Napoleon that there was no opposition to his taking the government into his own hands. First of all, everybody was thankful for order after the reign of terror, and for the reëstablishment of commerce and industry on a sound money basis. Then Napoleon's armies lived on the land wherever they went and cost France nothing. The transition in ten years from a nation fighting for its life against half a dozen hostile states to the greatest power in Europe, imposing treaties upon all other countries, nourished fully the rapid growth of nationalism.

But there was more than that! Napoleon utilized the Jacobin spirit and ideal from the day he led his first army across the Alps into Italy. He made his armies feel that they were freeing oppressed peoples and bringing to them the blessings of the Revolution. What he told his soldiers, he told the peoples of the countries he invaded. France was not the enemy, but the big sister who had found her way into nationhood. Hers was not the spirit of conquest but of emancipation. Every proclamation of Napoleon, as well as every speech to his armies, was a declaration of the high mission of France. The French were friends; the enemy was a ruler who had not given his people liberty, equality and fraternity. It was Jacobinism pure and simple.

Napoleon had his savants, who told him the past history of the regions through which and the countries toward which his armies marched. So the proclamations called the people back to the ancient glories of the past, and promised a resurrection of political units that had ceased to exist.

We are not concerned here with the motives of Napoleon, and his inconsistencies. He put himself on the throne of France, and gave to members of his family the thrones of some of the countries of Europe that he had conquered. His actions often seemed to belie his words. But whatever his motives, the wars waged by Napoleon in all parts of Europe did carry on the program of the French Revolution. Peoples who had no national consciousness began to acquire it. Slumbering traditions, which would tend to give birth to national aspirations of submerged peoples, were awakened. Large states, through the humiliation of invasion and conquest, were incited to the same growth and display of nationalism that had recently come to France through invasions. Last, but not least, Napoleon's interference with the existing political divisions of the Holy Roman Empire and Italy, paved the way for the later development of German and Italian nationalism. It is not too much to say that the Napoleonic upheaval marked the beginning of national movements in Europe which transformed that continent into a series of countries and peoples inspired with nationalism.

We shall give briefly the principal instances of how

Napoleon's invasions and policies influenced the course of national development in the nineteenth century and in our own day.

The nationalism of the French Revolution, as we have pointed out, was in its first stages the awakening of the people to the consciousness of their privileges and obligations. The flaming zeal and the assertiveness of the nationalist movement came when the country was threatened with invasion, and it was feared that the old régime might be restored. But all along there was a strain of internationalism inherent in the very conception of French nationalism. The Jacobins believed that it was a mission of Revolutionary France to overthrow all despots and to carry the gospel of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and constitutional government to all peoples.

It was this Jacobin doctrine of which Napoleon claimed to be the exponent. It was the justification of his wars, and he used it not only to inspire his own soldiers but to incite revolt against rulers along his path of conquest and thus to facilitate his coming. At St. Helena he more than once explained his career by saying that he was the victim of the jealousy of England and the fear of European despots to whose oppressed peoples he was bringing freedom. But in stirring up nationalism to destroy the rulers who opposed him Napoleon had an international conception. In 1804, with the crown of France upon his head, he had predicted that there would be no peace in Europe until it was under a single ruler. His idea of uniting

European peoples—of making a United States of Europe—was a system in which there was to be an emperor who would have, as he put it, "kings for officers." This idea he tried to put into effect. But the nationalism he evoked did not become internationalism: it was nationalism of the kind that destroyed him and that has prevented France from ever again attaining the place in Europe she occupied under the Bourbons and himself.

A series of successful wars, followed by treaties that changed the map of Europe, enabled Napoleon, up to 1809, to begin—and go a long way toward—realizing his ideal. The process of unifying Europe was begun in the treaty of Campo Formio, in 1797, when the Venetian Republic disappeared, and the Cisalpine Republic was formed under the protection of France. At that time Venetia was given to Austria. France had already taken Belgium from Austria, and changed Holland into the Batavian Republic. Before he became emperor, Napoleon as First Consul had already started wiping out the miniscule political units of the Rhineland and South Germany. In his 1805 campaign against Austria, when his flank was constantly exposed to the danger of Prussian intervention, he put into effect his buffer state idea, which, after the battle of Austerlitz, at the end of 1805, was written into the treaty of Pressburg. Baden and Bavaria had their boundaries increased, and the dukes of Bavaria and Württemberg were raised to the rank of kings. Less than two years later, after he had crushed Prussia and

fought Russia to a standstill at Eylau and Friedland, Napoleon wrote into the treaty of Tilsit Russian recognition of a partly-revived Poland, to be known as the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. Continuing the idea of making as large as possible the buffer states, he stipulated that the King of Saxony should rule over the new grand duchy. The year before he had compelled Francis II of Austria to renounce the title of Holy Roman Emperor, and had joined fourteen small German states with Bavaria and Württemberg to form the Confederation of the Rhine under the protection of France. To this coalition he now added Saxony and Warsaw.

Prussia had always felt that any consolidation of German states and any lessening of the territories of Austria would necessarily be to her advantage. But she could not tolerate the overlordship of France, and so she declared war against Napoleon after the treaty of Pressburg. The French Emperor turned his armies northward, won the battle of Jena, on October 14, 1806, and occupied Berlin within a year after his entry into Vienna. He punished Prussia by taking the part of her territory nearest the Rhine to make another buffer state, which he called Westphalia. This in turn necessitated a closer hold on Holland. One brother he made King of Westphalia and another King of Holland. The policy of "kings for officers" had begun. Not in their interest or for family pride so much as because he needed those he could trust, he made his brothers and sisters rulers, and put on the thrones of

Sweden and Naples men who had fought under him and on whom he thought he could rely.

Obsessed with this idea, he took the first step that led to his downfall when, in 1808, he decided to make his brother Joseph King of Spain. Spain was the first large country, geographically a well-defined unit, that Napoleon had tackled. It was the first large country he invaded, in which existed already, as in France in 1792, national consciousness. His well-organized armies got to Madrid and put Joseph Bonaparte on the throne, but the country did not accept the change. The Portuguese and English helped Spanish nationalism to defy Napoleon. The effect of this inconclusive Spanish campaign was not immediately felt. In the course of time it became one of the open wounds by which Napoleon, militarily, bled to death.

Napoleon was better able to cope with a national uprising in Austria the next year. The battle of Wagram was followed by the peace of Vienna, which completed the substitution of French influence for Austrian in the peninsula of Italy, and increased the strength of the South German buffer states. Austria was forced to make an alliance with France, which was sealed by the marriage of the daughter of Francis to Napoleon. On the surface, Napoleon seemed to be the master of Europe. From Spain to Holland, from Naples to Prussia, from Belgium to Warsaw, he or his minions ruled over Europe, supported by imperial armies that had never known defeat. But the British blockade of the continent caused distress everywhere. In almost

every country the nationalism called forth by Napoleon and his armies took the form of a burning desire to get rid of foreign control. In building an international Europe, where all would be together, the Napoleonic invasions gave birth to a nationalistic Europe, in which the names of countries began to mean peoples and not dynasties.

Napoleon had only gone as far as Dalmatia and the Ionian Islands, but his agents had penetrated the Balkans, where Christian peoples were under the domination of the Turks. For the first time since the days of imperial Rome, the Italian peninsula, whose people spoke the same language, were under a sole political control, and even the temporal power of the Pope was set aside. Napoleon wrote to the Pope, in fact, that he ruled in Rome, although the Pope might be its sovereign. His thought of making Rome the second capital of France was revealed in the title he gave his son, born in 1811. Belgium and the German states, separated from Austria, were oriented toward a different future.

During the recent World War the Entente Powers preached the doctrine of self-determination, and made themselves its champion, with the sole thought of weakening their enemies. They did not realize the boomerang effect upon themselves. It was that way with Napoleon during his attempted conquest of Europe. He capitalized nationalism, bringing to bear every argument that history and tradition, economic interests and idealistic principles of government, could give him,

in his effort to destroy the despotic rulers who were his enemies, "enemies of civilization" they were styled in France. But the enthusiasm he called forth, turned against him in the countries his armies invaded; and the specter of despotism he evoked became, in the eyes of the people to whom he posed as liberator, the Emperor Napoleon.

The outstanding illustration of a national spirit created by Napoleon which destroyed him is the Tugendbund in Prussia. Napoleon thought he had disarmed Prussia in 1806. He had. But the youth of the country, organized by men imbued with the spirit of the French Revolution, prepared secretly for years to free their country from foreign domination. Nationalism became their religion, and was the incentive for every sacrifice. In 1813, when the tired armies of Napoleon returned from Russia, they found themselves passing through hostile territory. Napoleon could not believe that the Prussians, whom he had crushed at Jena only seven years before, could put up much of a fight. At Leipzig, in October, 1813, the secretly trained members of the Tugendbund furnished the principal contingent in the armies of the last coalition against Napoleon.

Leipzig was Napoleon's first overwhelming defeat. It was called significantly "the battle of the nations," because the opponents of France were not rulers whose soldiers were fighting at their behest, but citizen armies, like those of Dumouriez and Hoche twenty years earlier. A new spirit had come over Europe.

The Russians at Moscow had burned their city rather than see it fall in the hands of a foreign invader; from the first clash at Gerona, the Spanish *people* had fought Napoleon; and everywhere a flaming spirit of opposition to the foreigner, which was the first and most marked sign of nationalism, was in evidence. Was not this proof that the French Revolution had started a new era in Europe?

Of the effort of Napoleon's victors, after Waterloo, to put back the hands of the clock, and restore the old order, we shall speak in the next chapter. In conclusion: Napoleon's idea of a united Europe laid the foundations for unity only within racial limits. His intervention made possible united Germany and united Italy, and started a number of national movements, among them some that were not to have their innings until the end of 1918.

III

THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONALISM IN EUROPE FROM 1815 TO 1870

Of the periods of history during which the development of the spirit of nationality and the evolution of nationalism can be traced, the fifty-five years between Waterloo and Sedan are the most important in tangible results. It was during this half century that Germany and Italy became nations, that Belgium was created, that the Christian states of the Balkans were formed, and that the national movements that were to spell doom to the Hapsburg, Hohenzollern, Romanoff, and Ottoman dynasties, assumed definite form.

No author, however able in his power of summarizing, could tell within the limits of a single chapter all the wonderful and moving story of this period. We can give only brief glimpses of these factors in the development of nationalism, and trust that they will tempt you to study nineteenth century Europe. Summaries, with bibliography for wider reading, are to be found in books on the shelves of public libraries, or in your homes, if you have children of college and high school age. Hazen, Hayes, Davis, Seignobos, Rose, Schevill, Andrews, Robinson, and Beard are names which come to one's mind. But I desire to recommend

particularly a small and compact volume, "Modern Times In Europe," by Professor Schapiro of the College of the City of New York; and a larger work, which has just appeared, "Modern World History," by Dr. Flick, State Historian of New York.

After Napoleon's exile to Elba, the victorious coalition sent representatives to Vienna to make a new map of Europe. They had summarily swept away Napoleon's "kings as officers," with the exception of Bernadotte, who had turned against his master and had joined the victors before Leipzig. The statesmen were in the midst of their work, when Napoleon made his dramatic return. France, you remember, rallied around him. He won back both his throne and his army without a shot having been fired. This event, one of the most striking in history, should have warned the peace-makers that the world could not be restored to the 1789 status. It was not Napoleon that they had to dread, but the inexorable working out of the principles of the French Revolution.

Napoleon went down to defeat at Waterloo, and was exiled to St. Helena. He was disposed of definitely. But when the Congress of Vienna reassembled after the Hundred Days, the ugly fact of what had happened in France, of what had imposed a new campaign upon the British and Prussian armies, haunted the negotiators like a specter. They had a profound distrust of the common people of France, and this time Napoleon had been put where he could do no more mischief. But what had made the people whom he

had sent to slaughter through years, and in the long run futilely, welcome back this man whom they should have known could bring them only further humiliation? Fear of losing what they had gained by the Revolution is the answer.

The Act of Vienna was not so drastic for France as might have been expected, after what France had done to all her neighbors. France was not punished and crippled, as the Entente Powers punished and crippled Germany a hundred years later. She was a party to the negotiations. What Talleyrand had to say was listened to and taken into consideration. All the powers, except England, were reactionary; and they did not want to discredit and make untenable the position of the Bourbon whom they had restored to the throne of France. The French were rewarded for accepting the restoration of the old dynasty.

As always, England wanted profits outside of Europe. When she has intervened in continental Europe, it has never been spontaneously or because of particular interests on the continent that she had to safeguard. Whatever state in Europe has threatened to become the dominant power, Great Britain has intervened on the side of the enemies of that power, because she felt that her security and prosperity depended upon no one nation in Europe being dominant. You remember that her statesmen were not unduly exercised over the danger to Louis XVI in 1792, and refused the first invitation of Prussia and Austria to form a coalition against France. But when the French Revolutionary

armies were in control of Belgium, England intervened. The Germans should have thought of history repeating itself in 1914!

After wars in which she was an ally of continental coalitions, Great Britain's policy has been to say to the victors whom she was helping, "You can fix up the European situation in such a way as to clip the wings of this pretender to European hegemony, and reward yourselves, but not so much that you will scare us the way the defeated state has done. We do not want to have poured out our blood and treasure simply to substitute one nightmare for another. Although we have been the deciding factor in the victory—you could not have won it without us—we do not want to dominate the Continent politically or commercially, and we have no ideas of revenge. We shall take our reward in tidbits that lie outside of Europe."

Russia, Prussia, and Austria were the three powers of coalition to whom England was willing to entrust the control of Europe, provided she got confirmation of her title to Malta, the Cape of Good Hope, Trinidad, and Ceylon. The three emperors and their statesmen, all of whom had suffered humiliation from the invasion of the French armies, were satisfied with the life imprisonment of Napoleon, and with the comparatively mild treatment accorded to France in the Act of Vienna. They had intervened in France in the early days of the Revolution to save the monarchical institution and to combat political ideas which they believed were subversive of the existing social order.

In 1815 they interpreted the victory as "Divine intervention" on behalf of rulers, and they determined to form a Holy Alliance to revive and reëstablish permanently the dynastic principle. Nationalism had threatened to weaken their power and overthrow them. The fall of Napoleon saved them. The contest was postponed for a century, although there were continual skirmishes. It was renewed in acute form in 1914.

The houses, of whom the three emperors were the heads, had assembled their territories on the dynastic principle. The kingdom of Prussia no more than the empires of Austria and Russia had grown to its proportions of 1815 by ethnic evolution. People of the same race and language had not just gradually come together in one political organism. Austria had been in Belgium, and controlled widely separated territories in the old confines of the Holy Roman Empire. Only a few years before the Revolution Frederick the Great had made Maria Theresa share Silesia. These facts show how geographical considerations in the formation of states have been ignored. Two of the three partitions of Poland took place after the Revolution began. This violation of both ethnic and geographical principles, which Napoleon had tried to upset, was confirmed in the Act of Vienna. That the ethnic principle in itself did not count in the face of the desires of the victors was shown by Austria's retention of the territories of the Venetian Republic and Great Britain's taking Malta for a naval station.

The Act of Vienna revoked all treaties made between

France and the rest of Europe since the beginning of the Revolution. Prussia and Austria were confirmed in their shares of the Polish partition, and the Kingdom of Poland was placed under the crown of Russia. Prussia not only got back Westphalia but extended her Rhineland control down to, and including, the Saar. The omelet in South Germany could not be unscrambled: that achievement of Napoleon was allowed to stand to the profit of Baden, Württemberg, Bavaria, and Saxony. Austria emerged from the conference as the mistress of northern Italy.

The Holy Alliance was formed with two aims: (1) preservation of the territorial status quo of the Act of Vienna; and (2) the reëstablishment of the political order of 1789. Neither was possible. The world had gone forward too fast. Territorially, Central Europe was bound to move toward unification, with political organisms in which both ethnic and geographical factors would be decisive. The delightful inconsistencies of diplomacy were revealed at Vienna. Although Austria, Prussia, and Russia had announced the intention of going back to the boundaries of 1789, they never seriously considered restoration in any case in which they would be the losers. Prussia and Austria were gainers by what Napoleon had done in South Germany and North Italy. They did not see at the time that they would eventually have to settle on the battlefield between themselves the question of their relations to Napoleon's German buffer states.

The second part of the program of the Holy Alliance

was the restoration of the internal political status quo of 1789 throughout the world. It centered around the personality of Metternich, who was, for more than a generation, a symbol of reaction and political oppression, and the leader of the forces that attempted to combat the rising tide of nationalism.

The idea of Metternich was that the internal political status of all countries should be restored to the 1789 basis, and then be guaranteed internationally by the powers so that there should be no change within a country in dynasty or form of government. This amazing conception was built, first of all, upon the evident self-interest of all the victors, including Great Britain, to see the Bourbons firmly in the saddle in France. Only in this way could a conspiracy of Napoleon's family or other followers be made impossible. The allies did not want another Hundred Days. Then there were the other rulers to be restored—in Spain, Holland, Naples, Sardinia (including Piedmont), and the dutchies of Italy. A long time had elapsed since the rulers were driven out, except in Spain, and Jacobinism, with its new political principles, had taken root in all the countries on whose thrones Napoleon had put "kings as officers."

Metternich decided to call the signatories of the Act of Vienna to international congresses from time to time, in which they would consider "the state of Europe" and arrange to take measures in common wherever either territorial boundaries or internal political status quo was threatened. In trying to get the boundary pro-

vision of a treaty internationally underwritten, Metternich was, unconsciously perhaps, just like Napoleon, proposing internationalism to check nationalism. It was a new form of the United States of Europe. This type of internationalism always appeals to upholders of a status quo by which they benefit. They want things to remain as they are forever and ever, amen. Was not theirs the kingdom and the power and the glory?

Although Metternich had the reputation of being the cleverest man of his day, his conception was essentially naive. It was like the conception of the framers of Article X of the League of Nations Covenant, who believed that international guarantees could be obtained to make permanent advantages gained in the war. It did not take into account changes in international political alignments, economic influences, and, above all, the leaven of nationalism at work among the ethnic groups in borderlands and in submerged countries. Intervention in the internal affairs of other countries for the purpose of preventing their democratic evolution, was equally naive.

The Holy Alliance was cloaked with high idealism, as all schemes of the kind have been. Its preamble was, "In the name of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost." Then it started out, "In order to reassert the principles of true religion, that God is God triumphant, that Jesus Christ our Savior, whose blood was shed for the remission of sins" . . . that was the old-fashioned theology of the men who set their faces

against the ethnic urge of divided peoples to come together in a common nationhood and against the triumph of the "Rights of Man," written into the constitutions of European countries. There are brilliant exceptions, of course, but as a general rule conservatives in theology are reactionary in politics and uninterested in or unsympathetic toward constructive humanitarianism. The Metternichs believed in religion as soporific, and thought that they could use it to checkmate the forces that were working for the enlightenment and betterment of the people.

The statesmen of Vienna, the emperors of Russia and Austria and the King of Prussia and their foreign ministers and other advisers, did not realize that Europe had been transformed during the Napoleonic wars. The principles of the Revolution had triumphed; the Declaration of the Rights of Man had found echo everywhere; and the call to nationhood awoke all the peoples in Europe. Added to the influence of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic invasions were the industrial revolution and the complete transformation of communications through the building of railroads. The industrial revolution had begun before 1789 and was beginning to have an influence upon the coming together of regions that were growing interdependent. Railroads began to be built within twenty years after the Holy Alliance was made. Railroad construction, amazingly rapid in the 1840's and the 1850's, worked consistently against the Metternich formula.

So no matter what Metternich said or did (and he

tried to influence the New World as well as the Old), no matter what the Holy Alliance attempted, the rising tide of nationalism swept aside frontiers and eighteenth century forms of government.

Against the reactionary spirit of Napoleon's victors, other influences than those we have mentioned were working actively in Europe from 1815 to 1870 to bring peoples of the same blood and culture together under one political organism, and to endow states with a constitutional régime. Probably the greatest of these was popular education. Books and newspapers and posters, when the masses become literate, upset the status quo without great effort. Illiterate Europe was a Europe of serfs. Popular education destroyed entrenched privilege, fortified through the centuries, with the ease and the invincibility of a wall of lava. When the people of Europe learned how to read, they realized that their well-being could best be assured by representative government. In this way they could control those who ruled them, and they could make their own laws.

In Europe, in the course of the nineteenth century, as in America, the schoolhouse gradually became the *foyer* of patriotism and citizenship. The new generation learned what the flag meant, the privileges it afforded, and the obligations it imposed. They learned through civics how to be socially minded.

We gave as one definition of nationalism, the sum of the aspirations of a nation. In this modern and abstract sense is it possible for any people to be imbued with nationalism unless there is a conscious effort to

work together in the knowledge that coöperation advances common interests and assures well-being? If people have no conception of common interests, if they do not know what well-being is, if they do not feel aspirations, and sense and voice them, can there be nationalism? Even in the sense of devotion to the country, which is patriotism, or instinct for the defense of the country, when it is not your direct cause or does not seem so, or when the invasion is far away from you, can national feeling exist? Attachment to the soil is innate only within the limits of a very small region.

After the World War and a residence of twelve years abroad, all of it spent in the midst of the testing of the soul of nations, I returned to America to give a certain number of lectures, and travelled pretty widely. For several years I used to receive letters occasionally severely criticizing a statement I made about patriotism not being innate, but acquired through education. To some of my critics I was not a one hundred per cent American, and others wrote: "How can you say that nationalism is not in the heart and soul? Is it not a blood instinct? Did we not drink it in with our mothers' milk?"

I was puzzling over how to answer that, when my six-year-old, who had not yet learned to read, came into my bed to give me the morning greeting. When I saw her sunny head on the pillow beside me, the thought came to me that she might give me an answer to my critics. I asked, "Hope, what is your country?" She looked blank. She did not know what I meant.

"What is the name of the place where you live? Your country? I mean, Hope, where do you live?"

She said: "Princeton." And then added: "But I used to live in Paris."

"No, no, not that. I don't mean that. Have you never heard of your country?"

She thought a minute. Then there was a glad smile. "Oh yes, now I know. Of course! Tizothee."

"Tizothee? Tizothee?"

"Oh papa, of course it is. Why we sing it in school: My country Tizothee."

The next time one of our preferred patriots got after me, I countered with this story. We do get these ideas through other people telling us when we are young. In school there is the ceremony of saluting the flag, of repeating the pledge. The little codgers come to know what it means through their teachers and their readers. Patriotism, or any intelligent, constructive manifestation of nationalism, is connected with the ability to read, or has been impressed in the classroom or through a public speech upon the minds and hearts of the auditors. In school Hope was to learn that she belonged to a country, what that country was, that it extended from the Atlantic to the Pacific, that the people of Los Angeles and Portland, Maine, of Portland, Oregon and Tallahassee, Florida, had the same government, the same laws, the same privileges, the same obligations; and that they prospered or suffered together. So she knows that she is an American, and she is very proud of her Americanism. Although born in France, with

the *droit de terre,* through her parents she has the *droit de père.* She still spends much of her time in France, but she is proud to call herself an American. If she knows what that word means, however, it is because of her school teachers, the books she has read, and what travelling she had done.

The tremendous increase in the ability to read made it possible in Europe after 1815 to continue to spread the principles of the Revolution. It gave propagandists for constitutionalism and nationalism the means of spreading their ideas. A Mazzini or a Victor Hugo in exile, when the people could read, was as much to be feared as if he were home. A Silvio Pellico in prison could write so graphically that his readers felt that they, too, were suffering loss of liberty.

Steam power, introducing the factory era and later increasing immeasurably facilities of communication, was a force with which the statesmen of Vienna and their successors could not cope. Industrialism literally drove people together, making their very existence dependent upon a large and powerful political unit. Coal had to be under the same flag as the factories; and there was not much use for iron ore where coal was not available. The capital for building railroads could not be found and combined where the lines had to cross into another country every hundred miles or less, with other laws and taxes and guarantees to concessionaires. Already late on the scene in the development of their nationalism, Central European peoples had to get together or remain in a hopelessly backward

state in relation to the more fortunate Atlantic Coast countries.

The British were the first to develop the factory system, and later to start steam railroads and change from small sail-driven vessels to steamships. Great Britain's population increased from 6,700,000 before the French Revolution until in 1820 there were over 12,000,000. In the hundred years from 1820 to 1920, the British Isles more than tripled their population, most of the increase being in England. Population could never have increased that way except by the gathering of raw materials from all the world, working over these raw materials, and selling the product in world markets. From the sales it was possible to buy abroad the foodstuffs demanded for the support of so large a population in so small a space. Watt's steam engine and Hargreaves' spinning-jenny and various other inventions gave a great impetus to industry in England during the Napoleonic Wars. She developed rapidly while Continental Europe was being subjected to sudden political changes, one after the other, through the fortunes of battle.

The birth, infancy, and self-assertion of nationalism from 1815 to 1870 can not be clearly presented unless we mention twelve different countries or regions. Into the first nine—Great Britain, the United States, Latin America, Spain, Belgium, Switzerland, France, Poland, and Russia,—we need to go only briefly. The most striking and far-reaching manifestations of nationalism were in the Ottoman Empire, the German states, and

Italy. In the Balkans arose the new Christian countries, which won their freedom from the Ottoman Empire. The struggle between Prussia and Austria ended in the creation of the dual monarchy of Austria-Hungary and the German Empire. The Italian Risorgimento created a state that had never before existed.

Great Britain deserves first place in our review. The internal development of the United Kingdom from 1815 to 1870 is one of the most fascinating subjects one can study in connection with nationalism; for during this time the English people continued in a remarkable way their democratic evolution. And just before the end of the period Irish nationalism began to make itself felt. The English paved the way for nationalism by their insistence upon and development of representative institutions—a process that went on without interruption throughout the nineteenth century. The English asserted themselves against their king as far back as Runnymede; they founded the first national church; John Hampden and his "no taxation without representation" antedated by more than a hundred and thirty years the American cry of the same kind. The putting of the purse strings of the nation under the control of Parliament, so that all money grants should come from the House of Commons, was a banner event in building up representative government. The English tried and executed a king nearly a hundred and fifty years before the French did, and their constitutional revolution was one century before that of France.

But the right of suffrage was so limited in England that, although representative institutions and principles had been splendidly developed, they were representative really of less than one hundred thousand of her population. There was hardly even a beginning of democracy in England. The disqualifications from holding office were applied to all who did not subscribe to the dogmas of the Anglican Church. Because England was governed by her aristocracy, as all countries were, none of the events, from the Magna Charta to the Revolution of 1688, which stand out in our minds as great steps forward in winning civil liberty, had much influence upon the continent of Europe. But the opposite is true, that the French Revolution and the cataclysm in Europe hastened the constitutional changes in England that converted her from a country ruled by a clique or caste into the most advanced in democracy of the larger nations. After Napoleon's downfall there was serious economic depression in England. Dissatisfaction was widespread, and the people insistently demanded a voice in the government, which they were outspoken in criticizing.

Increasing popular education stimulated this demand. The intellectual life of Great Britain constantly expressed itself in a demand for a more liberal form of representative control. We must remember that the idea of universal manhood suffrage, which the United States has had from the very beginning, did not have a strong hold in Europe. Even those who called themselves liberals distrusted the people—in the larger sense

of that word. For many decades they were lukewarm in advocating giving a vote to all the people.

We Americans pride ourselves on the fact that we were pioneers not only in universal manhood suffrage but also in incorporating into a constitution (the first ten amendments must be taken as a part of the original conception) full guarantees for the protection of the individual against arbitrarily exercised authority. Why then are we not as free a country as England? Why have we less regard for the rights of others than they have in France? Probably because it is that we have not developed the love of freedom and the sense of the inalienable rights of the individual through centuries of struggle. We blundered into our national life—we took formulas recently drawn up, and made them the law of the land. Everything in English political institutions and administration of the law, which are the most admirable of any country in the world, is the result of a long period of struggle and testing, as in France and other countries of the Old World.

The steps in England's progress are marked by the Reform Bill of 1832 which liberalized Parliament and made it more fairly represent the country; the Second and Third Reform Bills of the 1860's and 1880's; and the triumph of 1911, when by limitation of the veto power of the House of Lords, the last stronghold of privilege was robbed of its power, and Great Britain became the model democracy. Up to the middle of the nineteeth century Liberals and Conservatives were very much alike. The great work done by Bright and

Cobden was the beginning of party government that more accurately represented the ideals and the judgment of the people. It has been a long, long process in the United Kingdom; and Ireland has been allowed to work out her own destinies only recently. But the contribution to the cause of nationalism has been considerable.

Great Britain's part in the evolution of nationalism has to do with the non-European world in a much larger degree than the part played by any Continental European country. Most of the developments of nationalism overseas, however, were important only after the period under survey in this chapter. Here we desire only to comment upon the contrast between the stormy methods of Continental Europe and the admirable working out of nationalism in Great Britain and her colonies by lawful processes. The intelligence of the people as a whole and their interest in government grew markedly from 1840 to 1870. The higher standards of education were having their effect. Statesmen and Parliament realized that the common people had to be educated more and more into citizenship as the country increased rapidly in population and acquired wealth overseas.

The second of the twelve is the United States. After peace with Great Britain it took four years to decide upon a constitution, and two more years to get it ratified. The constitution has endured and is eloquent testimony of the ability and foresight of those who drafted it. But the thirteen little colonies along the

Atlantic Coast had not developed national consciousness, in the sense of feeling that their inhabitants formed a separate race. During the whole period from 1815 to 1870 we were still in a state of migration, still, if I dare say it, in the nomadic period. The decade from 1860 to 1870, that of the Civil War and reconstruction, marked the first real sacrifice we made of blood and treasure for the establishment of a principle.

The South advanced the thesis that we were a confederation of states, with the supreme authority resting in state legislatures. The union was only a convenience, into which states had entered of their own free will. They could withdraw when they wanted to. The North maintained that the union was indivisible, and that any states that seceded were in rebellion against their common country, and would have to be brought back to their allegiance. From the viewpoint of nationalism it was an interesting question. What was the unit, the state or the union of states? Where people are of the same blood and culture, belong to the same geographical region, have common economic interests, and have been united for nearly three generations, is it possible for them to allow the state thus formed to be broken up because of the dissatisfaction of a minority?

At the time of the American Civil War the political trend of Europe and the economic trend of the whole world was toward larger governmental units. Racially and geographically, as we see from the examples of Italy and Germany, people were coming together, and

abolishing frontiers and tariff walls. Nationalism was performing an international service—was paving the way, as constructive nationalism has always done, for internationalism. Putting to one side social and moral questions involved, it was a matter of life and death to the existence of a powerful economic unit in the New World that the states should stick together. The great issue of the Civil War was national unity, not the liberation of the slaves, and the war itself was a reflex in the United States of the movements that were going on in Europe for the development and strengthening of the national idea.

During the post-Napoleonic period the United States promulgated the Monroe Doctrine, because we were troubled over the Metternich policy of intervention to restore the status quo of 1789. During the Napoleonic Wars, when Louisiana changed hands twice and the English, at war with Spain, nearly annexed Florida, we had found that war not of our own making, in territories adjacent to ours, might easily involve us. When Metternich proposed at the Congress of Verona, in 1822, that the Powers join in aiding the lawful authority in Spain to put down the rebellions in America, the Duke of Wellington, who was representing Great Britain, received orders from Canning to oppose any such move. But Wellington could not prevent a mandate being given to France to put down the revolution in Spain. Only British mastery of the seas blocked an effort to take international action in America. Therefore, the instinct of self-preservation led to

the Monroe Doctrine. It was the beginning of the assertion of American nationalism, and it was a precious support to the new nationalism of the Latin Americans. For more than a hundred years the United States has been able to prevent the extension or reëstablishment of political sovereignty of European states over any part of the American continent.

Under our third head we have grouped a region and do not speak of a separate country. From Mexico to Cape Horn there was no republic, or attempt to establish one, until the Napoleonic Wars. Only in Venezuela had there been signs of incipient nationalism, due to the North American Revolution. Latin Americans were not only under European political sovereignty, but they were, as they remained until comparatively recently, in closer cultural and economic touch with Europe than with the United States. Continental Latin America, with the exception of Brazil, was Spanish. Aside from Spain, Great Britain, France, Holland, Denmark, and Sweden had islands in the West Indies. In Central America Great Britain had a foothold at Belize, on the Honduran coast; and in South America, France and Holland on the Guianan coast.

The invasion of Spain and the putting of Joseph Bonaparte on the throne gave the occasion for Spanish American colonies to revolt. The royalist garrisons were embarrassed and weakened. By the time the usurper was ejected, the revolt in America had gone so far in most places that the cause of Spain was hopeless.

Communications were difficult, and took a long time. The Congress of Vienna did not realize the seriousness of the New World situation from a reactionary point of view. In fact it was not until 1819 that European statesmen realized that Spain did not have the power to bring back under her sovereignty Mexico and the Central and South American countries. Her effective administrative control was confined to the West Indian possessions.

One republic already existed in the West Indies—the only country where negroes had the ascendency. Haiti was a French colony until 1803, when Toussaint L'Ouverture decisively defeated the army Napoleon had sent out under his brother-in-law, General Leclerc. The Republic of Haiti was proclaimed on January 1, 1804. Napoleon let it go at that, and the Bourbons made no attempt to reconquer it.

Despite Metternich's horror of the republican spirit —he said: "All America is going to be republican"— there was nothing that he could do after Verona to override the Monroe Doctrine, seeing that it was approved by Great Britain. It is probable that the Americans could not have made the doctrine effective at the beginning had it not fitted in with the British policy. At Vienna the British secured the title to Trinidad and part of Dutch Guiana, which they had held before. But they were unable themselves to extend their sovereignty over Latin America, and they were suspicious of France's intentions. Seeing that these countries would not come under British protec-

tion, it was better for the defense of the large political and territorial influence Great Britain already possessed in the New World and to the advantage of her commerce that Latin America be independent.

We have not the time to go into the development of Latin America into twenty-one republics. In the study of nationalism, however, South and Central America and the West Indies should not be neglected. How the former Spanish provinces became separate states, what decided their boundaries, and the course of their development into conscious national units, make a story of intense interest and value to the student of nationalism. Here were vast regions, sparsely populated by European stock, where the colonists had mingled their blood with Indians, and in some places later with negroes. Except in Brazil, which was a Portuguese colony, Spanish was the language. The people were widely separated. And yet they developed national heroes, who were ready to go to the aid of one another—and did so brilliantly—during the War of independence. Afterward they broke up into separate countries, and came gradually to have toward one another the selfish and aggressive national sentiments that we are accustomed to attribute in Europe to long centuries of inherited prejudice and hatred. One will not find a more intense spirit of nationalism than that which exists between Chilians and Peruvians, who have the same background, come from the same stock, speak the same language, and were under the same political sovereignty hardly more than a century

ago. We shall discuss Tacna and Arica later. I had the privilege of going there, to look into the irredentist state of mind, while the American plebiscite commission was at work in 1926.

Fourth, we speak of Spain. The rebellion against her authority overseas was inevitable as a result of Napoleon's invasion. Spain had long been in decline, and in wars, whether she had been the ally or the enemy of France, she seemed to get none of the fruits of victory and stand heavier losses than were proportionately hers. But Spanish nationalism, as we emphasized in the last chapter, was the first to resist energetically an army of Napoleon. That he was compelled to keep large contingents fighting for years in Spain was one of the causes of his downfall. In Spain Great Britain had found the weak spot in Napoleon's armor, and sent Wellington to attack him there. The Spanish people set an example, followed later by other European peoples, in refusing to allow their country to be supinely a part of the Napoleonic Empire, with its "kings as officers."

After 1815, Spain was in the position of France both as to loss of colonies and restoration of dynasty. But there was this big difference. Spain had not gone through the spiritual experiences of France—I use spiritual in the widest and deepest sense of that word. Nor, despite the resistance to Napoleon, had her people been exalted to such a degree, as the people of France had been, that defeat in the end did not stun them.

The eclipse of Spain, as a powerful influence in

Europe and mistress of a continent and a half overseas, is not easily explained, and we cannot go into the variety of reasons that have been given for it. The nineteenth century, in view of the new opportunities, marked the decadence of the Spaniards more strongly than the eighteenth century. Immediately after the Napoleonic Wars, the protests of the people, culminating in the Revolution of 1820, seemed to indicate that the Spaniards were going to be the first people of Europe to check the post-Napoleonic reaction. Ferdinand VII was so outrageous in his despotism that even Metternich was frightened, and urged him to be cautious. But the Congress of Verona, as we have seen, gave a mandate to reactionary France to intervene. For a second time in fifteen years a French army crossed the Pyrenees. But this time it was with the backing of all Europe, and for the purpose of opposing the principles of the French Revolution. The French came not to depose Ferdinand this time, but to support him. He had a new lease of life, thanks to this outside aid, and was able to continue to rule for ten years longer. When he died in 1833, Spain was ruined economically and morally. Spain reacted only feebly to the Revolution of 1848. Off in her corner of Europe, she has not influenced either Europe or the outside world since the Revolution of 1820.

Our next country is Belgium, a creation of the nineteenth century. The Act of Vienna joined Austrian Netherlands to Holland. It was not a happy combination. Most Dutch are Protestants. Belgians are Catho-

lics. The people of the former Austrian Netherlands are of two races. The Walloons speak French. The Flemish dialect is between Dutch and German. When the revolutionary movement of 1830 swept over Europe, the Flemish revolted against the rule of Holland, thus being the first people to challenge successfully the status quo of the Act of Vienna. It was a national revolution, and it put into European international politics a question that has never received a satisfactory solution.

According to the formula of Metternich, international intervention, or the intervention of one power as mandatory for the others (like France in Spain in 1823) should have put down the revolution, and have restored the sacred status quo of 1815. But Great Britain would not have tolerated either France or Prussia as a mandatory, fearing their ultimate control over a region on the North Sea too unpleasantly near England. As part of the people of Belgium were of German stock and part of French stock, France and Prussia were mutually suspicious. Flemings and Walloons were too much mixed up geographically and had too many common interests to want to see their country divided between France and Prussia. Their declaration of independence and the calling to the throne of a German prince was not only a challenge to the status quo of the Act of Vienna: it was the first example of twentieth century nationalism setting up a state in accordance with geographical and economic, and not ethnic, dictates. In the new Belgium the conscious volition of peoples

of two racial stocks and different languages had formed a common country.

Because of the vital interests of France, Prussia, and Great Britain in this little region, the independent status of Belgium was accepted, and in 1839, after years of negotiations and bickerings, the famous neutrality treaty was signed. It was this treaty that Germany regarded as "a scrap of paper" in 1914.

Belgium was avowedly a buffer state, and, as such, has continued to exist. The violation of her neutrality by Germany in 1914 indicated that the Germans had placed too much reliance upon the internal dissension in Belgium over the language question as a divisive factor.

The sixth country in our review, Switzerland, may be called the phenomenon of nationalism. Belgium has two languages and two ethnic groups. The more commonly spoken of the Belgian languages is a dialect, that is neither German nor Dutch. But the Swiss speak the languages of their neighbors—German, French, and Italian. The independence of the Swiss cantons began before the end of the thirteenth century in the defensive league of three groups of mountaineers. Most of the territory of modern Switzerland became independent of the Holy Roman Empire at the end of the Thirty Years' War. The Helvetic Republic, with nineteen cantons, was formed by Napoleon between 1798 and 1803. In 1815 the independence of Switzerland was not questioned at Vienna. The Congress acknowledged the Federal Pact of Zurich, with the

three additional cantons. The five victors over Napoleon, Austria, Prussia, Russia, Great Britain, and Portugal guaranteed a perpetual neutrality of this mountain country in the heart of Europe. An arrangement was made with France, who had to give back Geneva, by which Switzerland was to trade in a free zone of several miles in the region of Geneva.

In 1815 it must be remembered that the Germans were not a united people: nor were the Italians. Nothing was more natural, from the viewpoint of these two elements, than that they should have a national life, independent of neighbors of the same race and speaking the same language. As for French Switzerland, the burghers and mountaineers of French language had become Protestant at the beginning of the Reformation. During the centuries in which the idea of French nationality was developing, Protestantism was gradually militated against and virtually proscribed in France. The French-speaking Swiss, therefore, clung to the independence which they could maintain only by union with the German and Italian cantons. Up to the nineteenth century geographical and political influences had brought and kept the Swiss together. For half a century after the Napoleonic period, Italians and Germans were still achieving national unity. Neither had a united fatherland to attract German-speaking and Italian-speaking Swiss. By the time there was a united Italy and a united Germany, Swiss nationality, consecrated in the constitution of 1848, had fully developed. Economic considerations also contributed to

the solid foundation of Swiss nationalism, which had grown in the face of racial and linguistic differences.

We deal next with France. I have tried to bring out in previous pages how every step in France in the struggle for nationalism had an instantaneous repercussion in other countries. This point is strikingly illustrated during the period from 1815 to 1870. Had France remained sodden and content under restored Bourbon sovereignty, had she played the game with the Holy Alliance for a long time, there is no doubt that the growth of nationalism in Europe would have been greatly retarded. As it was, the Revolution of 1830, the liberalism of the July monarchy, the Revolution of 1848, and the final establishment of the republic in 1870, were felt in every country in Europe. By the determination of France not to lose the benefits of the Revolution, fully as much as by the irresistible unification process in the Italian and Germanic states, the principles of Metternich were refuted and the status quo of the Act of Vienna destroyed.

Louis XVIII was foolish enough to think that he could wipe out overnight the changes of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic eras. Before his death in 1824 he had already been compelled to modify his reactionary policies. Charles X lasted only six years. The Revolution of 1830 sent the last Bourbon king of France into exile, and put upon the throne a member of the Orleans family, Louis Philippe, who had identified himself with the bourgeoisie and who was known as "the citizen king." In fact his attachment to the prin-

ciples of the Revolution of 1789 had caused him to be dubbed Philippe Egalité. The July monarchy, as it was called from the month of its establishment, was not recognized by the Hapsburgs, Hohenzollerns, and Romanoffs. It denied the dynastic principles which had been revived in 1815. It was contrary to the Metternich formula. The people of France put Louis Philippe on the throne: he received the crown by their wish, and not by right of family, although he was a member of the cadet branch of the old dynasty. He prided himself on being a democrat. While his predecessor, Charles X, was upholding the divine right of kings, Louis Philippe used to poke around the streets of Paris, wearing a dilapidated hat and carrying a faded and bulging umbrella.

Louis Philippe had able and liberal ministers. But in the second decade of his rule, the government, as was inevitable under a monarchy, began to show reactionary tendencies. France found that she did not have all the liberties she expected from the Revolution of 1830. Certain safeguards to nationalism and constitutionalism, such as a wider suffrage, liberty of the press, and freedom of assembly, had been won. But, as in England after the first Reform Bill, there was still much to be accomplished if the people were really to have a voice in the government. France, beginning to feel the effects of the new industrialism, tended toward socialism. The socialistic movement was developing throughout Europe, but it had more freedom for ex-

pression in France than elsewhere, and the main preachers of the early days were French.

A number of causes contributed to the outbreak of a revolution in Paris in 1848. The July monarchy had become corrupt, and certain powerful bourgeois, enriched by industrialism, took the place in the minds of the people of the old nobility. They proved to be as reactionary as the group around earlier sovereigns. Firing on mobs of students and workmen, instead of quelling demonstrations, led to the hurried departure of Louis Philippe, when the people of Paris got out of hand. The Second Republic was proclaimed, and the election of a Constituent Assembly by universal suffrage was called for. But the provisional government, in the hands of socialists, fell of its own excesses. The socialists were unable to make their economic theories work out. One of the immediate causes of the Revolution had been unemployment. The socialists believed that if there was not enough work, the government could create it. In practice this theory exploded, and Paris went through a new reign of terror until moderate elements got control of the situation. The Constituent Assembly decided upon a constitution like that of the United States. A nephew of Napoleon was elected President in December, 1848.

The principal significance of the Revolution of 1848 was its success in many other countries of Europe in forcing rulers to grant constitutional rights to their people and in liberalizing still further governmental institutions in countries which enjoyed already a cer-

tain measure of constitutional guarantees. Even where the Revolution was momentarily unsuccessful, as in Prussia and Italy, the foundations were laid for the democratic evolution of the next generation. Every gain in constitutional rights was a step forward in nationalism.

For some years before 1848 Paris had been the home of political exiles. Proscribed in their own countries, advanced liberals and extremists, socialists and nationalists, found refuge there. It was a queer combination of internationalism with nationalism. Fundamentally the preaching and propaganda of the socialists, endeavoring to awaken the workers to class solidarity, was internationalism. Fundamentally the preaching of the nationalists, seeking to arouse opposition to absolute rulers and incite the people to ethnic unity, was the antithesis of internationalism. The socialists had the upper hand at the beginning in Paris, but they were discredited within three months when their theory that work could be created by the government was demonstrated to be unsound. The moderates, who succeeded them, turned the revolutionary movement into a movement for more liberal political institutions, throwing aside the economic program of socialism. In other countries than France, constitutionalists and liberal political agitators had been in control of the revolutionary movement from the beginning.

Louis Napoleon overthrew the Republic by a coup d'état on December 2, 1851, and revived the imperial régime. At the time of his accession, while he may

have followed the inspiration of personal ambition, Louis Napoleon did not represent a reactionary current. In his own way, he was a liberal. He declared that he was truly the product of the Revolution of 1848 in that he professed and proposed to champion the principles of Napoleon I for the liberalization of Europe, as opposed to the Metternich conceptions of government. He rightly believed that what the Holy Alliance stood for had been destroyed by the Revolution of 1848, and that the era of nationalism, as his uncle understood it, was coming into its own. He promised to rule as a constitutional monarch, listening to the voice of the people.

Of the influence of the Second Empire upon nationalism in the rest of Europe we shall speak later. Napoleon III ruled over France through two decades of prosperity at home and great power throughout the world. He can not be compared with his uncle, either as an organizer and an initiator in his own country, or as a European influence. He was neither creative nor inspiring. And yet France went ahead more rapidly and more quickly under him than in the more brilliant days of the First Empire. The reasons were that Napoleon III did not have continual wars on his hands, and that the middle of the century was still for France an era of unquestioned primacy among European nations. Great Britain courted Napoleon's favor; the rest of Europe listened to him when he spoke. But there was this difference between his era and the earlier Napoleonic era. With Napoleon Bonaparte, it had

been the man that counted; with Louis Bonaparte, it was the country over which he ruled that counted. Not until nationalism did for Central European states what it had done for France, was this primacy first diminished and then destroyed.

Poland, like Belgium, had a revolution in 1830. But unlike Belgium, the revolution was not successful.

From the viewpoint of reaction, the Congress of Vienna had acted unwisely in the settlement of the Polish question. The three partitioners of eighteenth century Poland wanted back their respective shares of the spoils of 1771, 1791, and 1793. Austria reannexed Galicia and Prussia Posnania. But the old Kingdom of Poland, which was territorially the lion's share and which Napoleon had in part made the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, was allotted to Russia in toto. Just as in earlier years, neither Prussia nor Austria was willing to see the other too much aggrandized in the East. But instead of giving Russia a clear title to her portion of Poland, the Act of Vienna linked "The Kingdom of Poland" to Russia only by the fact of a common crown. It was a political union with Russia under the Romanoffs, and not an incorporation of Poland in Russia, that the Act of Vienna provided for. Russia, of course, started in to treat the Kingdom of Poland as an integral part of her own territory, and began the policy of Russianization that lasted a hundred years. The Russians met with stubborn resistance for fifteen years in a country that had become impregnated with the principles of the French Revolution.

Who as a child has not read "Thaddeus of Warsaw," by Jane Porter? It was she who also wrote "Scottish Chiefs." Her pictures of the sufferings of the Poles in asserting their nationalism remain to this day vividly in my memory. Poland's geographical position made impossible outside support. The Revolution was put down rigorously. Its result was the disappearance of the flower of her aristocracy and also of bourgeois and artisans of the cities. Other countries had been gainers in the eighteenth century by the splendid type of exiles that the revocation of the Edict of Nantes lost to France. After the Revolution of 1830, Occidental Europe and the United States received numerous Polish families which, especially in France, contributed much to the nation, just as France gained by Italians fleeing from reaction in Italy, and as the United States gained after the suppression of the 1848 revolution in Germany.

The Polish revolutionaries had expected much of the July monarchy. All French liberals were strongly sympathetic with the Polish movement. At the time of crisis and for years afterward there were interpellations in the Chamber of Deputies. The answer of a minister of Louis Philippe's government to one such query has remained in the language. He said: "Order reigns in Warsaw." It was the order of death. In 1863 a second revolution was equally unsuccessful, and provoked another exodus of liberal Poles to Western Europe.

Tradition counts for so much in creating, fostering, and reawakening nationalism, that if you are going to take a new generation, and bring them up with the

idea that they will some day have to fight for an ideal, there must be blood behind them, the sacrifice of a former generation. If the blood of martyrs has been the seed of the Church, it has also been the seed of national movements. The nationalism of the Poles since 1918, tangibly realized by the World War, would hardly have been capable of creating and carrying on resurrected Poland, had not the idea of a native country been kept alive by the example of the unsuccessful revolutions of 1830 and 1863.

Aside from Poland, the Romanoff Empire had contact with other national movements, which were sacrificed to the imperial idea. Russia, like Great Britain, continued her expansion after the Napoleonic Wars. But the British expanded overseas. Not until comparatively recently have they met nationalism as a subversive influence, as an obstacle, in holding their empire together. The Russians expanded in contiguous territory. The history of Muscovy is like making a giant snow-ball.

Russia had been across the Ural Mountains, into Siberia, as far as the borders of China, in the seventeenth century. In the eighteenth century she developed her hold on Siberia, and began to press southward along the Black Sea, east and west. After the Napoleonic Wars, in the process of her expansion, she merged many small independent peoples, and began to take territory from the Ottoman Empire and Persia. She took in millions of Mohammedans, formerly subjects of Turkey and Persia. I remember that one of my

first French books in school was Xavier de Maistre's *"Prisonniers du Caucase."* It gives a graphic picture of Russian expansion in the Caucasus. How many independent peoples she submerged was realized after the World War, when there were fifty-eight claimants to nationhood in Daghestan alone.

Russian expansion at the expense of the Ottoman Empire caused two wars during the period under survey and led to a third one in the decade following 1870. Of these we shall speak later. Like Great Britain and France, Russia started to encroach upon Chinese territory, and found her way to the Pacific Ocean at Vladivostok by taking the maritime province from China in 1858.

In the course of this expansion in the Near East and the Far East, with the sacrifices demanded of generations of soldiers and the invasion of the heart of Russia by Napoleon in 1812, and the Crimea by Great Britain and France in 1854, the Russians developed a sense of nationality. Although the mass of the nation remained densely ignorant there did start to work the leaven of Slav nationalism, which was inflamed more than once by the wrongs, real or fancied, which they were told that the Christians of the Balkans were suffering.

And now we come to the three peoples whose history from 1815 to 1870 was more profoundly influenced than any others by nationalism. To the first of the three, the Turks, it was a destructive force: to the other two, the Germans and the Italians, it was a unifying force.

No epoch is more soul-stirring, none more fruitful for studying the development of nationalism, and none more important in tracing the conflicts that arose among the larger European powers and culminated in the World War, than that of from 1815 to 1870 in the Near East. Throughout it is marked with bloody struggles, largely unsuccessful, of Christian subject peoples against their Turkish masters.

Russia was seeking to get to the open sea. After reaching the Black Sea, it was a natural ambition to want to control the outlet to the Mediterranean. This meant Constantinople, traditional and cultural center of the church to which the Russian people were fanatically devoted. In the Near East, Russia's way to the sea was blocked by the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Empire remained, after the Napoleonic Wars as before, Russia's great enemy. Napoleon's expedition to Egypt scared the British. They saw in it a revival of ancient dreams of conquering India. Unconsciously probably Napoleon was partly responsible for the British determination in the generations following his day, that no other European power should be allowed a foothold in the Near East that might threaten the approaches to India. Great Britain maintained the principle of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire to defend her hold on India.

The play of forces was tremendous. On the one side, liberal England, with a Protestant interest in Bible lands, felt sympathetic with the aspirations of subject Christian races. The English would like to see Jerusa-

lem in Christian hands. They believed that the Armenians were a nation of martyrs for religion's sake. Their friendship for the Greeks was cultural as much as religious: Englishmen of the ruling class were strongly imbued with philhellenism. We remember how Bryon went to die at Missolonghi. On the other hand, because of India, Russia had to be blocked—and this meant backing the Turks!

Another element in the situation was the policy of Austria to keep other powers out of control of the mouth of the Adriatic, her access to the outside world, and to get an outlet at Saloniki through the Balkans. Austria, therefore, also feared Russian encroachment upon the Ottoman Empire, and felt, with Great Britain, that Turkey should remain mistress of the territories she possessed. In other hands they might hurt her. The common interest of liberal England and reactionary Austria, to block Russia, retarded for half a century —and more—the development of nationalism in the Balkans. In the long run, it made the World War inevitable.

The Ottoman Empire was crumbling. Over a large portion of the territory attributed to them on the map, the Sultans had never extended their administrative authority. The Arabs were superior in culture, if inferior in organizing ability. The portion of the empire inhabited by them was not easy to get at, and most of the Arabic-speaking regions were only nominally under Ottoman sovereignty. The Christian elements in the Balkan peninsula and Asia Minor were subjects to

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the Turks. But owing to the failure of Mohammedan religious law (there was no civil law) to provide for the existence of infidels in the state, the Ottoman Sultans had to grant a special régime to their Christian and Jewish subjects. Nationality and religion had to be synonymous. At the same time, from the beginning of their contact with Europe, the Osmanli allowed Europeans settled in or travelling through their dominions to be under the protection of the governments to which they owed allegiance and subject to their own laws and not to the laws of Turkey. Hence began the capitulations.

From the three-fold standpoint of their own conception of the identity of religion and nationality, (1) in its application to their Mohammedan subjects, (2) in its application to their non-Mohammedan subjects, and (3) in its application to foreigners, nationalism had an earlier and more significant development in the Near East than anywhere else in the world. If one were a Turk it meant something to be a Turk; or a Greek or Armenian, claiming allegiance to their *millet* (nation) gave them certain protection and privileges; or a foreigner, the prestige of the nation to which the foreigner was subject was the measure of both his security and prosperity in Turkey.

When Napoleon called Near Eastern peoples to race consciousness, particularly the Greeks and Slavs, and evoked the memory of the glories of days before the Ottoman conquest, he found a most fertile field for his sowing. His political activity in the Ionian Islands and

Dalmatia threw the Balkans into a ferment. His Greek propaganda before the Treaty of Tilsit—and the Russian propaganda which followed—revived Hellenic national feeling to the point where no downfall of Napoleon and Act of Vienna and Metternich formula could stop it from breaking forth into rebellion. In 1821 the Greeks of the Black Sea, the Balkans, and the islands of the Aegean Sea, rose in the first concerted revolt in centuries against Ottoman rule.

The influence of the Greek Revolution upon nineteenth century nationalism is incalculable. It was the pioneer nationalist movement not only for the Balkans, but for Europe. It was a flat defiance of the program of the Holy Alliance, encouraged tacitly by one of the members of that alliance. The way it was supported by liberal public opinion in France and Great Britain, and the astonishing results of that support, was one of the very first indications of the influence upon the foreign policy of great states of what the people thought. French and British philhellenism undoubtedly forced the governments of the two Occidental powers to give some measure of protection. They couldn't allow the Greeks, fellow-Christians, to be wholly crushed. Hence the interposition of the Allied fleets at Navarino in 1827, and the destruction of the Egyptian fleet. Had Mehemet Ali been allowed to bring reinforcements to his suzerain, the Turkish Sultan, the Greeks would not have won independence even in the limited territory of the Protocol of London.

But the aid of the Occidental powers was half-

hearted, because they were suspicious of Russia's intentions. In 1830 the Kingdom of Greece was created, under the protection of Russia, Great Britain, and France. It was a small Greece, as small as possible, because of Anglo-French fear of Russian influence with the Greeks. In their struggle to free themselves from the Turkish yoke the Balkan peoples were handicapped by this fear throughout the nineteenth century. Paris and London sympathized with Hellenic nationalism, and later with Serb and Bulgar nationalism. But the only effective aid came from Russia, and at the moment of the realization of their hopes, the diplomatic intervention of the Occidental powers would either prevent an incipient revolt, or, if the revolt occurred, rob the Balkan people of the fruits of victory. It was a policy that persisted throughout the nineteenth century.

The geographical position of the Balkan peoples prevented their nationalism from developing normally. Constantinople and the Dardanelles, Saloniki, Epirus being at the mouth of the Adriatic, and the fact that Russia and Austria were Turkey's neighbors at the confines of the Balkans, made what might happen in the Balkans of vital concern to all Europe. The Balkans peoples were Christian, but unfortunately they were Orthodox Christians, and therefore always suspected of being amenable to Russian influence.

We have seen how Napoleon used nationalism as a weapon with which to fight his enemies, just as the Entente Powers used it a hundred years later. During the century that intervened experience in fishing in

troubled waters was acquired by the chancelleries of the powers through three generations of intrigue in the Ottoman Empire. The Balkans have been aptly called "the cockpit of Europe." To checkmate one another the powers in turn breathed hot and cold upon the nationalistic aspirations of Balkan peoples; and to further their own interests, when the cocks became lusty, they armed them with spurs and set them to fighting each other. It is a disgraceful story—a maze of intrigue so constant and tortuous that we can not go into it here.

Of course, it may be advanced that the powers were responsible for what measure of emancipation the Christian subjects of the Turks were able to attain. Had not the French and British fleets intervened at Navarino, for instance, there would not have been question of an independent Greece, even within the narrow limits laid down. A similar argument was advanced after the Greco-Turk War of 1897, when diplomatic intervention saved Athens from being occupied. But we must remember that Hellenism had its *foyers* in Epirus, Macedonia, and the islands and littoral of the Aegean Sea. The revolt started in the North, and those who bore the brunt of the War of Independence were Anatolians, Islanders, Macedonians, and Epirotes. The principal champions of nationalism, the principal sufferers by the war, were left under the Turks.

The creation of the Kingdom of Greece was what the French call a *pis-aller*. Nothing could have been worse for Hellenic nationalism. Right through the

nineteenth century, the existence of a small independent Greece, at the tip of the Balkan peninsula, harmed the Hellenic national movement more than it helped it. It was the idea of statesmen, Machiavellian, to throw a sop to public opinion in their own countries, and to prevent Balkan nationalism from helping Russia's ambitions. Philhellenes in Great Britain and France were classicists. They naturally thought of Greece in terms of the Peloponnesus and Attica. They forgot the old saying, "Where there are Hellenes, that is Hellas." Most of the Greeks imbued with the spirit of nationalism lived outside the limits of the kingdom created in 1830. The tragedy of this fact weighs heavily upon the student of the Near East and upon all who have lived there during the last thirty years. While the Greece of 1830 might practically have included Epirus, a corner of Macedonia, and more of the islands than it did, those who traced its frontiers wanted every part of the independent territory to be within range of guns and landing parties of their fleets.

Almost immediately after the settlement of the Greek rebellion in the Balkans, a dispute between the Sublime Porte and Mehemet Ali, the viceroy of Egypt, ended in an Egyptian invasion of Asia Minor. Russia intervened, when the Egyptians threatened Constantinople, and then France and Great Britain, once more suspicious of Russia, renewed their efforts at Constantinople and Cairo to save Turkey and to destroy Russian influence. Two decades of intrigue, which it would be too wearisome for us to follow, culminated in the

Crimean War of 1854. Russia was ready to abandon her pretension to the exclusive privilege of passing through the Dardanelles and agreed to neutralize the Black Sea. To get the allies out of the Crimea she was willing to give back to Moldavia the part of Bessarabia whose control had brought her frontier to the Danube. She gave up also her right to intervene in Turkey for the protection of Orthodox Christian subjects.

A treaty was signed at Paris in 1856 by which the powers admitted Turkey to a position of equality in the "Concert of Europe," and guaranteed her independence and territorial integrity. Moreover, they bound themselves not to intervene either collectively or separately in the internal affairs of Turkey. But they refused independence to the Serbs who had been struggling for recognition for half a century; they left Greece as she was in 1830; they ignored Bulgarian nationalism; and they rejected the contention of the Rumanians that the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia should be united.

The Congress of Paris failed to stifle the rising tide of nationalism in the Ottoman Empire. The excuse of Great Britain and France, that Turkey was going to reform, was soon proved to be a vain one. Public opinion in these two countries, once more aroused by oppression of Christians and sympathetic with nationalism, made difficult the "stand pat" diplomacy of the governments. Garibaldi's spectacular feat of arms in 1859, of which we are going to speak, made still more

difficult suppression of nationalism in the Near East by blind support of Turkey.

In 1860, when the Christian Maronites in Syria were being massacred, Napoleon III had to intervene with an expeditionary force, thus violating the provision that the English and French statesmen had put into the Treaty of Paris because of their fear of Russia. In 1859, Rumanians took things into their own hands, elected the same ruler for both principalities, revived the name Rumania, and two years later confronted Europe with a *fait accompli* in the formal union of Moldavia and Wallachia. Nationalism thus triumphed, despite the veto of the powers. In 1866, Crete rose against Turkey, and secured an autonomous régime. In 1860, Bulgarians refused to recognize the Patriarch of Constantinople. Just at the end of our period, in 1870 the Sultan recognized the Bulgarians as a separate church, with their own Exarch, thus, according to Turkish principles, making them a nation different from the Greeks.

The realization of the nationalist aspirations of non-Turkish subjects of the Ottoman Empire belongs to the half century following 1870. The two great triumphs of nationalism between 1815 and 1870 are the creation of the German Empire and Kingdom of Italy.

The defeat of Napoleon at the battle of Leipzig, as we have pointed out, was due to nationalism fostered by the Tugendbund. It broke Napoleon, and thus served the common end of the coalition. But its benefits accrued mostly to the Germans. It was really a

victory of Germans over French, wiping out the humiliation of Jena. Waterloo, also, was of more benefit to the Germans than to any other nation of the coalition. It must not be forgotten that although Wellington and the British bore the brunt of the fighting, Napoleon would have won the day if it had not been for the timely aid of Blücher and his Prussians.

Political units in Central Europe before Napoleon's iconoclastic changes were not only bewilderingly numerous and in many cases infinitesimal in size, but they had different kinds of governments and owed allegiance to the Holy Roman Empire and to the House of Hapsburg in varying degrees. The political attachments were in some instances ecclesiastical, but mostly dynastic. In North Germany the successors of the Elector of Brandenburg had gradually advanced the fortunes of the House of Hohenzollern until Prussia became more powerful than Austria. Napoleon ignored the inherent rivalry between Prussia and Austria, who were both his enemies. He created along the Rhine and across South Germany his chain of buffer states without realizing that he had thereby fatally weakened the hegemony of Austria among the German states, which had always been a disruptive influence, and played into the hands of Prussia, a unifying influence. By the very completeness of his victories in Central Europe Napoleon I prepared the way for the humiliation of Napoleon III at Sedan.

The Germans in the course of the half century following Waterloo became more thoroughly the

exponents of ethnic nationalism than any of the peoples to whom Napoleon carried the gospel of Jacobinism. They were born into consciousness of race and inspired with the ideals of unity and solidarity during an epoch when the motive of self-interest was strongest in fostering nationalism. So many centuries had the Germans been separated politically—in fact they had never been together—that they had not come to take as a matter of course, as Spanish, Portuguese, French, and British took it, that within well defined geographical limits a common national life could be lived, conferring privileges and imposing duties. Their nationalism was not the gradual development from attachment to the soil. It had neither historic nor juridic bases. It was a new conception, the Deutschthum, into which the generations of 1815 and 1848 were born. Profoundly different though the people of the Germanic states were, and of two creeds traditionally at variance, their nationalism, with its ethnic and linguistic basis, became a religion. Ideally, it captured the imagination because of its very novelty and also because of obstacles ahead and steps that had to be taken before it could be realized. Materially, the movement was solidly grounded in the common sense of the people because of new conditions of life imperatively imposed upon them by industrialism.

Germany was not blessed like France and Poland with excellent agricultural soil. What happened in our own country right here in these New England states, as population increased, happened in Germany. The

people took to manufacturing. Manufacturing needed absence of tariff restriction in the home markets and transportation facilities. A few figures here are eloquent. In 1800 Prussia had sixty-seven different tariffs. In 1818 a uniform tariff was adopted. Prussia then asked other states to join her in a tariff union. The growth of the Zollverein was gradual. The need of it was not greatly felt until the late 1830's and the 1840's, when industry began to thrive in Central Europe. By 1852 all the German states except Austria, the Mecklenburgs, and the free cities, belonged to the Zollverein instituted hardly more than a generation before by Prussia.

Between 1830 and 1850 the German states constructed more than 3500 miles of railroads. In the development of nationalism steam transportation played a more important rôle in Germany than in any other country. The railroads broke down tariff barriers; brought people together in cities, which they made distribution centers, bringing to them the coal and the raw materials for the factories, and taking away the manufactured products. The old hand industry in homes for local consumption was largely abandoned by 1848. A middle class was developed. Educational facilities were increased. Seventy-five years after the French, the German people began to have the same feeling of dissatisfaction with an autocratic régime. The Revolution of 1848 failed in Prussia because the time was not yet ripe in backward Germany for a popular movement to prove irresistible. That was to come. The educa-

tional work went on for another generation. And during the second generation Prussia under Bismarck forced Austria to acknowledge politically what had economically been accomplished by the industrial revolution, the railroads, and the Zollverein.

Had there been a liberal régime in Prussia, the unification of Germany might have been accomplished without bloodshed in 1848. The Frankfort Parliament, which met on May 17, 1848, with over five hundred delegates from the German states, was the first concerted expression of German nationalism. Liberal Germany was ready for union. But the movement for unification in that assembly was linked with the movement for constitutionalism. Frankfort demanded a free Germany as well as a united Germany. Twenty-two years before Versailles, a king of Prussia could have been emperor of the Germans. Unfortunately the reactionary Frederick William IV indignantly rejected the imperial opportunity, offered him by the delegates of thirty-five states. He said: "I want a king's crown, not one picked up in the gutter like that of Louis Philippe."

Thus was the unification of Germany postponed for two decades, and an internecine struggle between Prussia and Austria rendered inevitable.

The Revolution of 1848 in Vienna caused Metternich to flee to England, and brought about a constitutional convention elected by universal suffrage. Emperor Ferdinand now had the chance offered him which his Prussian cousin had spurned. But he chose to be a

dynastic sovereign rather than the central figure in the unification of the German people.

We must always bear in mind that nationalism is a sword that cuts both ways, and that ethnic nationalism may destroy in some places, where it builds up in others. The Hapsburg dominions were a congeries of races. The Austrian emperor wore the crown of St. Stephen, but as King of Hungary he was as much a dynastic sovereign as he was as Emperor of Austria. Nationalism ruled at Agram as well as at Budapest. The Hungarians wanted to separate from Austria. This was the time of the revolution headed by Kossuth, over which the United States sentimentalized. Ferdinand, like Federick William, succeeded in putting down the revolution in Vienna. But he had his hands full in a Bohemian revolution in Prague, in the Italian rebellions, and in the serious challenge to Hapsburg overlordship in Hungary. At the end of 1848 he resigned in favor of Franz Josef. Russian intervention in Hungary saved the situation there. The irreconcilability of nationalist aspirations in Austria kept him on the throne.

Nationalism worked in just an opposite sense in Prussia and Austria. Because Prussia was in the heart of a German-speaking country, surrounded by states of the same race and language, ethnic nationalism worked powerfully for unification under Prussian hegemony. Austria, on the other hand, was a purely dynastic state. The Hapsburg ruled over Germans, Italians, Slovenes, Czechs, Moravians, Slovaks, Dalmatians, Poles, and,

through the connection with Hungary, over Hungarians, Croats, Rumanians, and Ruthenians.

In 1848, there was no Poland to whom the Poles could look, no Rumania to whom the Rumanians could look, no Serbia to whom the Yugoslavs could look, and no Italy to whom the Italians could look. Hungary's neighbors were all hostile, and she had the same problem of national movements within her own borders as Austria. Bohemia was partly inhabited by Germans, and surrounded by Germans on three sides. Under these circumstances, especially as the ruling classes of the non-Germanic elements were suspicious of liberalism and profited by the status quo, it was not surprising that Franz Josef was able to weather the storm. After the Revolution, the Hapsburg dominions remained under the authority of Vienna. The policy of Great Britain and France in the Near East, of which we have spoken, helped delay the dissolution of the empire; and Russia was a contributing factor of great importance. The wars with France and Prussia took away most of Austria's Italian population. From 1867 to 1918 the Hapsburg dominions remained, in the heart of Europe, a negation of the principle of ethnic nationalism.

In the 1850's and 1860's the increase in importance of industry as an influence binding people together made for the unification of Germany and for the maintenance of the integrity of the Empire of Austria. What had been true from the viewpoint of international diplomacy, that if Austria had not existed she would

have had to be invented, was true from the economic point of view in the second half of the nineteenth century. Prosperity came through membership in a larger political organism.

After 1850 the unification of Germany, like that of Italy, was inevitable. It simply had to come! Whatever was blocking it had to be swept away. Prussia, under Bismarck's able guidance, became the nucleus of the unification of Germany. Extension of Prussia's power by the incorporation of smaller German states, was the first step. The second was to keep France neutral, and expel Austria from any part in German affairs. The third step was to "draw the teeth" of France, whose intervention to prevent the unification of Germany or to forbid it was always to be feared. In seven years, from 1863 to 1870, these steps were successively and successfully taken.

The ascendency of Prussia was completed by the war with Denmark in 1863, by which it was decided that the million inhabitants of the dutchies of Schleswig and Holstein, of whom three-quarters were German-speaking, should belong to the Germanic Confederation and not to Denmark. This not only pushed the borders of the embryonic German Empire northward a little beyond "Deutschthum," but also gave Prussia the neck of the Danish peninsula through which a canal could be constructed from the Baltic Sea to the North Sea.

The expulsion of Austria from the Germanic Confederation was accomplished in a brief war in 1866, in

which the Austrians were decisively defeated at Koeniggratz. The new Italy made common cause with Germany, and won Venetia. Prussia incorporated Schleswig-Holstein, Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, Nassau, and Frankfort. There were still twenty-one small independent states north of the Main, whose sovereignty was respected, but who joined the North German Confederation. Aside from Prussia there now existed only six German states internationally independent: Austria, who was out of the picture, Bavaria, Saxony, Württemberg, Baden, and Hesse-Darmstadt.

The final step in the unification of Germany was taken as a result of a war with France in 1870, in which France was as completely humbled as Austria had been. The victorious German states established what they believed to be a solid foundation for their national life together in January, 1871. At Versailles they proclaimed the German Empire, with the King of Prussia as emperor. France was compelled by the Treaty of Frankfort to cede Alsace-Lorraine.

The year after her defeat, Austria came to an agreement to "divide and rule" with Hungary. The dual monarchy of Austria-Hungary was created in 1867. It rendered the Germanic element preponderant in Austria and the Hungarian element preponderant in Hungary. In the face of the development of ethnic political unions of Germans and Italians, this *modus vivendi* was the most practicable measure that could be taken at the time. Austrians and Hungarians could not have either political stability or economic prosperity

alone. The non-Germanic and non-Magyar elements were not strong enough to assert their independence. Nor would it have been to their economic advantage to do so. The seeds of future trouble, however, were there. But the Hapsburgs had a new lease of life until Turkey lost her Balkan provinces, Italy grew strong, and the collapse of the Hohenzollerns and Romanoffs made possible the resurrection of Poland.

The twelfth, and last, manifestation of nationalism between 1815 and 1870 was the unification of Italy, or rather the appearance of Italy in the family of nations. There had been a Holy Roman Empire, largely Germanic, and the German dynasties of the Hapsburgs and Hohenzollerns had been powerful states, wielding a decisive influence upon European affairs, long before the French Revolution. Austria, as we have seen, was neither geographically nor ethnically a nation in the modern sense of the word. Prussia, on the other hand, had been evolving for several hundred years along ethnic and geographical lines. Italy, quite the contrary, was only a geographical expression until the middle of the nineteenth century. Although the Italian peninsula, with the islands, had been developing since the middle ages into a racial unit, with the same language and culture, there never had been even the semblance of political unity. For national traditions the Italians had to go back to Roman days. Although they always spoke of their national movement as the Risorgimento, it was not a resurrection such as Poland has recently experienced.

In their nationalism, however, the Italians had several advantages over the Germans. The Italian-speaking population of Europe was sea-bound and mountain-bound. Only slightly did Italians spread over the mountains in to the transalpine Riviera, the Savoy, Switzerland, and the country north of the Adriatic. They were pretty well hemmed in on the western and northern frontiers by peoples whose nationalism took conscious form several generations before theirs. Then they were of the same religion. The Reformation had not been a divisive political or cultural influence. In the third place, they did not have in their midst allogenous elements.

But they were also laboring under handicaps that confronted no other people. As the home of the Pope, who had temporal sovereignty over the ancient capital, Italy's status was international rather than national. She emerged from the Middle Ages and lived through the centuries when other peoples were gradually coming together in larger governmental units with several distinct centers of governmental power, none of which was compelled to feel its dependence upon the others. Principalities grew up in the interior belonging to or allied with powerful dynasties. The city states, especially the maritime republics, depended for their power and wealth upon the world outside the peninsula; and their contacts were generally those of rivals and enemies. Accessibility of approach from the sea made Italy easy to invade. The rich northern provinces, and the strategic position of Sicily, were a continual

temptation to successive aspirants to dominance in Europe. Through centuries the Holy Roman Empire linked up the fortunes of Italy with those of the dynastic German states of Central Europe.

We have seen how Napoleon destroyed the old political balance in Italy when he created the Cisalpine Republic, gave the *coup de grâce* to decaying Venice, and replaced hereditary rulers by his own "kings as officers." The Act of Vienna restored the deposed sovereigns, but made Austria heir of the Venetian Republic. It left Corsica to France, and Malta to England. Dalmatia, too, was Austrian, and the Vienna Conference allowed Great Britain to have a protectorate over the Ionian Islands. The situation seemed hopeless.

It would take a volume in itself to describe and comment upon the development of nationalism in the Italian peninsula from 1815 to 1870. The unification of Italy affords the most fruitful field in all history for the study of nationalism in its different phases. Working for and against the national ideal we see the play of forces between liberalism and conservatism, anticlericalism and clericalism, tradition and reality, history and imagination, constitutionalism and anti-constitutionalism, and the ultimate goal and the immediate object. They are all mixed up—sometimes on one side, sometimes on the other. The influences from outside brought to bear to encourage or block the progress of Italian nationalism are as interesting a study as similar influences we have mentioned in the Balkans. The ethnic idea was there, as in Germany. The economic

influences, although not as powerfully felt at any time, were in reality as great as in Germany.

But what makes the story of Italian nationalism unique is the pure idealism of the Risorgimento up to 1848, and the combination of clever statesmanship and Quixotic heroism that brought it to fruition during the stage of action. There were the writings of Mazzini, Balbo, Gioberti, and Pellico to work upon the minds of the element that was everywhere the backbone of nationalism; the cold but intense patriotic ability of Cavour to bring every international influence and every economic argument to the aid of the Risorgimento; and the incredible intuition of Garibaldi to seize the right moment for his spectacular interventions.

Is there any fiction that equals the story of Italian unification? I think not. At least I have never read more fascinating stories than the simple record of the most picturesque episodes of the nineteenth century, which center around Garibaldi and Mazzini, aiding the Revolution of 1830 from their exile; the Carbonari and their battles in 1848; the Roman Republic of 1849; and all that followed up to the departure of the French from Rome in 1870. Let me give several illustrations to whet your appetite for the Risorgimento.

A Genoese ship was in the harbor of Montevideo, and a sailor on the deck looking through a telescope spied a girl on the porch of a house up on the hillside. He went ashore to find out who she was, fell in love, married her. Do you know that this was the Anita whom Garibaldi carried dying in his arms up the

hill road to San Marino when the Austrians were tracking him across Italy after his first glorious failure? A member of the Carbonari fired on Napoleon III in Paris in the heyday of his glory, recalling thus to him the oath of his youth to that secret organization. On the following New Year's Day reception at the Tuileries, Napoleon paused before the Austrian ambassador, and said words to him that foreshadowed French intervention in Lombardy. The battle of Solferino a few months later broke the power of Austria in Italy, and made possible Italian unification. But on the battlefield Napoleon and Franz Josef had an interview, in which the French emperor evidently agreed to end the war at the moment of victory, leaving Venetia to the Austrians. No one knows what was said in the tent there that day, and Franz Josef died more than half a century later, during the World War, without giving the secret to history. When Cavour learned that Napoleon was not going to insist upon the cession of Venetia, he contemplated suicide. And a Swiss tourist, traversing the field of Solferino shortly after the battle, was so impressed with the agony of wounded soldiers that he founded the Red Cross Society. When Garibaldi and his Red Shirts were hurrying northward toward Rome, after liberating Sicily and winning over the Kingdom of Naples to the unification movement, they met Victor Emmanuel and the royalists of Piedmont coming southward. Garibaldi's republicans would have fired had he said the word. But the hero of the Risorgimento, who had done the work, realized

that international recognition of unity for Italy would come only through Piedmont and the House of Savoy. He went on foot to the stirrup of Victor Emmanuel, did homage to him before the troops, and said, "My king!" Then he withdrew to obscurity, leaving the reward and glory to a timid man who had had neither his vision nor his faith.

Well, these are only a few of the stories we could tell. Are you interested in this epic of nationalism? Read the three books of George Macauley Trevelyan—"Garibaldi's Defense of the Roman Republic," "Garibaldi and the Thousand," and "Garibaldi and the Making of Italy." After that take W. R. Thayer's biography of Cavour.

Although the Tugendbund in Prussia was the first nationalist organization of youth to influence history, the "Young Italy" of the Risorgimento was the model and inspiration of other national groups bearing similar titles, that have been upsetting ever since the solemn decisions of statesmen determined to maintain the status quo. We study nationalism in Italy, not only for its accomplishment at home, but for its remarkable influence upon nationalism everywhere else, which is still at work.

After the unsuccessful Revolution of 1848, the young nobleman and farmer of Piedmont, who had been supporting the unification idea for many years at a court and among a class that it had not touched deeply, devoted himself to the liberalization of the régime in his country. Cavour became Prime Minister in 1852.

Piedmont, the Italian Savoy in the northwestern corner of Italy, with Turin as its capital, was the land portion of the Kingdom of Sardinia. Cavour took Victor Emmanuel in hand, made him see that Piedmont could do for Italy what Prussia was doing for Germany, and induced him to accept the program and the coöperation of the nationalists whom he instinctively distrusted and feared. To get recognition among the powers of Europe, Cavour joined the Franco-English Alliance against Russia, and sent Sardinian soldiers to the Crimea. He made Victor Emmanuel agree to pay for France's aid in 1859 by giving up the portion of Savoy and the Riviera that lay west of the Alps, and consenting to the marriage of a young princess of Savoy to a member of the Bonaparte family.

The liberation of Lombardy and the overthrow by Garibaldi of the despotic ruler of Naples resulted in the formation of the constitutional monarchy of Italy, with Victor Emmanuel as King. But much remained yet to be done. Austria still held the province of Venetia and the rest of the inheritance of the Venetian Republic. The Pope still ruled in Rome, which all the leaders of the Risorgimento declared would have to be the capital of the new Italy. Without Venice and Rome Italy was not yet a united country. The opportunity to get Venetia came when Prussia and Austria went to war in 1866. Prussia compelled Austria to surrender Venetia to Italy in the Treaty of Prague.

But Napoleon III, who had helped in the emancipation of Italy, did not dare to go against the strong

Catholic feeling in French government circles. He had promised to sustain the Pope, and this he did by sending a garrison to Rome to protect the temporal power of the Papacy. But when France was defeated by Germany in 1870, the garrison was withdrawn. Victor Emmanuel then marched into Rome, disregarding papal protests, and made it the capital of the united Italy. The two last stages of German and Italian unification thus coincided.

What changes in fifty-five years! Metternich proposed, but nationalism disposed.

IV

NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS FROM 1870 TO 1914

I HAVE been asked why I take the dates of wars to mark my periods. Why should not constructive events of peace be more to the point in studying the past? Wars, revolutions, acts of violence—are these more important in retrospect than the invention of the steam engine, the cotton gin, and the telegraph? Was a battle fought by Napoleon a more significant date to remember, and mark an epoch by, than the construction of the first international railroad or the initiation of the first plant to generate electricity from water power?

It may well be that history of the future will emphasize more constructive forces and less destructive forces, will pay more attention to economics and sociology and less to politics, will seek to trace and explain cultural currents rather than the noisy manifestations of national feeling and racial antagonism as the transcendent forces in the evolution of the modern state. Thoughtful educators are thinking along these lines. But we belong to a generation that took to the sword, and, after more than four years of fighting in which almost the whole world was engaged, dictated by force a peace settlement on the basis of *vae victis*—woe to the conquered.

The subject of nationalism cannot be divorced from violence. Nationalism calls for the spilling of blood, at birth and during growth; its successive steps—so far—have been marked by wars. We have tried to show, however, that the constructive economic forces were silently at work, irresistibly changing peoples into nations. And yet we cannot do otherwise than take the dates we have chosen. For the period after 1870, for instance, could we find another termination than 1914? Hardly, for the war that broke out then had its origins, remote and immediate, in the conflicting aspirations of nationalism in European countries. The skeins, interwoven at the end to make war unavoidable, are precisely what we are trying to untangle, describe, and explain. When peoples fly at one another's throats, it is no simple incident, accidental and unexpected, that furnishes the motive. And when some naively impute the blame—the sole responsibility—to a single nation, we remember the old saw: "It takes two to make a quarrel."

We were unable to discuss adequately the development of nationalism between 1815 and 1870 in any of the twelve countries and regions under review. I had to resist the temptation of dwelling on the picturesque side of the Italian Risorgimento. The survey of the steps in the unification of Germany was also briefer than I wanted to make. The outstanding events of the period, and its culmination, were: (1) the unification of the German states, except Austria, on the battlefield of Sedan; and (2) the unification of Italy

on the day Victor Emmanuel entered Rome. Both these events took place within two months of each other in 1870.

One would have thought that these successes, far beyond their dreams, would have satisfied the two new states. But nationalism in Europe is like imperialism in Europe overseas—the appetite grows in eating. Instead of letting well enough alone, the German Empire decided to make France give up Alsace-Lorraine. Italy believed that her frontiers with France and Austria should not stop at the mountains but should pass over natural geographical limits to embrace in united Italy the Riviera as far as Antibes (Garibaldi was a native of Nice); the Trentino; the northern end of the Adriatic; and even the Dalmatian Coast and islands. Italy wanted Corsica and Malta also on ethnic grounds. For strategic reasons she wanted the Ionian Islands. From the beginning of the Risorgimento Mazzini and Balbo had taught that Tunisia and Tripoli were essential to united Italy. Had they not been the granaries of imperial Rome? Here were two burning problems of nationalism which worked against durable peace in Europe and against international understanding and coöperation.

On the battlefield of Koeniggratz in 1866, Bismarck entreated his king not to march Prussian troops into Vienna. He pointed out that the aim of the war was not the humiliation of Austria but the exclusion of Austria from the Germanic Confederation, where she had been a baneful influence working against German

unity. Bismarck wanted friendship with Austria, or at least no bitter souvenir. The king yielded. But when Bismarck thought that it was unwise to annex Alsace and the German-speaking portion of Lorraine, his counsel did not prevail. His reasons were sound, that, after having achieved German unity, claims to this borderland had better be waived than create a permanent source of hostility. The militarists declared that the strategic frontier for Germany was the Vosges, and the nationalists claimed Alsace as an integral part of the Deutschthum they were building.

As a problem in nationalism Alsace-Lorraine deserves special study. From the ethnic point of view the Germans had a case. Were not the Alsatians German-speaking? And historically they were as much a part of the Germanic Confederation as any of the other German states. They had been incorporated into France by conquest. Now the day of emancipation had arrived. This was all right in theory and on paper. But France had a counter-claim historically, and the Rhine was a reasonable boundary from the geographical point of view. The interesting feature of the Alsatian question was that these people, although German-speaking, had no ethnic national consciousness. Nor were they culturally drawn toward the new Germany. They had belonged to France at the time of the birth of national feeling. They had lived as Frenchmen the periods of 1789 to 1815 and 1815 to 1870. Therefore, they had national affinity with the French because of participating in the Revolution and

the Napoleonic epopee. Was not the *Marseillaise* written in Strasbourg? Did not Napoleon draw for his armies up to the rank of marshal from Alsace? In the final analysis, nationality, claimed the Alsatians, was a matter of volition. They declared at Bordeaux, before the treaty was signed, and afterwards in the German Reichstag, that they had been transferred from one sovereignty to another against their will, and that they refused to accept being treated like cattle.

Had the Germans made the annexed territory a German state, with representation in the Bundesrath, it is possible that community of language and the development of common economic interests—for united Germany quickly prospered—would have reconciled the Alsatians in the course of time to the new sovereignty. But Alsace-Lorraine was made a Reichsland, and it was administered as conquered territory. The new Germany was unable therefore to assimilate territory which she felt was historically, geographically, and racially a part of the Teutonic Empire.

Nearly twenty years after the annexation, in 1887, protesting deputies were returned to the Reichstag in overwhelming numbers, despite the governmental weapons of intimidation, disenfranchisement, and North German immigration. The younger generation was continually running away to become naturalized, so that they could serve in the French instead of the German army, or if they were too late or technicalities prevented naturalization, enlist in the Foreign Legion. The second generation was as irreconcilable as the

first. After forty-two years, Kaiser Wilhelm II, on a visit to Strasbourg in 1912, felt that he had to use threatening language to the Alsatians. He said:

> Listen. Up to now you have only known the good side of me: you could learn the other side of me! Things cannot continue as they are. If this situation lasts, we shall suppress your constitution and annex you to Prussia.

I entered Strasbourg with the French army in November, 1918, and will never forget the demonstrations of joy on the part of the people, very few of whom knew a word of French. I was present at the occupation of Metz, Mulhouse, Colmar, and other Alsatian cities. It was the same everywhere. This people of Germanic stock, of Germanic language, and, at the bottom, of Germanic culture and habits of thought, after nearly half a century under Germanic rule, displayed its French nationalism.

By right of the strongest, Germany had annexed land from France. But she had not thereby secured the full-hearted transfer of the allegiance of those who inhabited the land. A new precedent was created: it was a striking precedent of its kind because the people of Alsace were German-speaking. It should have served as a lesson to the peacemakers of 1918, who committed the same type of mistake in thinking they could fix frontiers in defiance of the will of the people. But of these things we shall speak later.

The effect of the loss of Alsace-Lorraine on the French was tremendous. It poisoned the minds and

hearts of a whole generation. The attitude toward new Germany was one of as bitter hostility as is the attitude of Germany toward France at the end of the first decade after the World War. Before nationalism arose to intensify passions in time of war and to make war a conflict of people against people rather than government against government, reconciliation after fighting was comparatively simple. Most of the people did not feel deeply, and were not touched in their economic interests, by the wars for which their dynasties were responsible. Outside the path of invasion it made little difference. But France of the third Republic never got over the humiliation of the War of 1870, not because of military defeats, but because of the necessity of ratifying the Treaty of Frankfort despite the impassioned plea of the Alsatian deputies at Bordeaux. Up to 1870 change of nationality by border peoples was a hazard of war, which was accepted philosophically. Since 1870 Alsace gave the example which has been followed in almost every similar case since then.

We have spoken of the aspirations of Italy. Mazzini, when he started to preach Italian unity, made extensive claims as to the limits of the state of which he dreamed. The new Italy was to have not only her ethnic borders but also the inheritance of Rome and the medieval maritime republics.

Every nation thinks, in its claims to territory, that it should have the benefit of all the arguments—ethnic, historical, geographical, economic, and strategic. But

each of these arguments, when invoked with identically the same logic and force by the counter-claimant, is indignantly denied. In fact, after an extensive study of nationalist propaganda of all countries for more than twenty years, I believe that the stout nationalist must assert against all comers, "Heads I win, and tails you lose." That is the unlovely side of nationalism. There is no give and take. It is wholly selfish, wholly heartless, wholly unreasonable. Ethnic and geographical arguments can be fairly well substantiated. But not always even these! As for historical and strategic arguments, they are, generally speaking, both unjust and ungenerous. When the tables are turned, and an oppressed nation is emancipated, it applies the opposite of the Golden Rule in its dealings with peoples of other racial stock. The wrongs it complained of, when under dog, it inflicts on others, when upper dog.

Because she was young and powerless, Italy had no chance to free what she called her *terre irredente*—her unredeemed lands. Great Britain gave the Ionian Islands to Greece in 1863, anticipating a demand from Italy for them. Although there are no English in Malta, and the first act of the Maltese Parliament, when the island was given self-government, was to vote for "reunion with Italy," Great Britain has not allowed the Maltese the right to dispose of themselves. British naval necessity is regarded as a justification for stifling the nationalist aspirations of the Maltese people. There never has been anything that Italy could do about it, owing to Great Britain's mastery of the sea. As re-

gards the transalpine Riviera and Corsica, Italian ambitions have always seemed futile and have never been taken seriously. Inhabitants of these regions are far more French than Italian; they have not been under an alien government and expressed the desire for union with Italy, as has Malta.

The principal fields of Italian irredentism between unification and the World War were the North African Coast, the Trentino, the Trieste and Fiume regions, and the Dalmatian Coast. So bitter was the Italian resentment against France for having anticipated her in Tripoli that Italy joined the Triple Alliance two years after it was formed, and remained the ally of Germany and Austria-Hungary for more than thirty years. Tripoli was the subject of secret negotiations with the two powers who were navally supreme in the Mediterranean, France and Great Britain: in 1912 Italy found a pretext for war with Turkey. An Italian army occupied Tripoli, which the Turks were unable to defend. The Italians have been trying ever since to bring it under administrative control. But Tripoli is not Tunisia! France still holds what Italian nationalists call their Naboth's vineyard.

The most important, the most serious, field for Italian irredentist propaganda and agitation from 1870 to 1914 was in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It was strategic and historic, as well as ethnic, nationalism. In the Trentino, across the border from the new Italy, was a large Italian population. The cities of Trieste and Fiume, at the head of the Adriatic, were regarded

as Italian. Dalmatia had virtually no Italians in her population, except in two or three ports. But this coast had once belonged to Venice—and before that to the Roman Empire. The Italian nationalists pointed out that the Adriatic side of the peninsula of Italy had no ports, from Venice to Otranto, and no islands. The ports and islands were all on the other side. United Italy could not tolerate their being held indefinitely by a hostile power.

Irredentism here struck at the very heart of the existence of the Dual Monarchy. Trieste was the only port of Austria, and Fiume of Hungary. If Italian pretensions were sustained, a larger political organism than Italy would be cut off entirely from the sea. Italy had access to the sea on the other side of her narrow peninsula. If her strategic policy demanded that the Adriatic be a *mare italicum,* how much more did Austria and Hungary need at least a share of it? And then Italy was an ally of the very country against whose security and prosperity her irredentism militated. It was a curious situation, which, when the World War broke out, ended in Italy's abandoning her allies and ranging herself with her enemies.

Italy was not the only country that dreamed of rounding out its territories at the expense of Austria-Hungary. As we have seen, the Dual Monarchy, given a new lease of life under that form of government in 1867, contained numerous ethnic elements. With the exception of the Czechs, all these were in regions with contiguous populations of the same ethnic stock across

the frontiers. As the Hapsburgs held Lombardy until 1859, and Venetia until 1866, Italian irredentism did not make itself felt until after the Revolution of 1848, which might easily have led to the disintegration of the Empire, had there been anything to disintegrate into! It was only after 1870 that Italian nationalism began to trouble Vienna, and after 1878, when the Congress of Berlin gave the Balkan nationalities political status, that the Hapsburg Empire was threatened by Serbian and Rumanian nationalism.

The Poles of Galicia played in with the Austrians throughout the period under survey because Galicia, in which they were predominant, contained a strong and militant Ukrainian minority. The Galician Poles before 1914 showed the same spirit that resurrected Poland has shown since 1919. They cried to high Heaven against the injustice and cruelty of their political subjection. But they in turn were as merciless to their underlings as their overlords had been to them.

In Hungary we had another example of the same sad trait of human nature. All the world had sympathized with the Magyars in 1848 and 1849, with Kossuth, Deák, and the other leaders. But when Austria made her bargain with the Magyars, as she did with the Poles, and the Magyars had a free hand in Hungary, their oppression of Croats, Dalmatians, Rumanians, and Ruthenians was terrible beyond words. I travelled in many countries before the war. In none did I see nationalism, in its bad aspects, more hatefully

displayed than in Hungary. I say this although I love the country and admire its people.

One can understand, without approving, what has happened since the tables were turned in Danubian countries since the World War if he knows how for half a century the Magyars acted toward the peoples of other ethnic stock. At Budapest, fascinating and enlightened cosmopolitan city, nationalism did not display its unpleasant features—except in the legislative bodies. But once outside the purely Magyar belt, one saw constantly instances of Magyar arrogance and intolerance that shocked him. The Hungarian officials on the railroads and in government services were overbearing and insulting. They treated the people with whom they had to deal, if they did not speak Hungarian, abominably. I have found railroad stations, for instance, in wholly non-Hungarian districts where the time tables and information for travellers were only in the Hungarian language. I have gone to police officials who refused to talk German, although they knew German and knew that their own language could not be spoken by the average traveller. Non-Hungarian subjects had constant annoyances—petty as well as serious at the hands of postal and tax authorities. Except where all the expense could be defrayed by local taxation, there was not even primary education provided by the state for non-Magyars.

Alas! Since the World War I have travelled through the same regions, and find that where there are Hungarians under Czech or Serbian or Rumanian rule,

they put the thumb-screws down on them in the same way. The Hungarians and Poles of the old Hapsburg Empire, studied on the ground as I have studied them, remind me of the couplet:

> Fleas have other fleas to bite 'em,
> And so on—ad infinitum!

The Austro-Hungarian Empire was saved, first by the late achievement of national unity and independence by the neighbors whose ethnic kin were inside the frontiers of the Dual Monarchy; by the connivance —or rather support—of the aristocracy of the non-German and non-Magyar elements; and by the large degree of economic prosperity that the country enjoyed. The first of these saving factors gradually disappeared from 1870 to 1913, when the Balkan Wars put the seal of success upon Serbian and Rumanian nationalism. But the second and third factors were deterrents to disintegration until the very end. We shall show later how the second factor worked to the benefit of the Hapsburgs during the World War. The third factor has not been sufficiently emphasized by those who have written on the fifty years of the Dual Monarchy.

We have seen how the Alsatians were unaffected by ethnic nationalism. Other influences were more powerful in attaching them to France. In Austria-Hungary the subject element in the cities—all those who had to do with commerce and industry—were opposed to the dissolution of the Empire and to being redeemed by

their "brothers of blood." I remember a prominent Italian of Trieste telling me one day about twenty years ago that if the Italians came to Trieste, he would fall in with the Germans to drive them off. When I asked him why, he answered that he was in the shipping business, and that he knew Venice would immediately try to destroy Trieste if there were ever a union with Italy. In my study of nationalism in Austria-Hungary before the World War I came across numerous examples of the truth of the adage that "Where your treasure is, there is your heart also." Non-Germans and non-Magyars who had landed estates were all for Franz Josef and union. They felt that if nationalism triumphed, and the Empire were to dissolve, drastic agrarian laws would deprive them of their holdings.

We do not want to belittle the work of the men whose life-long devotion to nationalism has finally triumphed, through the accident of the World War, but it must be said that the devotees of the subversive nationalist movements in the Austro-Hungarian Empire—the men who intrigued with neighboring countries—were almost invariably professional men and students—professors, doctors, dentists, briefless lawyers, and youngsters. You see, they had no stake in the country: they could leave at a moment's notice, and not be worse off materially than they were at home.

We have noticed this same law of human nature working in the case of refugees during wars and optants after wars. Most of the refugees who flee before

an invading army are people who have been economic failures—they could afford to leave, because they were not leaving anything. What was ahead might even be better than what was behind. In refugee work in France, at the beginning of the World War, I used to say to other workers who had quickly come to dislike the Belgians, that they must not judge the Belgians by the refugees. I had learned that in earlier wars. The really worthwhile people among refugees are generally neurotic. As for optants, although there are exceptions to prove the rule, the same type is likely to refuse the new nationality and emigrate. Of course there are always intellectuals and the very young.

The strength of the Dual Monarchy—and it did have strength—was in the fact that membership in a powerful political organism, which could bargain for and exact tariff privileges and which could see that its citizens were not discriminated against and were protected in their rights in commerce throughout the world, was highly appreciated during the industrial development of the second half of the nineteenth century in the Danubian countries. Had Bohemia, for instance, become independent, had Poland been revived in 1848, could there possibly have been the industrial development that took place in Bohemia, Moravia, and Galicia? During the reign of Franz Josef, Vienna grew from 600,000 to 2,500,000, and Budapest from 200,000 to 1,300,000. Do you know Vienna and Budapest? Are there more charming cities anywhere in the world, cities with more varied

resources, cities more worthy by right of public buildings and physical aspect to rank high among the great capitals of the world? Political unity spelled prosperity with the subjects of Franz Josef engaged in industry or commerce.

The Germans of the post-1870 period were good nationalists because of ethnic pride plus growing revenues. Austro-Hungarians did not feel the ethnic pride, because what was being accomplished in building the country was not the work of one race. But they, too, could have the feeling of the heavy purse.

And now we shall see how Austria-Hungary's very existence was menaced by what happened in the Balkans.

We left the crumbling Ottoman Empire bolstered up by the aid of Great Britain and France, who fought Russia in 1854 to check the spread of national movements in Turkey—movements which the Occidental powers feared Russia would use to get down to the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf. Having to make themselves champions of the Turks against their Christian subjects was a constant embarrassment to British statesmen, who always used to say that the Turks were going to reform. These reforms did not materialize. We have seen how in the 1860's Crete and the Lebanon secured autonomy, and how Rumania was formed, in defiance of the powers, by the union of the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia. In the same decade the Bulgarian nation got official recognition from the Sublime Porte through the Sultan's decree, clothing

Orthodox Church in Bulgaria with an independent status under its own Exarch. Heretofore, it had been simply a part of the Orthodox Church controlled by the Greeks. In the 1870's, momentous events took place that advanced the nationalism of the various Balkan peoples, despite the opposition of the British Government.

After the Franco-Prussian War Russia declared that she would no longer be bound by the Treaty of Paris, which had compelled her to agree to the neutralization of the Black Sea. This was an indication that Russia was preparing to resume an aggressive policy in the Ottoman Empire. Having lost her hold in Italy by the wars of 1859 and 1866, Austria-Hungary logically felt that the Balkans, being next door, afforded opportunity for commercial expansion. It was imperative also for Vienna to intervene in the Balkans to prevent the growth of Serb nationalism to such an extent that it would harm her. And Germany, not having colonies and being compelled to find markets and raw materials, looked to Turkey as a promising field. There was bitter rivalry in the Near East between Great Britain and France, and between Austria-Hungary and Russia. When Germany entered on the scene, Great Britain feared both her commercial competition and her penetration into Asia Minor, Arabia, and Persia. Great Britain revived her policy toward Russia of the Crimean War days.

Insurrections broke out in the Balkans in 1875. They were followed by Russian intervention. Rumania

joined Russia. Despite Gladstone's denunciation of "the Red Sultan" for the massacres in Bulgaria, only Russia went to the aid of the Bulgarian people. The Russian army, after the stubborn resistance of the Turks at Plevna, marched to the gates of Constantinople and compelled Turkey to sign the Treaty of San Stefano. This treaty was nothing less than a charter of Balkan nationalism. Turkey recognized the independence of Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro, with additions of territory. An autonomous state of Bulgaria, including part of Thrace and Macedonia, was created. Reforms were promised in Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Armenia. Rumania was given, by transfer from Russia, most of the Dobrudja, provided Rumania would recede the part of Bessarabia given to her at Russia's expense by the Treaty of Paris.

But Great Britain threatened war. She had sent her fleet to the Dardanelles, and it looked as though the tragedy of the Crimean War would be re-enacted. The British were bitterly opposed to any extension of nationalism in the Balkans, and to any emancipation from Turkey, if it were to help the policy of Russia. Bismarck intervened as "an honest broker" to avert war. A conference of the great powers was arranged to be held at Berlin, with the idea that all the powers and Turkey would sign a joint treaty establishing and guaranteeing the Balkan situation.

The Congress of Berlin established a new principle in the direction of European affairs. At Vienna, in 1815, victors in a war gathered to make peace. The

territories whose fate they decided belonged to the countries engaged in the war or affected by it through invasion and actual changes made under the Napoleonic régime. The Congress of Paris, in 1856, assembled after a war in which some of its members had been involved, and it confined its work, in so far as territorial matters were concerned, to the regions and problems on account of which the war had been fought. The Congress of Berlin, in 1878, was a veritable "Concert of the Great Powers." It was called, not to reëstablish boundaries upset by war, not as a peace conference between victors and vanquished, but in order to prevent war.

The curious thing about it was that since the Congress of Paris three of the six Great Powers had been created by the triumph of nationalism in wars. Prussia had fought Denmark, Austria, and France. Austria had fought France and Piedmont, then Prussia and the new Kingdom of Italy. She had also participated in the war over the dutchies against Denmark. Sardinia (Piedmont), we remember, had intervened in the Crimean War in order to get international standing in the peace conference that would follow. Great Britain and France had fought Russia to save Turkey. Russia had fought Turkey three times within fifty years to emancipate the Christians of the Ottoman Empire. Great Britain, as we have seen, was ready to renew the war against Russia.

There had been too many wars! Europe was exhausted. 1854, 1859, 1864, 1866, 1870, 1877. It was

too much! Industrialism was making the Powers prosperous, and they were beginning to intensify and greatly enlarge the scope of their politico-economic activities in Africa and Asia. The Suez Canal had been in operation for eight years, and it had made a great change. International finance wanted no more wars, and said so quite plainly. Most important of all, the big questions that Vienna had not settled seemed to have been solved by these wars. Germany and Italy, having achieved their union, and Austria having found a new *modus vivendi,* were ready to frown with the others upon any new troubles due to nationalism. Russia, in fact, was much in the same frame of mind as the other Great Powers. She did not have more submerged nations under her rule than Great Britain. But hers were all in contiguous territory, and the Polish problem was one of prime importance that she shared with the new Germany and the new Austria-Hungary.

Utter selfishness, callous indifference to the rights of the weak or to their sufferings, have probably always been the keynote of diplomacy. This was never more strikingly illustrated than at Berlin. Disraeli was the dominant factor in the Congress. But the statesmen of the other powers were imbued with the same determination as he was to preserve peace, even if it meant the sacrifice of everything the Balkan insurgents had gained by the outpouring of their blood.

A sop was thrown to the feelings of the British Liberals, of whom Gladstone was the spokesman, in

certain clauses—proven later to be meaningless—protecting the rights of Armenians, Cretans, Macedonians, and other subject peoples. The regions in Asia Minor of ancient Armenia, which Russia had freed from the Turks, were partly put back under Turkish rule, thus eventually condemning their inhabitants to death. Macedonia was restored to Turkey, and we shall see how fatal that was not only to the Christians of the region but to the peace of Europe. Greater Bulgaria, which the treaty of San Stefano had created, was reduced to a small autonomous province, and south of the main Balkan range a semi-autonomous Bulgarian province of Eastern Rumelia was provided for. As in the case of Greece in 1830, the object of British diplomacy was to make the emancipated country as small and weak as possible. Berlin did recognize the independence of Montenegro, Serbia, and Rumania. But Rumania, although she had been an ally of Russia in the war, was compelled to cede back Bessarabia to Russia; and Austria-Hungary, instead of Serbia, was given the administration of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the privilege of maintaining a garrison in the Turkish Sandjak of Novibazar—to separate Serbs and Montenegrins!

Disraeli told his compatriots, when he returned to London, that he had brought back "peace with honor." The expression has remained in the language, like "Order reigns in Warsaw." The Conservative Prime Minister lived to see neither the renewal of the massacres in Armenia and Macedonia nor the multiplica-

tion of crises that led to the World War. The Concert of Great Powers, when they consulted their own interests at Berlin, thought they were establishing peace. All they were doing was putting off the evil day, and thus making it worse when it did come.

Just as in Central Europe after the Congress of Vienna, the permanent status quo had not been established by the fiat of Metternich and his fellows, so, after the Congress of Berlin, the status quo in the Balkans and the Ottoman Empire was not established by the fiat of Disraeli and his fellows. It is a long and involved story, the development of nationalism in the Balkans and Turkey from the Congress of Vienna to the World War. But we must give, within the limits imposed upon us, an outline of what happened. It was my great privilege to be an eye witness of the events of the fateful years that ended this period, from the restoration of the Constitution at Constantinople in 1908 to the Treaty of Bucharest in 1913.

There was a "Young Turk" party in the Ottoman Empire as early as 1876. Turks who had studied in Europe were fired with the democratic and nationalistic aspirations, which they had seen marvelously realized, of the Germans and Italians. They felt that Turkey could be saved from destruction only by constitutionalism. They were able to depose two Sultans, and to force Abdul Hamid to promulgate a constitution as the price of his accession to the throne. The moment was critical, in 1876, with insurrections in the Balkans, and Russia on the point of declaring war. But British

intervention and the Congress of Berlin saved Abdul Hamid, enabled him to suppress the constitution, and rule as a despotic monarch for thirty years.

Those thirty years, between 1878 and 1908, did not arrest the progress of the nationalism of the Balkan peoples, and, in a lesser and more feeble degree, of non-Turkish and Turkish elements within the empire. Had Turkey been left to herself, to experience the normal evolution that nationalist movements in Western and Central Europe had gone through, the Christian peoples of the Balkans might have come to an entente before bad blood arose, and the Mohammedan and non-Mohammedan elements in the Ottoman Empire might have developed a common national spirit. But the Powers, especially Russia and Austria-Hungary, intrigued against one another in the Balkans, and scrambled for economic concessions in Asia Minor and Arabia. Abdul Hamid made capital out of conflicting Balkan national aspirations and the rivalries, jealousies, and suspicions of the Great Powers.

In 1885 Prince Alexander of Bulgaria issued the first defiance to the status quo of the Congress of Berlin by proclaiming himself "Prince of North and South Bulgaria," and declared that Eastern Rumelia was united to the principality of Bulgaria. The Bulgarians were following the example of the Rumanians who had similarly upset the status quo of the Congress of Paris. The history of nationalism has shown that nothing is more ridiculous than to keep apart regions of the same race and language by a mere treaty stipula-

tion, when the artificial boundary drawn is between independent or autonomous organisms. The same thing was done at Paris in 1919. The Allied Powers gravely wrote into the Treaties of Versailles and St. Germain that Germany and Austria must forever remain apart. They forgot the consistent history of nationalism!

It took the Powers ten years to recognize the union of Eastern Rumelia with Bulgaria. But the Bulgarians did not care. They were having a remarkable success in unifying their country, combatting illiteracy, developing its resources, and building up an army, so that they would be ready for the next step in their national evolution. Only an annual tribute, paid in Constantinople, was the recognition of their vassalage.

Armenian nationalism continued to develop in the regions of ancient Armenia left to Turkey by the Congress of Berlin. The articles, promising reforms and protecting the Armenians, which Disraeli had put into the treaty to justify before the British public opinion what he had done at Berlin, were not carried out. When Armenian nationalism grew strong, Abdul Hamid, in 1894, began to massacre them. The massacres, continued in 1895 and 1896, shocked the civilized world. But the Powers limited themselves to futile representations at the Sublime Porte. Germany was getting concessions for railroads in Asia Minor, and did not want to indispose the Turks. Great Britain, more fearful of Russian ambitions in the Near East than at any time before—even than in 1854 and 1877—

believed that intervention would only strengthen the expansion of Russia. Consequently, the British relieved their conscience by establishing orphanages for the children of the victims of the massacres.

Equally important with the problem of the Armenians was that of the Greeks. As we have said, independent Greece helped little the cause of Hellenism. Its weakness and incapacity was so great that the existence of the kingdom often seemed a reproach to Hellenic nationalism. This was exactly what the Occidental Powers had intended. Greeks belonged to the Orthodox Church. A Greater Greece seemed to British and French statesmen of the nineteenth century a calamity to be avoided at all costs because of the extension of Russian influence to the Mediterranean, which they believed would inevitably follow any revival of Hellenism on a large scale.

In 1878, to prevent a possible foothold of Russia near the Suez Canal, a majority of the shares in which Great Britain had recently acquired, Disraeli secretly negotiated with Turkey an arrangement for British administration of the Greek island of Cyprus. This was a great blow to Hellenism. Another blow was the refusal of the Powers at any time to countenance the extension of Greek Sovereignty over Crete and the Aegean Islands. Crete had a special status. But insurrection after insurrection led finally to the first of the wars of the contemporary period in Europe, a war which most of us remember. Little independent Greece was in no position to wage single-handed war

on land against Turkey. But Hellenic nationalism was so strong that King George would have lost his throne had he not declared war to help Crete. The Turks would have marched into Athens, had not the Powers intervened. As it was, Greece was required to cede a strip of Thessaly to Turkey. But Crete won full autonomy. This was in 1897. Followed ten years of struggle over the determination of the Cretans to unite with Greece. The old problem of nationalism again! The Powers could not prevent the union of Moldavia and Wallachia to form Rumania, and the union of Eastern Rumelia with Bulgaria. But, as Crete was an island, it was easy to send their fleets there and solemnly tell the Cretan "brigands" that they must haul down the Greek flag, and rehoist that of Turkey. It was in the insurrection of 1905 in Crete that Venizelos first attracted international attention.

The Balkan peoples, with the exception of the Montenegrins, who were content with their mountain and little window on the sea, and the Albanians, who were racially and religiously separated, the Balkan racial groups coupled their effort to develop stable political organisms with a movement for the inclusion of regions peopled by the same ethnic stock beyond the limits they had attained. We have spoken of Greater Greece as the aspiration of Hellenic nationalism. Well, there were also Greater Bulgaria, Greater Rumania, and Greater Serbia. It is important for us to get a clear idea of what these nationalistic movements meant at the beginning of the twentieth century. For in them

we find the immediate cause of the World War, and one of the major remoter causes. Please be patient with me, therefore, if I define each one of these, and show its tendency at the moment when Young Turkey burst upon the scene with a program for the regeneration of the Ottoman Empire.

(1). Greater Greece. The center of Hellenic nationalism was Constantinople. There lived the patriarch of the Orthodox Church, and in Constantinople were more Greeks than in Athens. Athens was not to become the center of the Hellenic movement until after the Young Turk Revolution and the departure of Venizelos from Crete to become premier of the Kingdom of Greece. Second in importance to Constantinople was Smyrna, also a city in which there were more Greeks than in Athens. Greek nationalism flourished along the Anatolian littoral of the Aegean Sea, and in the islands. As a whole, the Greeks under Ottoman rule were better educated than those of independent Greece: they were certainly more thoroughly imbued with the spirit of nationalism. Hellenism meant to them emancipation in the fullest sense—equality before the law, equality of opportunity in business, security of life and property. Then there were Epirus, the coast cities of Macedonia, Rhodes and the other islands of the Dodecanese, Crete, and Cyprus. Hellenism was helped by foreign colonies of Greeks, at Alexandria, Khartum, Marseilles, Constanza, Odessa, and Rostof. The ideal was the substitution of Greek Christian for Turkish Mohammedan rule in all parts of the

former Byzantine Empire, as far as practicable, with Constantinople as capital. It must not be forgotten that ancient Greece gave no lesson of unity. The first ruler of united Hellas was a Macedonian—and long after his time, on the ruins of the Roman Empire, arose the Eastern Empire, which became Greek in culture, religion, and language.

(2). Greater Bulgaria. The Bulgarians dreamed of a country with the frontiers of the Bulgaria of the Treaty of San Stefano. Such a Bulgaria, they asserted, corresponded to ethnic reality in Macedonia and part of Thrace, and to economic necessity. Eastern Rumelia, they claimed, was only the beginning of the process that would have to go on until all the Bulgars were under one rule, as in medieval times before the Turks came.

(3). Greater Rumania. Like the Bulgarians, the Rumanians went back to pre-Ottoman days to establish their nationalistic goal. They aimed to restore Rumanian rule over all the country that their medieval chiefs and those of the beginning of the modern period had brought under their sway. In addition, they claimed everything that had at any time belonged to them, or been suggested as being possibly attributed to them in international conferences. By the historical method they established their claims to Transylvania, the Banat of Temesvar, Bukowina, at the expense of Hungary; to Bessarabia, at the expense of Russia; to an enclave on the south side of the Danube opposite the Iron Gates, at the expense of Serbia; and to the

Dobrudja, at the expense of Turkey and Bulgaria. The Dobrudja is the country lying south of the Danube, where that river turns sharply to the North before it reaches the Black Sea. Rumanian aspirations were as complete a mixture of ethnic, historical, economic, geographical, and strategic arguments as one could find in all the history of nationalism. Rumania was not different from any other country in wanting the sword of an argument to cut both ways in her favor. For instance Russia proposed to give the Dobrudja to Rumania in compensation for taking Bessarabia away from her. But the fact that the Dobrudja was offered by Russia was given to substantiate her claim to it, and at the same time she claimed Bessarabia.

(4). Greater Serbia. The Serbs were the first Balkan people to assert their nationhood in response to Napoleon's call. Their revolt preceded that of the Greeks by seventeen years, and its first successes were attained the year that Napoleon became French emperor. The Serbians, like the Rumanians, had obtained the recognition of their independence by the Powers and Turkey at Berlin in 1878. But they, like Greeks and Bulgarians, invoked medieval times, and declared that at the time of the Turkish conquest a large part of Macedonia was part of the kingdom of Stefan Dushan. Although they had never in all history been united closely with Dalmatians, Croatians, and Slovenes, the Serbians spoke of these people as being of their own race and blood, and dreamed of a reunion, which would be as much at the expense of the Austro-

Hungarian Empire as the unification of Italy had been in the fact and as it was embodied in the irredentist movement. In addition to these territories, the Serbians claimed on ethnic and historic grounds Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Novibazar, which were held by Austria-Hungary.

From this brief statement of the nationalistic aspirations of the four largest Balkan peoples it will readily be seen that: (a) The nationalism of Greece and Bulgaria was solely at the expense of Turkey; (b) that Rumania and Serbia could not fulfill their nationalism without the virtual destruction of the Dual Monarchy; (c) that the Balkan states, with the exception of Rumania, had overlapping claims in Macedonia.

We see the chances for mischief! The statesmen saw them too, and got busy. It was a glorious chance for the Turks to fish in troubled waters in Macedonia, to egg on the rival bands of Christians to terrorize villages and to fight one another. At the Sublime Porte, when the European newspapers denounced Turkish persecution of Balkan Christians, the answer was made that the Christians were doing one another in. The clever old Pasha who governed Macedonia told the correspondents who came to investigate the Macedonian question: "I am living among mad men in a mad house." And he certainly was. This was the time when the United States got interested in Macedonia through the kidnapping of Miss Ellen Stone by Bulgarian *comitadjis*. S. S. McClure, you remember, had just started his ten-cent magazine, and this was

his first big story. The Powers decided to help Turkey restore order and tried to establish an international gendarmerie in Macedonia. It was almost a hopeless task. Nationalism was so intense and bitter that the country was in a constant state of turmoil.

And then Italy and Germany entered in. They had not been much interested in the Balkans before. They were too new at the game.

Italy was as much alarmed as Austria at the evolution of Serbia. You see, when Serbia coveted Dalmatia, Austria was only the owner. Italy was the prospective heir, and you know how it is with expectant heirs! Serbian nationalism threatened a new danger, greater than the existing one perhaps, for Italy in the Adriatic. So the Italians went over into Albania, and tried to checkmate both Austria and Serbia there, at the same time that Serbia was intriguing against Austria and Italy. It nearly gives me a headache to describe this Balkan situation. Please bear with me for just a few words more, and then we come to the moments of real drama.

While Italy and Austria-Hungary were working together and against each other at the same time in Albania, Russia saw a great chance to use Serbian nationalism to destroy the Hapsburg Empire. She had been vaguely aware of the possibility, of course, throughout the nineteenth century. But after her defeat at the hands of Japan in the Far East in 1905, Russia turned her attention to the Balkans, and began there nine years of intrigue, blowing on the fire of

nationalism until it flamed into a war that brought the greatest of disasters to Russia herself.

Having lived in the Balkans during those years, I was able to see, before the storm broke, the result on the Serbian mind of Russian advice and pressure at Belgrade. There were enough Serbian-speaking subjects of the Hapsburgs north of the Adriatic and on its east coast and in the mountains behind to ruin the Dual Monarchy if they were ever strong enough to secede. Take the map, and trace out the provinces that Austria-Hungary lost to Serbia as a result of the World War. Bosnia, Herzegovina, Dalmatia, Novibazar, Croatia, Slovenia, the south-east corner of Hungary proper, and part of the Banat of Temesvar! The Serbs were Orthodox—and they were Slavs.

Then came the first of the years of destiny—1908, and with it a new complication in the sudden awakening of Turkish nationalism. My bride and I were at Oxford, going through a collection of pamphlets of the Guises of the sixteenth century—I mentioned them in tracing the development of French nationalism just before Henry IV—when Abdul Hamid was forced to revive the constitution. "A bloodless revolution," the heading of the newspaper I bought on the High Street said. Here was nationalism in the making. I looked at my bride. "Let's go!" she said.

And go we did, as fast as train and boat would carry us. We reached Smyrna six days later, in time to take part in the celebrations there, the next day Constantinople for the "reformed" Sultan's first Friday *selam-*

lik. Participants and witnesses of the ceremony at the mosque were bubbling over with enthusiasm and joy. Then to Syria—Beirut and the interior; and then to Asia Minor and the Taurus Mountains. In a few weeks, we saw in different parts of the Empire the manifestations of peoples of different races and religions. It looked too good to be true. It was too good to be true. So much was happening during these epic days in the history of nationalism that we stayed for five years—and then moved on to Paris to live through the main acts of the drama of which this was the prologue.

The Young Turk movement was quite different from any other nationalist movement. It was as if Austrians or Hungarians had tried something of the kind. Unlike Italy and Germany, but like Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire was a mixture of peoples, whose problem of living together under a common political organism was complicated by religious and cultural chasms. There were the same kind of irredentist influences working against the Osmanli as against the Hapsburgs—and as are working against Poland and Czechoslovakia today. The Young Turks launched the nationalist movement to save their country. They hastened its dissolution.

From without, the first blow came from Bulgaria. Ferdinand proclaimed the independence of his country, and changed his title from prince to king. Cretans once more asserted that their island was "an integral part of Greece," and sent deputies to the Athens Parlia-

ment. Austria-Hungary notified the other powers that Bosnia and Herzegovina, under her administration for thirty-two years, were formally annexed.

Internally, after it was seen that by Turkish nationalism was understood the dominance of the Turks in the administrative and constitutional life of the country, other elements, Mohammedan as well as Christian, refused their support. At the very beginning the Turks asserted their ethnic right to control the new Turkey. But they were not in the majority. They had never established administrative control over Arabic-speaking portions of the empire. The autocratic sultans had been wise enough to leave the Albanians largely to themselves, and to allow the Christians to run their own affairs. The result of the Young Turk pretension to monopolize Ottoman nationalism was a series of revolts. There were Armenian massacres in Cilicia and northern Syria, a serious rebellion of Mohammedan Arabs in the Hauram, a Kurdish rebellion, and a recurrent rebellion for three years, which could not be put down, in Albania.

Then what the European statesmen feared as much as the Turks happened in the Balkans. The four Balkan states, neighbors of Turkey, formed an alliance. This international manifestation of nationalism on the part of peoples that were bitter rivals came about this way. Italy, as we have seen, made war on Turkey in 1912 to seize the province of Tripoli—Turkey's last African possession. This war, and the Arab and Albanian rebellions, encouraged the Balkan states to join

together so that they would be strong enough to negotiate directly with the Turks about the Cretan and Macedonian situations—something that they had never done before. None of them had faith either in a regenerated Turkey or in the possibility of concerted and disinterested aid from the Great Powers. They had come to see that the only path of salvation lay in themselves, and that their disunion had enabled Turkey and the Powers to keep them in a subservient position.

Although the pressure of public opinion was great, especially in Bulgaria, after the massacres of the summer of 1912, I doubt whether any of the allies except Montenegro really wanted war. United, they felt that they could give a good account of themselves in war. But they were afraid of European intervention, and, more than that, of themselves, in their relations one to the other, should they find themselves able to drive the Turks out of Europe.

Early in September, 1912, Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, and Montenegro decided that peace could be preserved only by the actual application, under sufficient guarantees, of sweeping reforms in Macedonia. They wanted also an unequivocal recognition, on the part of the Powers as well as Turkey, of the union of Crete with Greece. When they appealed to the Powers to sustain them in demanding for Macedonia a provincial assembly, a militia recruited within the limits of the province, and a Christian governor, the answer was unsatisfactory. Then Turkey ordered autumn manoeuvres north of Adrianople, mobilizing for that pur-

pose more than fifty thousand troops—the élite of their army which they had been getting together for several weeks. The four allies answered this challenge by simultaneous mobilization.

It was not until the day of Balkan mobilization, September 30, that it began to dawn upon Turkey and her sponsors that the Balkan states meant business. Even then the Powers felt that they could save the day. I remember as vividly as if it were yesterday the amazing blindness of diplomatic circles at Constantinople. As far as I could find out, no chancellery had been warned by its home government of the possibility of war. Certainly the Turks did not believe that war was coming. What can we think of the diplomacy of the six Great Powers, which would endorse and actually subscribe to the presentation of the following note, handed in at Sofia, Athens, Belgrade, and Cettinge:

The Russian and Austro-Hungarian Governments declare to the Balkan states:

1. That the Powers condemn energetically every measure capable of leading to a rupture of peace.
2. That, supporting themselves on Article XXIII of the Treaty of Berlin, they will take in hand, in the interests of the populations, the realization of the reforms in the administration of European Turkey, on the understanding that these reforms will not diminish the sovereignty of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan and the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire; this declaration reserves, also, the liberty of the Powers for the collective and ulterior study of the reforms.

3. That if, in spite of this note, war does break out between the Balkan states and the Ottoman Empire, they will not admit, at the end of the conflict, any modification in the territorial status quo in European Turkey.

The powers will make collectively the steps which the preceding declaration makes necessary.

Let us read over again the third statement of this joint declaration. Funny, is it not? And stupid? No more astounding utterance has ever been put into a diplomatic note. So the Great Powers would not permit the status quo to be upset, no matter how the war turned out? Metternichian a hundred years after Metternich! When I read this note I had just returned to Constantinople from a trip through Macedonia from Nish to Saloniki, across to Smyrna, and into the interior of Asia Minor as far as Konia. Before that I had been in Sofia and in Belgrade. It was incredible that the Powers should have been either so uninformed or so blind as to think that Balkan nationalism was not aware of the hollowness of promises and did not now realize that the alliance was in a position to defy the Powers. Had not the history of Balkan nationalism for a hundred years been a succession of events and changes, all of which had happened in spite of rather than with the aid of "the Concert of the Powers"?

Montenegro was the first of the Balkan states to declare war against Turkey. The declaration was handed in at the Sublime Porte one hour after the joint statement of the Powers. The three other allies

delivered an ultimatum to Turkey demanding the autonomy of the European provinces under Christian governors and their occupation by the allied armies, also the expenses of mobilization. Turkey of course refused. The Turks tried to detach each of the allies by offering it alone sweeping concessions. They were unsuccessful. The war, which was to lead to the World War, was on.

I am not going to yield to the temptation of telling you about the autumn of 1912. I could not do that without reminiscing—and I have to remember that this is only one part of a whole. Suffice it to say that the Turks were soundly beaten on every battle front in Europe, and were soon behind a line defending Constantinople, with all of European Turkey lost. An armistice was declared. The attempt to make peace was unsuccessful. The war was renewed. In the spring of 1913, the Turks were compelled to send delegates to London to make a treaty in which they gave up Crete and the Aegean Islands, and all of European Turkey except a slight hinterland for Constantinople.

Alas! The story is not ended. The allies could not divide the spoils. The years of bad blood among the Balkan Christians prompted the Bulgarians, who had born the brunt of the fighting, to turn their arms against the Greeks and Serbians. On July 1, 1913, just after peace had been made with Turkey, a second Balkan war broke out. Rumania, in order to secure Dobrudja, attacked Bulgaria in the rear, while she was facing Greece and Serbia. Then Turkey reëntered the

war, and won back most of Thrace, including Adrianople.

In August, 1913, a second peace conference was held at Bucharest. Bulgaria was isolated. Her greedy Balkan neighbors took everything, and left her nothing. The Greeks and Serbians divided Macedonia, and the Rumanians stayed in the Dobrudja, which they had occupied while Bulgarians had their hands full in Macedonia.

In the meantime, the Albanians, sustained by all the Great Powers, formed an independent state, much to the distress of Montenegro and Serbia on the North, and to the greater distress of Greece on the South, who saw Epirus divided. Albania was born as a new state into the family of nations. But her independence had to be guaranteed by a British fleet and contingents of French, Russian, Italian, and Austrian troops, who were still at Scutari when the World War broke out.

Before we leave the Balkans, we must not fail to mention the blow to Greek nationalism of the Italian seizure of the Dodecanese. Greece had won substantial advantages in the Balkan Wars—a large share of Macedonia, including Saloniki and Cavalla, the Aegean Islands, and Crete. But at the south-eastern corner of the Aegean Sea were other islands, ethnically and historically Greek. The largest of these was Rhodes, whose ancient colossus was one of the seven wonders of the ancient world. These islands had been seized by Italy a year before, during her war with Turkey, and had been ceded to Italy by the Treaty of Ouchy,

which ended the Italo-Turk War. Rhodes became, with Cyprus, a *terra irredenta* of Greek nationalism. Despite the set-back of the Hellenic movement after the World War, of which we shall speak later, the Greeks still hope to get the Italians out of Rhodes and the English out of Cyprus. Where one has well-defined geographical regions—and islands are that—inhabited almost wholly by one race, with an ethnic consciousness, the responsibility in regard to world peace of an alien occupying Power is great.

We have spoken of the disintegrating effect of the nationalism of subject Ottoman races during the period from 1870 to 1914, and have shown how the Turks, masters of a conglomerate empire, failed to get the elements of other ethnic origin, Mohammedan as well as Christian, enlisted in the cause of Turkish nationalism. Here was an instance of the disruptive effect of nationalist movements, in sharp contrast to the unifying effect in Italy and Germany. And remember that we were pointing out how tactics similar to those of the Young Turks would have brought about the disruption of the Hapsburg Empire, had they been used in Vienna and Budapest.

I am not sure that they were not used! I do not mean that the Austrians and the Hungarians, especially the former, were lacking in finesse and experience, as the Young Turks were, and that they could have been so naive in their conception—and in their hopes—as to count upon assimilating the non-German and non-Magyar elements in the empire. They had a hard

enough time to adjust their own relations, and to get along themselves in double harness. But within their own separate boundaries they did strive to build up a dominant nationalism. That had been the intention, in the establishment of a Dual Monarchy.

The effort was not as ruthless in Austria as in Hungary. For international reasons, the Austrians wanted to get on with the Italians. They were tolerant of Italian irredentism, never dreaming that it would come to anything. While the Italian element was considerable in the Trentino, there were also a quarter of a million German-speaking Tyrolese. Trieste had been under the Hapsburg crown since the fourteenth century. The inhabitants of this port had sought the protection of Austria because of the uncompromising maritime competition of Venice. For geographical reasons this did not change with the centuries.

The Poles, as we have seen, being scarcely more than a majority themselves in Galicia, played in with the Germans. They had a nationalist problem of their own to cope with. The eastern end of Galicia was inhabited almost wholly by Ukrainians, and Russia worked on Ukrainian nationalism even more effectively than on South Slav nationalism. Therefore Vienna and Cracow understood each other, and the Germans could always count on Polish support. A Polish governor-general was assassinated by a Ukrainian student. The Ukrainians carried on a propaganda at Vienna to secure the conversion of the University of Lemberg into an institution largely staffed by Ukrainians, giving

courses in the national language. The Austrians sustained the Poles, and, in return, the Poles upheld German hegemony in the rest of Austria.

Where Austria had her greatest difficulty was in Bohemia. Czech hatred for Germans was proverbial. It began before the Reformation, and was enhanced by the Hus period. After the Revolution of 1848, Czech nationalism began to manifest itself. Surrounded —inundated, one might say—by Germans, Czechs and Moravians had almost lost their language. But because they lived in regions that were partly limitrophe to Slavs the revival of the vernacular was not so difficult as in Ireland. Illiteracy was the first obstacle to overcome. In two generations the Czechs became literate. They became literate in their own language through the almost superhuman patience and self-sacrifice of teachers who had to instruct without books.

Czech nationalism fed also upon what seemed to be a legitimate and serious grievance—the discrimination in railroad rates and facilities and in underwriting industrial enterprises in favor of Vienna and to the detriment of Prague and other Bohemian industrial centers.

Before the World War the Czech nationalist movement was not regarded by students of nationalism as having as much chance of success as other national movements in the Dual Monarchy because of the hopeless geographical position of Bohemia. But it attracted the attention of the world because of a new departure in tactics. The clergy were upholders of the status quo, as they are at all times almost everywhere. Al-

though the Czechs were virtually all Catholic, they resented deeply the way their hierarchy worked in with Vienna. This prompted them to revive the lost cause of John Hus, their national hero. The cry arose, *"Los vom Rom."* A perplexing problem confronted the Vatican. After hundreds of years there came once more from Prague the old Reformation demand of communion in both kinds and the right for priests to marry. The difficulty was all the greater because there did exist in the Dual Monarchy clergy and people, under the Roman Church, to whom these privileges were allowed. I have not time to go into the question of the uniates—religious bodies professing Roman doctrine and under Roman discipline, but with Orthodox ritual and a married clergy. The Church stood firm against the Czechs, with the result that before the World War more than a million schismatics were counted in Bohemia. In separating themselves from Rome, they formed what they called a national church.

Hungary's nationalism resembled more that of the Turks. The Hungarians, like the Turks (and they are a kindred race), wanted to impose their language upon the entire kingdom, in which they were in the minority. It was not a language that one could hope to use outside of Hungary, and it did not contain the literature and the text-books essential to university, let alone postgraduate, study. The same difficulty has faced the Czechs since the World War. Who could assert that Magyar was a useful language from an international point of view? Comparatively few people other than

Hungarians could speak a word of the language. But the Magyars insisted just the same that everybody should speak this odd and useless tongue. They refused higher educational facilities to non-Hungarian elements. In protest, Rumanian and Croatian nationalism resisted the Budapest conception and determination. It was natural that where they lived in territory contiguous to an independent kingdom of the same ethnic stock and language as themselves, they would turn to their free brothers across the border for sympathy in resisting Magyarization.

And now we come to the nationalist movement that was the most serious for the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and that finally decided the Vienna statesmen to take the fatal step which destroyed the Dual Monarchy. The Serbian-speaking subjects of the Hapsburgs were numerous, strategically placed, and distributed between both Austria and Hungary. Austria had Slovenes, Dalmatians, Bosnians, and Herzegovinians. Hungary had Croatians, whose ancient country lay between Budapest and the sea. Both members of the Dual Monarchy had a vital interest in preventing the union of all the South Slavs in a single state. In 1908, Austria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina. This act, if permanently maintained, would have cut Serbia off from the sea. Of course Serbians protested, government and people alike, but they yielded to economic threats. Austria had her way.

The development of Balkan nationalism between 1908 and 1912 had its repercussion across the frontier

in Austria and Hungary. It is not too much to say that had the police been supine or lacking in vigilance, the Serbian secret society, Narodni Obrana, would have stirred up plots and weakened the hold of the Hapsburg sovereign on his Yugoslav subjects to such an extent that they might eventually have seceded from the Dual Monarchy without a war. Sometimes there is such a thing as a movement getting too powerful to be mastered. But the police were vigilant. I was in Croatia in 1911 during the famous trial, when students were charged with treason. I made a tour of Dalmatia, Bosnia, and Croatia, just after the second Balkan War, studying the spread of Serbian propaganda, which I knew at the time to be encouraged and directed—perhaps subsidized—by the Russian Legation at Belgrade. Between 1911 and 1913 the two Balkan wars had increased greatly the territory and population of Serbia, had given her a trained army with experience in victory, and had raised her prestige immeasurably. Before 1911 Serbia was not to be feared. After 1913, by the miraculous changes of two years, Serbian nationalism had become a deadly menace to the existence of the Dual Monarchy.

Whatever one's sympathies may be in the matter of wishing to see the aspirations of nationalism realized, one can still understand how Austro-Hungarian statesmen felt at this time. They were entrusted with safeguarding the security and furthering the prosperity of the Hapsburg dominions. They saw what the Narodni Obrana nationalist propaganda was leading to. They

were fully aware of the intrigues of the Russian minister at Belgrade. Should they allow Serbian nationalism to pierce the weak place in the Dual Monarchy's armor, or should they put up a fight? While they were debating this question, the Archduke Ferdinand was shot by a Serbian nationalist at Serajevo. To those who had been living for years in the midst of the nationalistic drama, of which this proved to be the culmination, it was clear that no earthly agency could prevent that shot being heard around the world. Now that the Austro-Hungarian Empire has disappeared, it is easy, with hindsight, to criticize the Vienna statesmen. But I venture to say that, given the circumstances of the case, had Gray or Poincaré been a minister of the Austrian emperor, neither would have acted in any other way than the man who drew up and sent to Serbia the ultimatum that precipitated the World War. Let us be fair, and put ourselves in the other fellow's place.

In the period under survey, nationalism in other parts of Europe than Alsace-Lorraine, Germany, Italy, the Ottoman Empire, and the Hapsburg Empire was a powerful influence locally, but did not have international complications. However, before going to the countries outside Europe, we should speak of Poland, Finland, and Norway.

We have said that Poland had an unfortunate geographical position in the eighteenth century evolution of Europe, and we showed how powerless her nationalism was, when awakened by Napoleon, to make itself

felt. Her lands had been partitioned among three powerful states, whose solidarity made wholly impracticable the success of a revolutionary movement. Italy was unified with the aid of France and Prussia. The German Empire came into being as a result of the efforts of a powerful Germanic people, who already formed a great political organism before the days of nationalism. Who was to help the Poles—and why? We remember how a minister of the liberal July Monarchy said in Paris, "Order reigns in Warsaw." The Revolution of 1863 was no more successful than the Revolution of 1830 for the simple reason that it was not either the real or fancied interest of any Great Power to help the Poles to regain their independence. Russia incited the South Slavs to work for national unity. But Russia never gave any encouragement to Poles subject to Austria for obvious reasons.

Even as late as the third year of the World War, when the Entente Powers were giving every possible encouragement to other nationalist movements at the expense of their enemies, it was *lèse-majesté* in France to say or write anything in favor of the resurrection of Poland. I lived in France throughout the war. Besides magazine articles and books, I wrote a daily newspaper syndicate article for six years. The only time during the war that the French censor objected to anything I sent out of the country was when I insisted upon the necessity of an independent Poland. The reason for this is easy to grasp. Polish independence was a German scheme up to the time of the defection

of Russia. When Czarist Russia was one of the Entente Powers, part of the price of her coöperation was that Polish nationalism should not only not be encouraged, but should be combatted. The records of the Paris Prefecture of Police reveal for years—for many years—bitter and uncompromising hostility to Polish nationalism. When it became useful to the allies to espouse the cause of Poles, to weaken Germany, the shoe fitted on the other foot. But we shall come to that later.

Finland belonged to Sweden at the time of the French Revolution. Napoleon was instrumental in taking Finland away from Sweden and giving it to Russia. This was one of the few Napoleonic arrangements confirmed in the Act of Vienna. Alexander I told the Finns that they would be regarded as a separate state, with autonomy. It was a promise, like to that to the Poles, which did not last long. The Finns suffered the common fate of non-Russian subjects of the Czar during the nineteenth century. But that common fate was no different from the fate of the Czar's Russian subjects. Here is a point that must always be made in discussing the nationalism of non-Russian peoples in the Romanoff Empire. With the exception of the Jews, they were not ethnically discriminated against. They did not have less rights than those accorded to Russians. And when the Revolution of 1905 came the Finns, like all other Russian subjects, revolted to win a constitution and not independence.

During the reaction after the Revolution of 1905,

constitutionalism in Russia turned to Slav nationalism. The conception was very much like that of Turkey at the same moment, i.e., the Duma wanted to make everybody Russian. The first step was to sweep away traditional privileges accorded various regions and ethnic elements. The autonomous status of Finland, as provided for in the Act of Vienna and confirmed by Alexander I, was done away with. Followed parliamentary conflict between the Finns and the Petrograd Government that lasted into the World War. The Entente Powers, up to the time of the Bolshevist Revolution, excluded the Finns, as they had excluded the Poles, from the application of the doctrine of self-determination. Germany, on the other hand, assured the Finns that the Germans were fighting for their freedom from Russian oppression!

The story of the blowing hot and cold on Polish and Finnish nationalism is one that we should take to heart. It affords the clearest possible proof of the lack of sympathy per se in the nationalistic aspirations of oppressed peoples on the part of all the Great Powers. History gives us no record of a distinterested move by any European power since Napoleon's day to champion the cause of a down-trodden people. The same powers that were eager champions of the nationalism of some peoples were equally bitter foes of the nationalism of others. For the Great Powers nationalism has always been looked upon as a weapon to use in fighting one another. There is a Polish proverb—and what country knows better the insincerity of all the Powers than does

Poland—to the effect that "when two masters fall out it is the peasant that receives the blows." I see someone nodding sympathetically. Are you a Pole? Well, am I not right: *Gdzie dwoch panów się bije, chlop w skurę, dostaje?*

In 1450, Norway was united with Denmark under the same king, and remained in this status until 1814, when Denmark was compelled to give Norway to Sweden. Denmark had been friendly with France and was alleged to have helped Napoleon. It was not to the interest of maritime powers, especially England, for both sides of the entrance to the Baltic Sea to be under the control of the same state. The Norwegians did not recognize the right of the victorious Powers, with whom they had not been at war, to settle their political allegiance. They elected the son of the King of Denmark as king of independent Norway. The Powers refused to sanction any such step, and compelled the Norwegians to elect the Swedish king and to form a union with Sweden. But Norwegian nationalism did not die out, and ninety years later, on June 7, 1905, the Norwegian parliament declared the union dissolved. There was talk of war. Sweden refused to allow a prince of the House of Bernadotte to accept the crown. The Norwegians then elected a Danish prince. Norway was the last new member of the family of nations in Europe before the World War. The act of her Storthing (parliament) was the final step in the defiance of the peoples of Europe to the Congress of Vienna.

The interference of the Powers in Scandinavian countries, in taking Finland from Sweden, and Norway from Denmark, and giving Finland to Russia and Norway to Sweden, for reasons that had nothing to do with the peoples concerned, shows that the Great Powers were thinking solely of their own interests. Nationalism finally nullified these decisions. The treaties arranged by the Great Powers, in the long run, determined neither allegiance nor boundaries. Because the statesmen at Paris in 1919 were actuated by the same absence of any desire to take into account the interests and wishes of border peoples, will not their work, too, perish in the same way?

We have space to speak only briefly of the extension of nationalistic movements from Europe to other parts of the world. This phenomenon occurred almost wholly in the period between the Franco-Prussian War and the World War. When extra-European peoples became educated (I do not mean all the people, but enough to count) and learned how they were being denied by overlords of the white race the privilege of self-government, to which these overlords owed their own power, they began to get restless. They demanded the right to rule themselves. They denied that right to an alien authority, which had been imposed upon them by force. Intensely interesting and vitally important manifestations of nationalism began to occur all over the world.

The only non-Caucasian, the only Asiatic, people that has won its way to a position of equality with the

Great Powers of the white race is the Japanese. There can be no doubt that in the spread of European economic and political imperialism over Asia and Africa it was expected that Japan would be amenable to exploitation in the same way as the other countries of those two continents. There is proof positive of this in the way the Japanese were first approached by Occidental diplomacy in the form of warships with guns trained and the kind of treaties Japan was compelled to sign. These treaties, like those with Turkey, Siam, China, and the North African states, provided a special status for the white foreigner. He was to have extraterritoriality, to pay no taxes, to be immune from arrest and imprisonment and trial by the native authorities, and to decide what import duties he should pay on the merchandise introduced into the country.

The treaties with Japan were an infringement upon her sovereignty. The excuse for them was that Japanese customs and law were different from those of our civilization. This might have been true as regards judicial matters. But was there ever any excuse for making foreigners free from taxation and denying countries tariff autonomy? I lived for some years under the capitulatory régime in Turkey. As a research student in the early history of the Ottoman Empire I am of course aware that capitulations were not originally forced upon Oriental countries, but were a trade convenience and inducement. I know about the incompatibility of Mohammedan religious law with our civil law. For all that, I think that the capitula-

tions, in their nineteenth century form, were designed to take an unfair advantage of the people of the countries with whom the one-sided non-reciprocal treaties were made.

Japan disappointed us all. She refused to be exploited. Her people in fifty years studied Occidental civilization and methods of international intercourse so well that at the end of the nineteenth century they began to play the game in our way and as well as we did. Japanese nationalism was carefully nurtured by education and was tested in wars.

When they could not get the European powers either to listen to reason or to give them an equal voice in dealing with China, Japan began to show the army and navy she had built up, and which no one took very much stock in. Intervention against Russia in Korea led to war with China. It was a war not against the people of China but against the corrupt Manchu Government that failed to protect China from European encroachment. When Japan did not succeed in checking by diplomacy the advance of Russia into the peninsulas dangerously near her coasts, the first modern war between a white and a yellow race began. The yellow race was the attacker, and swept the white race's navy off the seas, inflicting irreparable damage upon it in a series of brilliant battles. On land, in a great pitched battle—the first in history with twentieth century weapons—the Japanese demonstrated their decisive military superiority over the Russians at Mukden. They stormed the defenses of the most strongly forti-

fied port in the world, and forced the capitulation of the garrison of Port Arthur.

After she became a great power Japan went the way of all flesh, and has been as interested as are the European powers and the United States in repressing to her own profit the nationalism of other peoples. She extinguished the independence of Korea, and has been acting in quite approved European fashion toward China for twenty years.

As an example to the world of what a nation of non-European origin can accomplish, Japan is unique. But her influence in the evolution of nationalism is not so much what she has done of good and evil, as affecting herself, but the demonstration she has given to Asia and Africa of the vulnerability of the white man. Japan defeated Russia overwhelmingly on sea and land in pitched battles. The little yellow man, using European weapons better than the big white man, swarmed over the defenses of Port Arthur.

Mukden had an instantaneous effect upon the suppressed national movements of a dozen non-European countries. We have already discussed at length the Young Turk movement. Arose the Young Persian, the Young Egyptians, the Young Indians, the Young Siamese, the Young Chinese. All these movements followed the classical Italian example. The aims were: (1) to get rid of the foreigners; (2) to win from a despotic sovereign or an oligarchy a constitutional form of government; and (3) the recognition of equality in international political and economic contacts.

The first Turkish nationalist movement, in 1876, had as its object the regeneration of Turkey to save the empire from dissolution. The Young Turk movement of 1908 was inspired by the same motive. But, as we have seen, Turkey had a hopeless problem, like Austria and Hungary, in her different nationalities, some of them inhabiting self-sustaining regions with well-defined limits, and others belonging to the same stock as independent neighbors across the frontier. The other "Young" movements of non-European peoples, except in India, did not suffer from the handicap of irreconcilable religious and ethnic differences. What they did suffer from, and what thwarted their development before the World War, was the interference in their internal affairs, and, in most instances, the actual exercise in their countries of sovereignty by an overlord of European stock. This overlord fought nationalism to the nail, knowing that if it grew, his power would be undermined, and that he would have to get out.

Where his own interests are involved, it is always difficult for a man to admit that he has not acted, and is not acting, rightly. We find justification for ourselves. We belittle those whom we are wronging. For these reasons non-European nationalistic movements have not received sympathetic attention. They have been most annoying! Although they have followed the classic form of nationalistic movements in Europe, the Powers, whose privileges they have jeopardized, refuse to see the parallel. Getting the Austrians out of Italy was the first important step in creating the Italian

nation. Poland has been resurrected by getting the Germans, Austrians, and Russians out.

We might go on to show how essential xenophobia is to the development of nationalism. But if it happens to be a non-European people who display it, then it is taken as a sign of their lack of civilization and to prove their unfitness to govern themselves. For instance, the Boxer uprising in China, which was a manifestation of nationalism, stirred up the whole world, and led to international armed intervention. We got the impression then—an impression that has not left us —that Chinese liked to kill "foreign devils," and therefore we have to keep an army and gunboats out there to protect our citizens. But we forget that in the United States American mobs have killed more Chinese than Chinese have ever killed Americans. Yes, the sad thing about what I am saying is that it is true. The figures are available. Every time an American is killed in Mexico, we take that as another evidence of the inability of the Mexicans to govern themselves. But we would never admit that the lynching of negroes or gang warfare in Chicago would justify a foreign country in coming over here, taking away our liberties, and ruling us for our own good.

Great Britain in India and Egypt, the United States in the Philippines, Great Britain and Russia in Persia, all the Powers in China, have opposed and endeavored to stamp out nationalistic movements. The history of the ten years preceding the World War in Asia and Africa is the story of the refusal of the European pow-

ers, the United States, and Japan to countenance in their possessions the development of nationalism. We have denied to others the right to have the feeling of love of country that we glory in, and to go through the process of development through which we have gone. We sneer at their leaders as self-seeking politicians, impracticable dreamers, or half-baked students. When they ask for constitutional government, and control of their own affairs, we put them in jail as common criminals, we track them as bandits, we execute them as traitors or rebels, and, on occasion, we shoot them down en masse. And then we justify our acts in other people's countries by slandering those who believe that they gave their lives for the fulfillment of a duty toward their country.

Under no circumstances will we admit that an Asiatic or an African might love his native soil, or that, having studied our history, he might want to follow our example. We deny nationalism to others simply because we do not want to get out of countries where we have no right to be. We justify ourselves by saying that we can run other people's countries better than they can run them themselves. From this thought it is not a long stretch of the imagination to a belief in our noble purpose. Why, we are self-sacrificingly bearing the white man's burden!

After having done this consistently and ruthlessly since the beginning of the nationalistic movements in non-European countries, the European Powers, Japan, and the United States took up arms to fight to free

small nations. On the day war was declared Viviani told the Chamber of Deputies that defense of small nations was France's reason for drawing the sword. On Lincoln's birthday, 1915, Sir Edward Gray explained to American correspondents in London that the motive inspiring Great Britain's war effort was to assure the triumph of the principle that all nations, great and small, had a right to live their own lives in their own ways.

Funny? No, tragic. The Powers were going to reap in blood what they have sown in blood. And, after sacrificing millions of lives, their statesmen were going to keep right on running international relations and exploiting small nations just as they had done before 1914.

V

NATIONALISM DURING THE WORLD WAR (1914-1918) AND THE PEACE CONFERENCE (1919)

NATIONALISM was a unifying force in Germany and Italy and a disruptive force in Turkey and Austria-Hungary. It made bad blood between France and Germany, because of Alsace-Lorraine; between Austria-Hungary and Italy, because of Trieste and the Trentino; between Russia and Austria-Hungary, because of the Serbian propaganda in the Dual Monarchy; and among the Christian Balkan states, because of rival claims to Macedonia. Japan, like Germany and Italy, became a great modern power by cultivating nationalism and imitating the Occidental methods of international intercourse. Fired by the example of Japanese success, nationalist movements sprang up all over Asia and in parts of Africa. But the Powers who controlled African and Asiatic countries, including Japan and the United States, were uncompromisingly bitter foes of nationalism, when it showed itself in the countries that they were running and exploiting.

We have not yet touched upon the influence of the nationalism of the Great Powers upon their relations with one another.

The Germans have a word, *Grosstädischekeit,* to

describe the mental attitude of the person who belongs to the big city. If we come from big cities, and possess a sense of humor, we know what this means. But better than city folk do people of small towns and the country know what it means! Ought not a similar word to be coined for the citizens of the Great Powers?

Americans travelling abroad are occasionally amused and disgusted by the boasting and bumptious attitude of a compatriot. But the unpleasant assertiveness of the man who feels that his country is the greatest and the best is not confined to Americans. We may lack in technique—and therefore be regarded as blatant or vulgar in showing how we feel about our country. But the Britisher and the German can outdo the American in arrogance and assumption of superiority. The Italian is getting that way, under Fascism. The Frenchman is more polite, but he is none the less sure that France leads all the world.

Rejoicing in the greatness of one's country is not unwholesome, although comparing ourselves with others to their disadvantage has its dangers. It is not this superficial and unimportant phase of national self-expression that we are interested in here. We call attention to it only in order to get what is behind it. Our nationalism is different from that of small states and of politically suppressed or submerged peoples. The citizen of the small independent state is constantly aware of his handicap in international contacts. The nationalist who is under alien rule is aiming to get rid of the foreigner and have a chance to run his own

affairs. But citizens of the Great Powers look at nationalism in another light. Their citizenship involves obligations—sometimes irksome, like compulsory military service—and costs a lot in taxes. But it pays to belong to a powerful country. It pays! The good dividends of nationalism are one of the principal causes and one of the lessons of the World War.

Why a large army? Why a large navy? Why colonies? Certainly the expense of maintaining armies and navies needs to be justified. To win a colony or protectorate requires a lot of money and not a few human lives. Is the conquest made for the benefit of the natives? One might almost think so to hear some people talk. No, the good dividends of nationalism are special trading privileges guaranteed by treaties, security for property in any part of the world or on the high seas, and protection for one's life. We spoke of Chinese having been massacred by mobs in the United States and Australia. China had no army and navy to send over here to put a stop to the murder of her citizens and the looting and burning of their property. But our battleships and resources in war equipment make it possible for us to stir things up in China if the Chinese kill Americans. A Haitian might make an investment in the United States and lose his money. But if an American is in danger of losing even the interest on his investment in Haiti, we are in a position to take over the whole island to protect him. It pays to be the subject of a Great Power.

This is the key to the whole situation in the develop-

ment of national spirit. Fear and profit are the motive forces behind the building and maintenance of a great fleet.

In our first chapter we spoke of the profit Paul got out of being a Roman citizen. When Kaiser Wilhelm was addressing the soldiers who were going out to China, he said that in ancient times, to say "I am a Roman" meant that a man could go with safety to life and property throughout the world. "I want you to go out and tell those Chinese who have killed our Ambassador," said the Kaiser, "that wherever there are German citizens, anywhere in the world, the long arm of Germany reaches out to protect or avenge." This same thought was expressed by President Coolidge recently when he explained to an audience which, because of the radio, was the whole United States, that "the national domain" included American citizens and their property, wherever they might be in the world. Because the people appreciated what that meant, they were quite ready to vote the money for fifteen new cruisers.

Putting nationalism on a paying basis has always been understood by the British since Cromwell's day. At the end of the nineteenth century Joseph Chamberlain felt that the dominions, especially Canada, could best be bound together by "preferential tariffs." He preached imperial preference, and told Britons overseas that it paid to be a subject of the British crown. Chamberlain was willing to change the fiscal policy of the United Kingdom and put on a tariff, so that he could

make a rebate for dominions and colonies. Thus they would have a practical demonstration of profit out of the British connection. They already knew they were getting security from them.

Yes, it pays to be a citizen of a Great Power. Your taxes are like club dues. To belong to a good club costs money, but you are willing to draw your check, thinking as you do it that you have a privilege denied to most people.

Now we come to the crux of the international situation before the World War. Public opinion sustained the statesmen of the different powers in the diplomatic efforts to gain for their fellow-citizens exclusive privileges here and there all over the world, and, from the very nature of the word exclusive, to shut the door in the face of other powers. When France and Russia were trying in Africa and Asia to checkmate British expansion, Great Britain was willing to join forces with Germany to do France and Russia in. Lord Salisbury tried to form an entente with Germany before Britain looked elsewhere. But naval and trade rivalry was just beginning. Anyway, Germany had no colonies to speak of, and there were no bargaining points upon which to build up an understanding.

The British formed an entente with the French in 1904 by mutual compromises of the many points of conflict they had throughout the world. The British gave the French a free hand in Morocco in return for France giving them a free hand in Egypt. Up to 1904 Great Britain had been working with Germany against

France in Morocco, while France was instigating and supporting the Egyptian nationalist movement. Three years later, Great Britain and Russia formed an entente, Persia being the victim. Without mentioning the fact to the Persian Government until after the treaty was signed, they made three zones out of the country, the northern one of which was to be under Russian influence and the southern one under British influence. A neutral zone, into which both agreed not to go, separated the erstwhile foes.

Germany claimed that she had been unfairly excluded from Morocco, and accepted the situation only when France gave her compensation in Central Africa. The Moroccan crises of 1905 and 1911 were provoked by Germany's effort to prevent France from getting control of Morocco, and freezing her out commercially. This made more bad blood between the two countries even than the old question of Alsace-Lorraine.

You see, it was to make nationalism pay that the Powers all wanted exclusive privileges in as many places as they could get them. They offered their own people this and that advantage in the acquisition of raw materials, the marketing of goods, and the investment of capital. Most of the German bankers who had gone to England and changed their nationality, like the Rothschilds, Barings, Cassels and others, did so for the palpable advantages of being British to the man with money to invest. German economic competition, together with the fleet she was building, changed her from the friend to the enemy of Great Britain.

Certain peoples have some exclusive privileges, and they always want more. The only way they can keep what they have and acquire more is by force. These privileges are not simply the satisfaction of national pride: they are the means whereby the business man of the most powerful state will have a commercial advantage in markets over competitors belonging to less favored nations. The basis of the whole structure is force. This force is obtained and augmented by the taxing of the people. In order to get them to vote the taxes, the statesmen have to emphasize their great and exclusive privileges as citizens of a country having so large an army and navy.

The wars of the last century seem to have been caused by little things. Historians and propagandists alike dwell at length upon these little things. You can read hundreds of pages in hundreds of books about how the World War started. Germany wanted a "place in the sun." Germany was afraid of being encircled, and anticipated this by choosing the moment best for her. But it goes back to the belief in the minds of the people in the different countries—on both sides—that the way to get along in the world was to be in a position to exercise power so great that you could shut the other fellow out from privileges you were enjoying. Internationally speaking it is well known that the only law is the law of force. The strongest is listened to unless several combine against him and checkmate him by marshalling superior force.

It is probable that in 1914 Germany believed she

could use her army, which was greatly superior on land to that of any other nation, so quickly and effectively that she would not have to face the military and economic resources of a coalition that could afford to wait, while she could not. It did not work out that way because her army, large as it was, was not large enough, and because she did not have nearly enough submarines. The lesson of the war was, therefore, that a nation in the twentieth century must have a very large fleet, the skeleton organization of an enormous army, and all the latest wrinkles in every field of attack and defense. This is clear from what has happened during the last ten years. Germany has been eliminated as a naval factor, and, temporarily at least, as a military factor. But the nations that were banded together against her, and the new countries created by the war, are steadily increasing the amount and the effectiveness of their armaments on land and sea.

Why? Well, the history of the century so far, and especially of the World War period, proves that every nation should be regarded as a potential enemy of every other nation, because the nations are all still seeking exclusive privileges for their citizens. The citizens, believing that nationalism pays, support governmental policies tending to exclusive privileges at home and abroad, and vote the money to increase navies and armies. Force, and force alone, decided the issue of the war and the terms of peace. Those who possessed the force, and who used it to their own ends, must keep it

and increase it, or they will lose what they gained by being the victors.

As long as citizens of some countries have privileges throughout the world denied to citizens of other countries, as long as a man is prosperous or is penalized because he belongs to this or that nation, we shall have wars. For the dispossessed will try to dislodge from their enviable position the nations that have special privileges. When the Entente Powers, for instance, took away the extraterritorial privileges of subjects of the defeated Powers in China and Siam, and retained them for themselves, they were giving the Chinese an argument to suppress all the capitulations and the Germans an incentive to work hard for another generation to get back their military strength.

When Germany came along, after 1870, and found herself faced with an extra-European world in which all the choice morsels were in the hands of other powers, the German schoolmasters began to teach that there were more Germans than English or French, that the Germans were better educated, and belonged to a superior race. The theory was developed of dividing the inhabitants of the world into four classes: Vollkulturvolk, Kulturvolk, Halbkulturvolk, and Naturvolk. The Germans, of course, were the only ethnic unit in the first category, the sole fully civilized people. Such teaching inevitably led to war.

One can hardly call it wholly the fault of the Germans, or content himself with saying that it was tough luck that Germany arrived so late on the scene

as not to get in on colonies. The exclusion that set the Germans aflame and put them in a warlike mood occurred during the ten years preceding the war. The German Government got naval and military credits out of the Reichstag because of what happened in 1904 and later in Morocco, Egypt, the Ottoman Empire, Persia, Siam, and China.

After the war, the creation of new states and new irredentist problems by the treaties was only one of four results of the Paris Conference that is of interest to the student of nationalism. The other three, which we shall discuss before coming to the treaty provisions, are: (1) the claim of the five "Principal Allied and Associated Powers" to decide upon treaty terms without consulting or getting the consent of the other states at the Conference, thus setting up a dictatorship as at Berlin in 1878 and Vienna in 1815; (2) the participation, with their own delegations, of the British self-governing dominions and India; and (3) the refusal to listen to Persia, Egypt, Ireland, and other submerged nations, who came to Paris for a fulfillment of the announced war aims of the victors.

Russia fell by the wayside during the war. When she made a separate peace with Germany, her allies considered her as an enemy and sent armies into Russia and Siberia in the effort to overthrow her revolutionary government. This left the other two original members of the Entente, Great Britain and France; the recruit of 1915, Italy; and Japan and the United States. Japan's participation in the war had been limited, and her

only interest in the treaties lay in Far Eastern questions and matters of general international order. The United States also had limited interests as she had been a limited participant. Her delegation, too, was the only one from a Great Power that was not clothed with authority to decide on the terms of peace.

Why President Wilson ever went to Paris is as much of a mystery as what he did after he got there. He died without explaining: and if he left papers that told the whole story, they have not been published. At any rate, he was there, and it is no mystery why British, French, and Italian received him on a footing of equality in the deliberations. They did not realize his lack of "full powers" to commit the United States. He was Commander-in-Chief of an army of two million men in France, whose presence was essential to dictate a peace to Germany; and he could endorse any check his British, Italian, and French colleagues wanted to draw on the United States Treasury.

When the Conference was organized, it contained many nations. The belligerency of Portugal, the Latin American states, China, Siam, and Liberia had not been of much importance. But other allies, notably Belgium and Serbia, had suffered from the war and had contributed to the victory, in proportion to their resources, more than any other country save France. Greece and Rumania, too, had suffered greatly from invasion, and from expenditures beyond their ability to make. Then there were the new states, whose existence and belligerency the Great Powers had recognized just as the war

was closing. The Peace Conference was to be their birth, and it certainly was a vital event for them. Serbia, Greece, and Rumania expected to be greatly enlarged by the realization of their national aspirations.

But from the very first day of the Peace Conference it was made clear to one and all that they were there only in an advisory capacity. They could present memoranda; they could appear before the Council of Ten; and when it was all over they could sign the treaties and become members of the League of Nations that was to be created. But the treaty terms were to be decided upon by the five big Powers, whose word would be final on every point. Unique in history was the dictatorship of four men at Paris. They imposed the treaties on the small states who were their fellow victors just as truly as upon the vanquished. As the United States and Japan had no special things to ask for (except Japan's Shantung stipulation), three men sat with their tongues in their cheeks, humored Wilson until they had fooled him, and those three men were able to draw a new map of Europe that would suit the foreign policies of Great Britain, France and Italy. The only lengthy discussions among the "Big Four" were to calm down Wilson and to find compromises for their own conflicting interests.

The routine work of the Conference was carried on by committees. Here, too, the large states dominated every phase of the work. On every committee there were two members from each of the five "Principal Allied and Associated Powers," and five chosen by all

the others together. This rule held even in the case of committees dealing with specific questions and boundaries that interested vitally certain states. The committees reported to the Big Four, who decided moot questions secretly. Even members of their own delegations did not know what decisions were made or what considerations influenced the decisions. Three of the five American delegates, to illustrate, formally protested to President Wilson against the Shantung decision. The text of their letter, which Secretary Lansing afterward published, shows that President Wilson had not communicated to them the decision of the Big Four, had not explained to them why Shantung was being given to Japan, and had not asked their advice.

This lamentable situation was known to all of us who were following the Conference closely at the time. When I wrote an article in the Century Magazine in May, 1919, called, "Versailles Goes Bankrupt," Melville Stone asked permission to send it out over the Associated Press on the day of publication. Mr. Wilson took me severely to task for having anticipated unfavorably the work of himself and his colleagues. But he refused to discuss the subject matter of the article with me. He had come almost to that point of elation where he felt that he should be regarded as a Moses handing out the law.

The influence of the method of making the treaties was almost as harmful upon the smaller allies as upon the vanquished. Premier Venizelos of Greece spoke his mind on several occasions. At one stage King Albert

of Belgium came to Paris and registered personally his protest. At the Eighth Plenary Session, when the text of the treaty with Austria was communicated to the delegates, Premier Bratianu of Rumania got up and said that it was inadmissible for the smaller allies to be thus summarily notified that the frontiers of their countries were to be this and that. He pointed out the experience of his father at the Congress of Berlin, and how clauses similar to some of those now drafted had worked out against the interests of Rumania. President Wilson made the answer for his colleagues. He said bluntly that the big allies had won the war, and would have to guarantee the peace; consequently, they were alone competent to dictate the treaty terms.

The Covenant of the League of Nations also revealed the Great Power mentality, which had prevailed at Vienna in 1815, Paris in 1856, and Berlin in 1878. The League of Nations was to be an international organization for world peace. Neutral nations were to be members, and the names of those asked to join were set forth. But all the power of the League was to be vested in a Council of nine members, five of them the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, and the other four elected from all the rest of the countries of the world. No representation was provided for the defeated enemies. This was nothing more or less than a revival of the Metternich conception and the Holy Alliance. The aim was to get the whole world to underwrite peace treaties to the advantage of certain powers who happened to be victorious in a war. The

voting majority on the board of the underwriting organization was to remain in the hands of the Powers that dictated the treaties in Paris in the year of Our Lord one thousand nine hundred and nineteen!

Here was an international conception—treaties making a new world, League of Nations, World Court, the triumph of international law, the machinery for international coöperation—vitiated from the moment of its birth by the intense nationalistic feeling of the statesmen and people of the Great Powers. Against this the nationalism of the smaller and weaker nations arose in protest during the Conference. They all joined the League, because it was their hope; but not an Assembly has met since its creation that has not listened to bitter protests of delegates against the high-handed attitude of the Council.

The war and Peace Conference, we see, thus caused an intensification of nationalism. The citizens of the victorious Powers believed they could make the war pay, and they did everything in their power to impress upon the citizens of the vanquished powers that losing the war was going to maintain them permanently in the position of outcasts and militate against them economically as well as socially throughout the world. The idea was: because our arms have triumphed on the field of battle, being a Britisher, a Frenchman, an Italian, an American, or a Japanese means special advantages and privileges in the post-bellum world: security and prosperity. But if you are a German, God have mercy on your soul after 1919!

The arrogant nationalism of the Great Powers, so overwhelmingly expressed in everything that happened in Paris, militated also against the spirit of coöperation with the smaller allies. Nothing in the world is so hateful as a benefactor. Belgians did not want to get their country back at the hands of British, French, and Americans. They had the feeling that they had done something themselves to bring about the defeat of Germany and to regain their independence. Serbia, having lost twenty-five per cent of her population, felt that she had contributed to the victory, and that she was not receiving favors. Rumania and Greece had intervened, risking their national existence upon the outcome. They also had gone through hell, and they could not understand why it was a crime—Paris almost made it that—to be small.

The second point of interest to the student of nationalism was the presence at the Peace Conference of delegations from Canada, South Africa, Australia, New Zealand, and India. These delegates signed their names to the treaty, along with the British delegation. The League of Nations Covenant provided for membership of the British Dominions and India as if they were independent countries. Not only were they to have separate votes in the Assembly and on commissions, but they were eligible to membership on the Council. Since the World War the Irish Free State has become a member of the League. Even as it was, it looked to Americans as if there were six British votes to one for every other country. The first reaction in

the United States against the League was due more to this than to any other single cause.

I shall not attempt to explain the anomaly of this situation. Why should I? I have not found any one who could. On the face of it the assumption that the four dominions and India are political organisms separate from the United Kingdom would seem to carry with it distinct nationhood. Does that mean that Canadians, South Africans, Australians, New Zealanders, and East Indians are not British subjects? Certainly no one would take this ground. Imperial preference within the empire still holds. While the Canadians have a minister at Washington and Paris, and there is talk of other Dominion legations, the citizens of the Dominions travel on British passports and their personal and commercial affairs throughout the world are in the hands of British consuls. In China recently, for instance, the British legation and the naval forces out there were protecting Canadian missionaries in exactly the same way that they protected English and Scotch.

A new kind of nationalism, a new definition of the term, a new psychological interpretation of it, must be made to fit the British Empire. International law has not yet taken cognizance of the new type of political organism that has been created, to enable one to classify the British Dominions.

And how about India? During the war, when the announcement was made that India had contributed five million pounds to the British Treasury for war expenses, the *Manchester Guardian* denounced the

transaction as a bare-faced steal. "One British official simply wigwagged to another," said this eminent newspaper. Has it not been that way ever since? East Indians were used in the war, in France, in Mesopotamia, and especially in East Africa. They had no say whatever as to where they went. The Indian delegates to the Peace Conference were picked in London, and so it has been ever since with the representatives at the League of Nations. Sometimes the Indian members of committees are British officials. So it has been on the Opium Commission, where Bishop Brent's and Congressman Porter's most bitter opponent has been a Scotchman, supposedly representing the people of India. In reality he was there to safeguard the revenues of the Indian Government, in which opium plays an important part.

During the war the British Government promised reforms in India, and yielded some points to the nationalists in a limited form of self-government. The Montague-Chelmsford program of 1917 promised an inquiry and further measures of self-government after ten years. The Commission appointed by the British Parliament is at work in India now. But the Nationalists refuse to coöperate with it because it contains no Indian member. There you have the attitude of the European Power toward a subject people still prevalent. Non-Europeans have no rights, but only what advantages are graciously granted them. The decision is to be made by the strong nation, whose interests must always be regarded as paramount. In a lesser measure,

the same attitude toward the sovereignty of small nations holds in Europe and Latin America.

The third point in our enumeration was the refusal of the "Principal Allied and Associated Powers" to listen to the delegations of submerged nations, who came to Paris in the hope that the victors would carry out their announced war aims. Had not President Wilson, taking his cue from the speeches of Entente statesmen, proclaimed the doctrine of self-determination? Of course, it would have been impossible for the Paris Conference to right every wrong, and to build an ideal world. Self-determination is reduced to an absurdity at times. One can not draw frontiers with strict regard to ethnic principles; one can not make small groups independent, when they are surrounded by larger ethnic groups. In cases like the Southern States in the American Civil War, the question of how far the doctrine of self-determination can be applied becomes a serious one. Where there are not ethnic differences, political disenfranchisement, economic discrimination or exploitation, should dissatisfied members of a flourishing political organism be allowed to disrupt it?

We do not mean to speak of self-determination in the quixotic, irrealizable, impracticable sense. Among the delegates who came to Paris were the elected representatives of countries historically, geographically, ethnically capable of preserving their entity in the twentieth-century world. But their sovereignty had been violated before or during the war, and their

independence had been diminished or extinguished by force. Had any of these wronged peoples brought a grievance against the Germans, they would have been received with open arms. In one case, in fact, a neutral nation had been invited to make a claim against Germany, and had been roundly scolded when she refused to receive from the victors regions that she knew were not ethnically hers. Denmark was invited to take back Schleswig and Holstein. What the Entente Powers wanted there was to remove Germany's control of the Kiel Canal, and they were no end provoked when Denmark was too prudent to play their game. But they raised no question of the status quo where their own interests were involved. We shall give a few illustrations.

Take Persia. Her delegation to the Peace Conference was an official one in the most technical sense of the word. It had been authorized by the parliament *(medjliss)*. No country had a better right to participate in and seek the advantages of the durable world peace that the Entente Powers said they were going to establish. Persia's neutrality, like Belgium's, had been violated. Russia and Turkey fought on Persian territory, doing tremendous damage. Uninvited, the British marched in. At the time of the Peace Conference the British were using Persia as a base against Russian Bolshevism. No Power had paid any attention whatever to the Persian protests.

As we have seen, Russia and Great Britain had sacrificed Persia ten years earlier to compromise their

conflicting imperial ambitions in Asia. When Persia established a constitutional régime, a very noble and beautiful expression of nationalism, which might have led to its regeneration, it was undermined and denatured by Russian and British intrigue. The Persian delegation wanted the Peace Conference to remake the boundaries of Persia with Turkey and Russia, and to secure from all the Powers a pledge that their independence and sovereignty would hereafter be respected. But they were ignored, despite the assurance they had received from the American Secretary of State that they would be heard. Mr. Lansing told me that he had no doubt of it. He just did not know what he was up against when he expressed sympathy for the Persians and offered to help them!

Take Egypt. Here was a country that had been under British military control for more than thirty years. The British had never paid much attention to Egypt until after the Suez Canal was dug and they had acquired financial control of it. The pretext of their intervention in Egypt had been a flimsy one, and the French had refused to join them. Once in, they declared officially that they would leave as soon as order was restored. These declarations were repeated by successive premiers and foreign secretaries of the occupying power until the World War. During the thirty years of British rule in Egypt an astonishingly large number of Englishmen of all kinds had managed to get on the Egyptian payroll. The Egyptians wanted to pay themselves for governmental service, and not

foreigners. The Nationalist movement had been revived after the Young Turks and the Young Persians of neighboring Mohammedan countries inaugurated a constitutional régime.

But the British had shown themselves unalterably opposed to giving the Egyptians any real power in their own government. At the outbreak of the World War they deposed the Khedive Abbas Hilmi, designated another member of the royal family as Sultan, and proclaimed a protectorate over Egypt. They used Egypt as a base of military operations throughout the war, drafting nearly a million Egyptians for army service, though none as soldiers, and requisitioned all the camels in the country. Egypt was therefore a belligerent.

The Egyptian Government had been assured by a proclamation of King George and by British officials that the protectorate was a wartime measure, and that the Egyptians would have independence after the victory, to assure which they were called upon to make so heavy a contribution in life and treasure. This was to be the reward of their loyalty. But when, after the armistice, the Egyptian National Assembly chose delegates to the Peace Conference, the British refused to allow them to leave the country. These delegates were not men of no importance. The leader, Zaghlul Pasha, took his law degree in Paris, had been a judge, and was the idol of the Egyptian people. They adored him. Mohammed Mahmud Pasha was a graduate of Oxford, where he had been a blue, and during the war he had

exercised with conspicuous success administrative functions in the Canal region. The third was the Sheik of the Fayoum, and the fourth was the richest man in Egypt. Worried by the clamor of the people for the fulfillment of the promises made during the war, the British ordered the arrest and deportation to Malta of the Egyptian delegation. Only because they were threatened with a man-sized rebellion did the British Government finally agree to release the prisoners, and let them to proceed to Paris. Then they played their joker at this end of the game.

Not only were Zaghlul Pasha and his companions not given an audience at the Peace Conference; but Lloyd George succeeded in inducing President Wilson to recognize the British protectorate over Egypt. This was one of the most reactionary and ill-considered steps taken by Wilson at Paris. Like the Shantung compromise, it demonstrated the lack of wisdom and foresight that prompted the Paris visit. Wilson at Washington could have dictated to the world. At Paris, his inexperience with the complicated problems of international diplomacy and his excessive anxiety to see the Covenant of the League of Nations embodied in the Peace Treaty turned him—unconsciously perhaps—from a sympathizer with and encourager of the aspirations of small peoples into the instrument for defeating their hopes.

Take Ireland. During the Conference Lloyd George received one day a delegation of Germans from Czechoslovakia. They begged him not to put them

under the Czechs. They pointed out that they inhabited overwhelmingly a large region, contiguous to Germany; that they were Protestants; and that they had created the wealth of the community. They showed how all the big enterprises were in their hands. Lloyd George answered that the sins of the fathers were visited upon the children, that this was a Czech land into which their ancestors had gone, that he was very sorry for them but they really had no business there, and that the war in which the victory had been purchased at so great a price would fail of its purpose if wrongs done to small nations were not righted. One of the Bohemian Germans argued that they had been in Bohemia three centuries longer than the Scotch had been in Ireland, and that there was a perfect analogy between the two situations. They were Protestants, they were educated, they had the business interests of the community in their hands. "I take your answer," said the German, "to mean that England is going to apply this principle of righting ancient wrongs impartially, and that you are going to let the Irish have their freedom. You tell us after six centuries to go back to Germany as a solution of our terrible situation. Are you going to give the same advice to the people of Ulster?"

This was cited to me afterward as a piece of "d—— impertinence" on the part of unrepentant Germans. But if one is a student of nationalism, objectively trying to work out the constructive policies that might be adopted to bring about a durable world peace, is not

the only ground of regarding this analogy as impertinence the fact that the fortunes of war had gone against the Germans?

An Irish delegation did come to the Conference of Paris. They had a memorandum ably worked out, beginning with quotations from Buckle's "History of Civilization," to show that the union of Ireland with the United Kingdom had been accomplished by disgraceful bribery. Followed their version of the one hundred and fifteen years from 1801 to the Easter rebellion of 1916. They pointed out that the Home Rule Act had been actually passed by a lawfully elected British Parliament on the eve of hostilities, and they submitted proof of the treason of General Gough and a group of British army officers in Ireland. They quoted the famous declaration of Sir Edward Carson, to the effect that if the King of England would not listen to the grievances of the Ulsterites, there was another Protestant king in Europe to whom they could turn, and they showed how the Ulsterites had purchased arms from Germany and smuggled them into Ireland to foment an insurrection there. But it did no good! Ireland had no hearing.

The Korean delegation tried to present their case against Japan, with the same lack of success. It was certainly not good policy for the Americans to encourage these submerged nationalities. Delegations from the Philippines, Porto Rico, and Haiti might have appeared! We were just getting in our good work in Haiti and Santo Domingo at that time. But we had

passed the Jones Act in 1916, declaring the intention of giving the Filipinos their independence; and in 1917, after nearly twenty years, we had given citizenship and limited self-government to the Porto Ricans.

Koreans have not become reconciled to Japanese rule, and they still try occasionally to get their cause once more before the world. Porto Ricans officially told Colonel Charles Lindbergh on his recent "good will" flight that they were not satisfied with the deal they were getting from the United States, and that they would not be content until they received full self-government. Filipinos have been continuing to ask the United States to make good its specific promise of 1916. They want their independence—they have wanted it since before we went to the islands, and they claim that they were on the point of success in 1898 when we intervened. But when the Filipino legislature voted funds for pushing the independence propaganda in a perfectly legitimate way at Washington, Governor-General Wood refused to allow them to use their own money that way.

Egyptians and Irish, as a result of using violence, have had a fuller recognition of their nationalism. We have not time to go into the striking history of these two countries during the years following the World War. Lord Milner went to Egypt with a Commission after British Liberals in Parliament had forced an inquiry into Britain's unfulfilled promises. His frank report as to the terrific expense of maintaining an army in Egypt large enough to keep nationalism down in-

fluenced the Government to grant Egypt the title of Free State, with a few of the privileges—not many—that would ordinarily go with that status. The Egyptian question is still partly unsolved. By a Solomonic decision, the British Government divided Ireland, and signed a treaty with the Nationalists, agreeing to withdraw their soldiery and recognize the autonomy of the Irish Free State, with dominion status, in return for Ireland's allegiance to the British Crown and recognition of Ulster's right of independent existence. The spectacle of two distinct governments in one island is a lamentable exhibition of nationalism at its worst. Or is it religious bigotry? There has been peace, however, in Ireland since the withdrawal of the Black and Tans, and it is the hope of moderate elements that Ulster will unite with Dublin after the generation of fanatics has died out. The disturbing factor is the irreconcilability of the extreme Nationalists, under De Valera, who are still working for the complete independence of their country.

Two other important modifications of British foreign policy as regards nationalism, rising out of the World War, are the abandonment of the policy of interference in the internal affairs of Persia and waiving the right to superintend Afghanistan's foreign affairs. The Treaty of Versailles had hardly been signed when it was announced that Persia had concluded a treaty with Great Britain, the terms of which put her under British protection and gave the British many exclusive privileges in Persia. There was a storm of protest.

The Persian people declared that the signature to the treaty had been secured secretly from the Minister of Foreign Affairs either by intimidation or bribery. The Medjliss refused to ratify it. Other Powers protested. This was going a little too far! Faced with the necessity of sending a large army to dissolve Parliament and make the treaty effective, Lord Curzon explained to the world that Britain's commitments were already too great and that there would have to be a retrenchment. Troops were withdrawn from Persia, and the Government of India was instructed to yield to Afghanistan's insistence upon full independence. The British were greatly frightened by Soviet Russia's sweeping recognition of Persia's and Afghanistan's rights. Left outside the British sphere, Afghanistan, like Egypt and Ireland, sent diplomatic missions to the Powers, and established legations.

Let us now pass on from the problems of nationalism which were only indirectly within the competence of the Conference to those that had to be tackled, and for which a solution had to be found. Perhaps it was expecting too much of human nature to criticize statesmen in the flush of victory, with very difficult and delicate problems confronting them, because they did not pause to consider irrelevant national questions. Unfortunately, however, the same inconsistency and insincerity were evident in the decisions affecting the nationalistic aspirations of peoples involved in the war that had just terminated.

From 1914 to 1918 much can be forgiven the En-

tente Powers. They were struggling for their existence. They were making superhuman efforts, they were consenting to stupendous sacrifices, in order to meet and get the better of a menace that was very real. Germany had shown by her treatment of the Polish question and by the terms of the Treaties of Brest-Litovsk with Russia and Bucharest with Rumania in 1918, how cold-blooded and selfish a Great Power can be when it thinks it can have its own way. With the tables turned, it was certainly not for the Germans to squeal! Their attitude toward the rights of small nations, from the moment they invaded Belgium, had proven their unfitness to be entrusted with the stewardship of fixing the destinies of other peoples. Undoubtedly, had they won the war, they would have imposed on us the same kind of a peace that we imposed on them. But is that not a poor justification for the Paris Peace Settlement? Drawing yourself down to the level of the man you have been condemning infers admiration for and approval of his methods—and a tacit acceptance of his ideals.

The Paris deliberations resulted in five treaties, named for the places where they were signed. These treaties were dictated, not negotiated. They were accepted by the defeated peoples because of the hunger blockade that had been maintained throughout the deliberations. The Treaty of Versailles dealt with Germany; the Treaty of Saint-Germain with Austria; the Treaty of Trianon with Hungary; the Treaty of Neuilly with Bulgaria; the Treaty of Sèvres with

Turkey. The Turkish treaty was not signed until 1920, because the victorious powers were unable to agree among themselves until after they had had a continuation conference at San Remo. Each of the five treaties, in its general clauses, was made as nearly like the others as possible. They all contained the Covenant of the League of Nations; and they all provided for indemnities to the victors of an indefinite amount, with the stipulation that full sovereignty would not be restored until the treaty terms were fulfilled. The vanquished were compelled to accept permanent restrictions in armaments, and Germany was specifically forced to agree that she was solely responsible for the war.

But our concern here is only with the treaties as they affect nationalism and retard or advance internationalism. Some of the most foolish provisions, such as bringing war criminals to trial, were abandoned as impracticable within a few years, and other provisions, such as limitation of commercial aviation and inability to negotiate commercial treaties on the basis of reciprocity, were for limited periods, which have now expired. The punitive clauses, such as acknowledgment of war guilt, reparations, military occupation of enemy territory, abandonment of missionary enterprises, interference with industrial life and overseas commerce, interest us only insofar as they have tended to retard the growth of an international spirit. The influence upon the development of nationalism comes mostly from the territorial clauses.

Germany lost to France Alsace-Lorraine and the Saar

region; to Belgium, Malmédy and Eupen; to Denmark, Schleswig; to Lithuania, the Memel district; to Poland, Posnania, the richer portion of Silesia, a strip giving Poland access to the Baltic Sea, including Dantzig; to Great Britain, France, and Japan all her colonial possessions and the leasehold in China. It was stipulated that after fifteen years, if the people of the Saar so voted, Germany would have the option of buying back the Saar for a definite gold payment. Registers were to be kept open in Malmédy and Eupen for some months, in which the inhabitants could record their preference for remaining under German sovereignty. This, of course, was a joke. The first who signed these registers were unceremoniously kicked out, which served as a lesson to the rest of the people. Dantzig was to be a free state. There were plebiscite zones on the frontiers of Denmark and Poland, all of which Germany won. But Upper Silesia was divided afterward by a commission of the League of Nations. The overseas possessions were transferred by title to the five "Principal Allied and Associated Powers." Of the mandates I shall speak later.

Austria lost the head of the Adriatic, the Trentino, the Tyrol south of the Brenner Pass, and Dalmatian ports to Italy; the Slovene region around Laibach, Dalmatia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina to Serbia; Bohemia and Ruthenia to the new Czechoslovakia; and Bukowina to Rumania. A plebiscite was provided for a border region between Hungary and Austria, in order to create bad blood between these former allies, and

between Serbia and Austria in the Klagenfurt region, Austria won both plebiscites. But her territory was reduced to a small inland state, inhabited by six millions, of whom over one-third were in the city of Vienna.

Hungary lost her Adriatic port, Fiume, to Italy, thus making her land-locked; her Danube port, Poszony (which the Germans call Pressburg and the Czechs Bratislava) to Czechoslovakia, together with Slovakia, and about a million Hungarians along the Danube; Transylvania and part of the Banat of Temesvar to Rumania; the rest of the Banat, a corner of Hungary proper, and Croatia to Serbia. Hungary also was reduced to a small inland state.

Hungary and Austria were permanently separated, and Austria had to agree not to unite with Germany, and Germany not to incorporate Austria.

Bulgaria was cut down still further than she had been in the Treaty of Bucharest. Turkey agreed to allow the Powers to settle upon a frontier with an independent Armenia, and renounce sovereignty over all parts of the former Ottoman Empire beyond Asia minor—Mesopotamia, Syria, Palestine, and the countries of the Arabian peninsula. This treaty, as we shall see, was upset by the success of the new Turkish Nationalist movement, and was superseded by a later treaty signed at Lausanne. In the later treaty, however, the territorial gains of the Great Powers did not suffer —only those of Greeks and Armenians! Turkey's cessions in Asia were made to the Principal Allied and

Associated Powers as trustees of the League of Nations, supposedly to the benefit of their inhabitants.

You have been good to bear with me in this very condensed summary of the territorial clauses of the treaties. It must be added, to make the picture complete, that the cession of Alsace-Lorraine to France and of the regions Italy took were made without conditions. But the small states had to agree to minorities provisions, for the protection of the millions of Germans, Austrians, Hungarians, and Bulgarians put under their sovereignty.

In the perspective of nearly ten years we can judge the Paris Treaties by their fruits. The injustice of the boundaries was apparent at the time: it becomes stronger with the years. At the time of the Peace Conference a major portion of the regions taken away from the losers was already in the hands of the new owners. Italy had virtually all she intended to ask for, as did France, by the armistice terms, and the ceded regions had been in the actual possession of these two powers for from eight to ten months when the treaties were signed. The new states, Poland and Czechoslovakia, came into existence at the very moment of the collapse of Austria-Hungary and Germany. Serbian soldiers hurried into the Serbian-speaking portions of Austria and Hungary to get ahead of the Italians even before the war came to an end. Transylvania, Bukowina, and Bessarabia (the latter was taken from Russia) proclaimed their union with Rumania before the Peace Conference met.

The German army was not demoralized; and the Revolution in Germany was orderly in most places. But the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire was complete. With the exception of the Czechs, and to a certain extent the Rumanians, the people on the whole had supported the Hapsburg régime until the end. Yugoslav fear of Italy and Polish fear of Russia had contributed powerfully to this loyalty. But the moment the ship began to sink, the breakup was complete. Austrians and Hungarians proclaimed republics like the others. Each of these peoples was an ethnic minority, and the solid mass of Germans in the empire of the northern ally was nine times as large as the Hungarians and ten times as large as the Austrians.

The boundaries finally delimited were a borrowing from Peter to pay Paul. Italy incorporated as many Germans as there had been Italians in Austria, and she took some Yugoslavs to boot. Irredentism simply crossed the frontiers. Now a quarter of a million Tyrolese, hostile to Italianization, look across the frontier to the fatherland to which they had been fanatically devoted for many hundreds of years. I was in the Tyrol a short time ago (early summer of 1927), and was able to see with my own eyes as intense and bitter nationalism as I have ever witnessed. In Innsbrück one can buy at any kiosk a series of postcards depicting the miseries of Germans under Italian rule. Mountaineers and townsfolk alike, south of the Brenner Pass, hate and despise the Italians, and the sentiments are returned in full measure by Italian

officials. You can go for hours in automobile over this country, and not find anyone to answer you if you speak in Italian. And yet the Italian authorities forbid German signs, teach Italian to the little children in school, make you ask for stamps in Italian at the post-office—why, my friends, it is the same old story I used to see so often before the World War.

And you can go, as I have gone, out from Vienna and Budapest in every direction, day after day in the border regions of the new Danubian states, and see just what you saw twenty years ago—nationalist fanatics trying to force their language and culture on people who had been bartered like sheep by statesmen ignorant of the regions whose destinies they were deciding. All the languages of this region are of as little use to a man, once he gets out of the country, as is Hungarian. German is the only language they have in common, but the nationalists refuse to admit it! The old story is repeating itself.

I have been out there several times during the last few years. I have a feeling of affection for the Rumanians, as I have for the Greeks. Their national aspirations have always been dear to me. I championed the cause of Polish independence at a time when it was an inconvenient—even dangerous—thing to do. I used to thrill over John Hus, and had a penchant for the Czechs. With the Serbs I have associated since the ante-bellum days of the Narodni Obrana. But they have Balkanized their part of Europe. Their nationalism has been intolerant in the extreme. In these new

countries, formed by politics rather than by economics and geography, it may be that the very violence and absurdity of the nationalist attitude toward peoples of other ethnic stocks will bring about a reaction, when the impossibility of indefinitely maintaining present conditions is realized. Let us hope so. Such a movement is already discernible in Czechoslovakia.

Outside of Europe the most notable development of national spirit from 1914 to 1919 was in China. The long and enthusiastic propaganda of Dr. Sun Yat Sen had brought about the downfall of the Manchu dynasty, and the proclamation of a republic in the oldest country in the world. The Young Chinese, who gathered round this leader, were, like most educated nationalists, convinced parliamentarians. They wanted a constitutional government in the fullest sense of the word. The military leaders, virtual dictators in the provinces, while they were willing to see the Manchus go and the experiment of a republic in Peking, refused to countenance the introduction of constitutionalism in their particular regions. They would support the Nationalist movement when it suited their purposes. But they were more interested in the anti-foreign aspect of it than in its goal of a parliamentary régime.

Canton and Peking fell out. There was civil strife in China, sometimes active and at other times only smoldering, throughout the war. China followed the United States into the World War, an unofficial truce was maintained between Peking and Canton while China hoped to improve her international position.

However great might have been the divergence of views between the North and South, all Chinese were agreed upon the importance of the Peace Conference in Paris. Exceptional efforts were made then, as they were later in Washington, to present a harmonious front during these negotiations. In the second year of the World War, shortly after Japan had taken Shantung from Germany (two foreign powers fighting a war of their own on Chinese soil, as it happened in 1904 and 1905), instead of giving back Kiao-Chau and the German concessions to China, Japan presented at Peking a serious note. The Twenty-One Demands, as they have been known since, represented a deliberate attempt on the part of Japan to profit by the preoccupation of the powers in Europe and by the civil strife in China to become virtually "the protecting power." Belligerency was China's hope of avoiding this protectorate and also of getting Japan out of Shantung. In view of the war aims of the Entente Powers and Wilson's speeches, Chinese statesmen thought they would put Japan in an embarrassing position at Paris.

They did not know their onions! The victorious powers were bound by secret treaty, which had been signed between the time the United States broke off diplomatic relations and declared war, to make Germany cede Shantung to Japan. In vain the Chinese statesmen pleaded at Paris, northerners and southerners showing solidarity. Nothing they had to say influenced the Big Four. Not only were they bound to

Japan, but each one of the three European allies had a similar axe to grind. One could not say that the failure to treat China decently at Paris was the reason for the continuance of chaos in that country. But it was certainly a blow against the prestige and influence of those Nationalists who were working for the regeneration of their country along Occidental lines. It discredited all the Powers with the younger Chinese generation.

The revolution in Russia occurred in the early months of 1917. The moderate element which first got control of the Government was quite willing to continue the war, but informed the other Entente Powers that revolutionary Russia was giving up all Czarist imperialistic aims. The deals that had made the Entente in the first place, such as the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 with its Persian zones of influence, was abhorrent to liberal Russia. Similarly, the czarist bargain of 1915 about Constantinople no longer held. And the new Russia wanted to treat China as a friend and equal. These intimations dismayed the allies of Russia. They refused the requests of the Lvoff and Kerensky Governments to restate the war aims of the Entente Powers in clear and unmistakable language. Great Britain, France, and Italy were unable to promise that the self-denying formula, "No indemnities, no annexations," would hold when it came to make peace. Each of these three powers had clear ideas of what it intended to grab.

When Russia went Bolshevik, in November, 1917, a

whole year before the war ended, the new rulers of the Muscovite dominions declared nationalism the corner-stone of their policy. They said they had thrown out the Kerensky régime because of its half-heartedness and insincerity in acknowledging the right of national groups to their own separate existence. The conception of Lenin was a union of federated socialist republics. He was quite willing to recognize as separate political organisms any ethnic groups who wanted to call themselves independent and organize a government. So, before the Peace Conference met, there were already in Russia many states, such as Ukrainia, Georgia, Armenia, Daghestan Union, Azerbaidjan, Bokhara, Siberia—we cannot name them all here. Poland's independence had been admitted in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Then there were Finland, Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Around the Baltic frontier, the Black Sea, the Caspian, and along the frontiers of Persia, Afghanistan, and China, the Soviet republics took form. And Soviet Russia announced the renunciation of all the old imperialistic one-sided treaties of Czarist Russia. Persia was freed of her shackles, and China. The Bolshevists made themselves the champions of all nationalist movements throughout Asia.

We cannot go into the involved story of Allied intervention and counter-revolutionary movements in the Caucasus, the Baltic provinces, Archangel, and Siberia, nor into the close relations of Soviet Russia with the new Turkish nationalism that had its center at Angora. Then there were anti-Bolshevist movements in the

Baltic provinces and Finland, and, shortly after the Treaty of Versailles went into effect, a war between Russia and Poland.

Nationalism triumphed, to a certain extent. Russia recognized the complete independence of Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Esthonia, and Finland. Five new states to add to Czechoslovakia, Jugoslavia (Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes), and the Free State of Dantzig! But Poland fell out with Lithuania, and occupied her capital, Vilna, which she still holds. And Poland put down ruthlessly the nationalist movement in Eastern Galicia, where the inhabitants are overwhelmingly Ukrainian and want to join Ukrainia. Borrowing from Peter to pay Paul again!

Within the past seven years I have had the privilege of visiting, for the most part in automobile, the new frontiers of Europe. From Batum to Vilna, from Dantzig to Malmédy and Eupen, from Strasbourg to Trent, from Trieste and Fiume and Maria Theresopel to Akkerman and Bender, from Karlsbad to Hust, I have tried to view objectively the political and economic conditions in corners of Europe, most of which I knew before the changes were made. As far as technical frontiers go most of these transfers of territory might remain permanent. They might easily remain permanent! All that is needed is a different spirit on the part of the race that happens to be on top for the moment, and a drastic modification in tariff and traffic regulations. For the bulk of the people are not as nationalistically-minded as one would think. They get

stirred up by agitators only when they are oppressed politically and economically, only when their cultural interests are threatened, and, above all, only when their pride is hurt.

To this optimistic generalization concerning the changes, some of them rather violent, made in Europe by the World War there is one exception. That is the Polish corridor, as it is called. Whoever was responsible for this stupidity (I do not want to use a stronger word) will have much to answer for before the bar of history. Lloyd George personally disclaimed in the most emphatic manner possible any part in this conception of giving Poland access to the sea by means of a strip of territory that cut East Prussia from the rest of Germany. Shrewd statesman, he foresaw the inevitable reassertion of German sovereignty over this strip. He felt that true friends of Poland—friends with any vision—should counsel against what was an artificiality, by geographical, economic, political, and ethnic tests alike.

Up to the last moment, at the Peace Conference, the Poles, backed by France, held out for the inclusion in the corridor of the Allenstein and Marienwerder districts. They showed us, by statistics, that these were historically and ethnically Polish lands. As a last-minute concession, a plebiscite was provided for the disputed regions. Despite the fact that Germany was a vanquished nation, bankrupt and threatened with Communism, and the more significant fact still that the plebiscite areas were under control of Allied armies of

occupation, nationalism was stronger than self-interest or fear. Allenstein and Marienwerder voted by over ninety per cent to remain with Germany, just as the border regions that the Allies had wanted to give to Denmark had done. There was no plebiscite in the Polish corridor. But the elected municipal council of Dantzig voted one hundred per cent to remain with Germany. This, of course, was a futile gesture, as Dantzig had already been detached from the empire, and made into a free state.

Speaking abstractly, the idea of giving Poland free access to the sea was a good one. Land-locked states are sometimes at the mercy of neighbors that hold the seacoast. But the same men who admitted the validity of this argument took away from Austria and Hungary the access to the sea that they had had for more than five hundred years. Borrowing from Peter to pay Paul!

The Polish corridor is to German nationalism like a strong cocktail served before every repast. It gives the Germans a fillip, stirs them up, keeps them unreconciled, inspires them to work for a new decision before the only court of appeals that has ever been heard in European history—the court of Mars. The map of Europe was so remade that despite the World Court at the Hague an eventual areopagus would have to be evoked.

The Covenant of the League of Nations, incorporated in all the treaties, provided for the establishment of three types of mandatory government, under the supervision of the League of Nations. The mandatory idea

was conceived for the double purpose of making it appear that the victors were not annexing enemy territories and for keeping Italy from getting her share of the booty. These were the practical reasons, as has been realized since by students of League of Nations mandates. Another reason, which has frequently been given but which we must in all fairness say has not been proved, was the purpose of the Allied premiers to bamboozle President Wilson. On the face of things, it looked as if this were the motive behind mandates, which were to be "a sacred trust for civilization." But we cannot be sure on this point. We can be sure, however, of the first two reasons.

We have no time to go into the African and Asiatic mandates that were awarded to Great Britain (and the dominions of South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand), France, and Japan. Suffice it to say that France and Great Britain divided the German colonies in West Africa; Great Britain took German East Africa; the Union of South Africa took German Southwest Africa; Japan, Great Britain, Australia, and New Zealand took the German possessions in China and the Pacific. These were all supposed to be titles vested in the five Principal Allied and Associated Powers, and allotted to mandatories by the League of Nations and subject to the League of Nations. It was a farce, of course, as the transaction between Belgium and Great Britain over the Congo-Tanganyika frontier and the union of Kenya and Tanganyika have proved. We must limit ourselves to the mandates in the Ottoman

Empire, which have a direct bearing upon the study of nationalism.

The Treaty of Sèvres, with Turkey, was not concluded at Paris in 1919. The rivalries among the victors were so great that it took continuation conferences to settle the text of the treaty. The final terms of the compromise were effected only in the spring of 1920 at San Remo. In the meantime, Great Britain had occupied Palestine and Mesopotamia; France, Syria; and Greece, the Smyrna region. The Covenant of the League of Nations, anticipating the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, had provided for a mandatory régime in the Arabic-speaking portions. The text of the Covenant is explicit. It states that the peoples, freed from the Turks, are to be educated to self-government; that the mandatory power is to perform this task; and that the wishes of the people are to be the first consideration in the choice of the mandatory.

There never was any intention on the part of Great Britain and France to abide by these stipulations. The two powers had violated the terms of the treaty before it was signed, and had been faithless to each other in the Near East. It is one of the most amazing chapters of diplomatic perfidy in all history. But it has always been that way in the Ottoman Empire, whenever Great Powers dreamed of or made a move to secure the succession of the Osmanli. We deal here wholly with facts. The statements I have made are not a matter of speculation or opinion. The man who had most to do with the Arab revolt during the war and who came

to the Peace Conference with Emir Feisul, son of the King of the Hedjaz, wrote in the *Westminster Gazette* of London shortly after the Peace Conference that the Arabs had been betrayed. Colonel Lawrence openly accused the British Government of having failed to carry out the treaty promises he had made in its name when he was inducing the Arabs to revolt against Turkey and join the Entente Powers during the war.

At the Peace Conference Emir Feisul told the Council of Ten what were the Arab aspirations. The Arabic-speaking former subjects of the Ottoman Empire, he declared, Mohammedans, Christians, and Jews, were united for cultural and economic reasons in their desire to revive the old Arabic Empire, under the leadership of the former Sherif of Mecca, who was now King of the Hedjaz. But this was not in the cards! Simultaneously with the signature of the treaty encouraging Arab aspirations to united nationhood, the British had signed another treaty with the French, making a definite division of the Ottoman booty. Syria was to go to France, including Damascus. Arabic nationalist aspirations did not make the slightest difference. A year later, in a further effort to cripple incipient Arabic nationalism, the British Government, by the famous Balfour Declaration, promised Palestine as a homeland for the Jews. As for Mesopotamia, extending inland to the Mosul oil fields, the British were saying, *"Nous y sommes, nous y restons."*

Can one imagine a greater confusion of high international politics and various forms of nationalism?

I shall not attempt to tell more about relations between French and British in the Near East after the World War. To listen to them talk out there, or better still, to watch them act, one would never have supposed that only a short time before they were mingling their blood, facing a common foe, on the battlefields of France. An Englishman in Constantinople, commenting on the treaty between France and the Turkish Nationalists, concluded at Angora when the British troops were still in Asia Minor, said to me, "I suppose that we should not blame Franklin Bouillom. He acted under orders from his Government. Nor should we blame the Government, which acted in accordance with what it thought was for the best interests of France. Good faith and fair dealing have no place in diplomacy. Why should we cry out against the French? Let us be just. You know well enough, Gibbons, that your nation and mine—and every other nation—are like the French in their approval of any acts of statesmen which tend to advance the particular interests of the nation they represent. Nations do not have friends. History proves that. Nations have only interested collaborators, whose coöperation is assured only so long as the collaboration pays."

There is nationalism for you—the quintessence of it! You belong to a group, meaning a nation—for a group has come to mean that. Your group has banded together in order to secure and maintain exclusive advantages for its members. Therefore the individuals of the group, that is, the citizens of the nation, approve and

support the leaders of the group in whatever they do, no matter how raw it may be, for the advancement of the group's interests. After the war the French press approved French policy, and the British press approved British policy. It was much like Decatur's famous toast: "My country, may she always be right! But my country, right or wrong!"

We recognize that Arab nationalism is in its infancy, according to Occidental standards, and that it is almost impossible to conceive of an Arabic state in the former dominions of the Ottoman Empire. But the Peace Conference not only gave freedom to the Hedjaz, whose belligerency the Entente Powers had recognized, but allowed the Hedjaz to be one of the signatories of the Treaty of Peace and one of the original members of the League of Nations. Now on the other side of the Red Sea, at the same moment, the Egyptians, who were a thousand times better qualified for statehood, were being thrown in jail for aspiring to independence. The reason for this inconsistency? It was simply because it did not suit the imperial policies of Britain to recognize nationalism in Egypt. Nationhood for the Arabs of the Hedjaz harmed none. They were remote. They held in check the nomads of the peninsula. There was no oil in their territory. But the moment the Arabs claimed for historic, ethnic, economic, and geographical reasons a larger territory, the Peace Conference's ear was deaf. Great Britain and France had arranged everything—not in accordance with the interest of the peoples of the region, who were

to be separated by artificial boundaries, but in accordance with their own interests. It has always been that way when Europeans have dealt with non-Europeans.

Syria and Palestine have every reason for being together. Their separation is as artificial as the separation of New York and Philadelphia, or London and Liverpool. There was no excuse whatever for a "Transjordania." Mesopotamia was the other side of the desert. But if the Hedjaz was independent, there is no reason why the same political jurisdiction should not extend over Palestine, Transjordania, and Syria. Such an arrangement was certainly to the interest of the inhabitants. With few exceptions—very few—they all thought so. If the Covenant of the League had been seriously taken, if its stipulations had meant what they said, the Syrians would not have had a French mandate. They did not want the French. After they had them, they wanted them less. And the Palestinians certainly did not want their land to become a national home for the Jews. When I speak of Palestinians, I include the Jews that were natives of Palestine. I have never found more bitter opponents of Zionism than the Jews who did not go away from Palestine, and to whom it was historically a native land.

The Zionist movement is one of the most curious manifestations of nationalism of the twentieth century. In the original conception of Hertzl, Zionism was a mystical religious movement, to call the Jewish people to a spiritual regeneration. He wanted Palestine to signify more than a pious hope, expressed in a mean-

ingless ritual. Then, because the persecution of the Jews in Eastern Europe grew more bitter at that time, Zionism came to mean the possible finding of a homeland where there would be freedom from persecution, in the same sense that New England was the goal of the Pilgrims.

For years the Jews, in their conception of Zionism, had much the same feeling as is expressed in the famous poem of Felicia Hemans. The homeland, the Zion, did not necessarily mean Palestine. This is proved by the negotiations between the Zionists and the British Foreign Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain, for establishing Zion in the highlands of East Africa. As for Jerusalem, when the Jews yearned for the Holy City, they had just the same vague, intangible feelings as the Christians, who sang, "Jerusalem The Golden" or "Jerusalem My Happy Home." Neither Jew nor Christian would have been anything else than dismayed if he were suddenly told that his wish was granted and that he had to go and stay there!

In countries where they were persecuted, kept within the pales, discriminated against economically and politically, where they lived under the menace of pogroms, Jews were justified in not having a feeling of loyalty to the country. In Russia and Poland, in Galicia, they had their own language. They were a people apart. But when they came to America, to cast in their lot with us, they had the same position before the law as other elements; they were admitted to citizenship on the same conditions; and no Jew in America could say

that he had not had a square deal from the economic point of view. In our country, composed of all religions and races of Europe, nothing could be more disastrous to national solidarity than to have an element look to another flag, foster any sort of national spirit other than American, or pretend that it had the right to double nationality. In France and Great Britain, where Jews had no disabilities, there was the same incomprehension of the reasons for Zionism in the sense of a national movement.

The common sense of American Jews has prevented the Zionist question from becoming a serious one. In Palestine, however, it was serious for several years after the mandate was assumed by the British. Since then, because the Jews are so hopelessly in the minority and because of their inadaptability to agriculture, the Zionist question is not as troublesome as it was.

For a while the British, who assumed also the mandate for Mesopotamia, had a serious time with the Arabs there. Finally, they withdrew their garrisons to Mosul, a seaport, and put Emir Feisul on the throne, as King of Irak. He had just been chased out of Damascus by the French. The British have collaborated in the Government of Irak admirably. It is one of the bright spots in the post-war Near East.

The French in Syria have had a difficult time. They went to Beirut, and sent their armies on to Damascus, against the wishes of the people, who felt that a Greater Arabia, under one mandate, was better for their country. Lebanon Christians, Maronites, who had

been traditionally under French influence, welcomed the French at first. But the nationalist spirit had been working among their youth. Older intellectuals, too, thought that it would be best to end religious differences by casting in their lot with the Mohammedan Arabs, as the Copts had done in Egypt. They felt that their traditional enemies, the Druses, would be better and more profitable neighbors as citizens of a common state. This did not fall in with the French policy, and a common statehood has not yet been realized. Nationalism in Syria has had much encouragement from the Syrians in the United States, who have backed it from the beginning, and who have influenced their former compatriots against French, and in favor of Anglo-Saxon, conceptions of political institutions.

The Greeks went to Smyrna in 1919, during the Peace Conference, at the invitation of the Big Four. Neither the French nor the British wanted to see the Italians get a foothold in Asia Minor, and, when they heard that an Italian expedition was being planned, this was their way of anticipating it. Not that the Greeks were unwilling! To hoist the Greek flag over Smyrna, one of Homer's birthplaces, was next to the return to Byzantium among Hellenic nationalist aspirations. But Clemenceau made Venizelos pay for the privilege by sending a contingent to take part in the Allied occupation of Odessa, in the hope of destroying Bolshevism. Venizelos agreed. He sent an army to the Black Sea for much the same reason that Cavour had done seventy years before.

Of the return of the Constantinist régime in Greece, and the rise of the Turkish Nationalist movement under Mustafa Kemal Pasha at Angora, we have not time to speak in detail. Nor can we dwell upon the disaster that came to the Hellenic Nationalist movement in 1922. I was in Asia Minor shortly before the collapse, and I believe that I am the only man to have gone over the whole of the eight hundred kilometers of battlefront between the Greek and Turkish armies, from the Aegean to the Sea of Marmora, by Afion Kara Hissar, Eski Sheir, and Vrusa. The temptation to tell you about it is great. I learned a lot about nationalism out there during that tragic summer. But I must pass on. The Turkish Nationalists triumphed. They expelled the Greek armies and then all the Greek inhabitants—people who had been there twenty-five hundred years before they themselves came. The Turks compelled the Great Powers, who had abandoned the Greeks, to revise the Treaty of Sèvres at Lausanne. The Powers agreed to the abolition of the capitulations.

Since 1922 the Turks in Asia Minor, freed of the Armenians and Greeks, have had a hard time economically. And they have had other rebellions on their hands. For three years the Kurds have asserted their nationalism—and they are a Mohammedan people, like the Turks.

The most interesting thing about the Turks is the program of national reforms of a sweeping character that Mustafa Kemal has initiated. He has gone to the

very heart of the problem of Turkish nationalism. Realizing that a Mohammedan country is incapable of attaining nationhood, in the Occidental sense of the word, so long as the clergy dominate the social life of the people, he emancipated women, doing away with their veils; abolished the khalifate, and deposed the Sultan; made it a misdemeanor to be illiterate; did away with the red fez as the national headgear; divorced the Church and State absolutely; adopted the Roman letters for Turkish, and made the people learn them; and has just lately given the vote to women. This is the most thorough-going program of reforms ever adopted by a non-European people. Up to now it has been successful, also, quite unlike the similar effort of Amanullah in Afghanistan. If the Turks can solve their economic problems, the history of nationalism may give a high place to the Angora movement.

And now we have come to the end of our brief summary of the results of the treaties of the Paris settlement upon nationalist movements. We have seen something of the constructive and the destructive side of nationalism. Many things have been omitted, especially in the treatment of the nationalism of the Great Powers. This has been done intentionally, in regard to some matters, for we want to speak of them as obstacles to the growth of internationalism in the next chapter.

VI

INTERNATIONAL COÖPERATION SINCE THE WORLD WAR

Ever since 1789 internationalism has gone along hand in hand with nationalism. We have seen how nationalism was a unifying influence up to ethnic limits of population among the German and Italian peoples, and how, because there was no single preponderant ethnic element, nationalism was a disruptive influence in the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires. But in all four of these cases—and in Russia as well—an international movement coincided with the nationalist movement. Italy had her Carbonari and Freemasons; and there have been advocates at times of a wider Latinity than that of the Italian-speaking people. Historically, it has been preached as a revival of the Roman imperial idea, which was international; while ethnically it has reached out to embrace French, Spanish, Portuguese, and Rumanians. The Papacy, dispossessed of temporal power at Rome, remained international. Germany, coincident with unification, gave birth to Marxism, which was to unite the workers of all countries in the common struggle against capitalism. Mingled with Turkish nationalism were two international conceptions: Panislamism and Panturanianism.

A racial or religious movement of an all-embracing character helps internationalism in the sense that it breaks down barriers dividing countries and gives a common bond to separated peoples. We might add Zionism, which came from Vienna. One may call it a nationalistic movement, and yet it is at the same time international.

Nationalism in Europe in the nineteenth century, both as a unifying and as a disruptive influence, was accompanied by some form of international movement in every country that experienced nationalism in an overwhelming degree.

And then we saw the revolution in communications and tariff policy at work. Railroads helped unification by making essential larger political units. The exigencies of the investment of capital demanded a continuous territory under one central government. Cavour used railroads as an argument for extending the administrative control of Piedmont. Railroads helped materially in quickening the entry of German states into the German Confederation. This was an aid to nationalism. But railroads, in establishing through services, made possible continuous travel across frontiers. The moment you are able to go to sleep in one country and wake up in another you are on the way toward internationalism. The breaking down of internal tariff barriers consolidated the authority of states, as in Prussia, and tended toward the formation of larger political units. A *Zollverein,* gradually taking in more and more political units, made people begin to

think beyond narrow and arbitrary political frontiers: then those frontiers disappeared. What economists call division of labor helped build up nations, especially in Central Europe. But the exchange of raw materials and manufactured products, with two railroad journeys to bring about the result, was a great aid toward (1) a larger political organism, and at the same time (2) an international frame of mind. We might add banking, which became irrevocably international after the underwriting of the indemnity imposed upon France by Germany in 1871. Investments and credits made those who had money vitally interested in the stability and prosperity of neighboring states, of whose existence they had hardly been aware before. There is no more broadening adage than "Where your treasure is, there will your heart be also."

Economic and financial forces built up nationalism and at the same time foreshadowed internationalism.

It is possible for the student of European history to look upon the World War as the inevitable liquidation of numerous problems that had to be solved and currents that had to be allowed to run their course. Tolerant observer of human nature, and more amused than indignant, the student can even consider the Peace Conference as the end of an old rather than the beginning of a new era. The statesmen gathered in Paris in 1919 were those who had waged the war, who had inherited and who had helped to increase the gravity of problems that made for an intolerable international situation. Why blame them for running true to form?

In making the peace they were still making war. They were still the captives of outworn formulae of the conduct of international relations. They were supported in their extravagant madness by public opinion that had been inflamed by the war and that was laboring under delusions and illusions. Because they were soon going to die and be gathered to their fathers, they had only to think of the advantage of the moment and of capitalizing prejudice and hatred that would not long outlast themselves.

This seems a harsh thing to say. But it is only because we are able to say it that we can count ourselves among the optimists. If one thought that the Peace Conference mentality was going to persist in Europe and throughout the world there would be no use of talking about internationalism, and thinking that it would be ever possible to have "Peace on earth, goodwill among men." If I have given what may seem a destructive criticism of the settlement made after the World War, it is only because I have desired to set forth, in an objective fashion, the facts in the case. I was at Versailles, in the Salle de Glaces with my wife, on the day the Treaty was signed. At the moment General Smuts appended his name, ushers passed out a mimeographed statement of his position, which I still have. The words of his protest were prophetic. He wanted everyone to know that he was signing under duress, when he stated: "The promise of the new life, the victory of the great human ideals, for which the peoples have shed their blood and their treasures with-

out stint, the fulfillment of their aspirations towards a new international order and a fairer, better world, are not written in this treaty. . . . There are territorial settlements which in my humble judgment will need revision. There are guaranties laid down which we all hope will soon be found out of harmony with the new peaceful temper and unarmed state of our former enemies. There are punishments foreshadowed over most of which a calmer mood may yet prefer to pass the sponge of oblivion. There are indemnities stipulated which cannot be exacted without grave injury to the industrial revival of Europe, and which it will be in the interests of all to render more tolerable and moderate. There are numerous pinpricks which will cease to pain under the healing influences of a new international atmosphere.

"The real peace of the peoples ought to follow, complete, and amend the peace of the statesmen. . . . I am confident that the League of Nations will yet prove the path of escape for Europe out of the ruin brought about by this war. . . . The enemy peoples should at the earliest possible date join the League, and in collaboration with the Allied peoples learn to practice the great lesson of this war, that not in separate ambitions or in selfish domination, but in common service for the great human causes, lies the true path of national progress."

How much more clearly than President Wilson did General Smuts realize the failure of Versailles! Smuts himself had once been a vanquished signer of a treaty. The British had accorded the fallen foe a magnanimous

peace; they had extended the hand of fellowship to Smuts, and had invited him to coöperate with them in building in common a new South Africa. His own experience and his sporting instinct combined to make him speak out at the moment the Treaty of Versailles was signed. He told the truth. Everybody knew that he told the truth. In only one thing did he go wrong. Like other idealists, he placed too much faith in the League of Nations.

But when I make this statement I ask myself whether I am right in doing so. It is easy enough to criticize the shortcomings of the League. I have had too little faith in the League's ability to substitute international coöperation for national selfishness in shaping the destinies of the world. The League Covenant seemed to me to be couched in terms that would enable the victorious nations to dominate indefinitely both the vanquished enemies and their own small allies. In the decade since it started to function the League has shown at times its impotence; and it has been guilty of a few crimes of commission and many of omission.

I could enumerate the shortcomings of the League. But I shall not take your time to do this. It is more to the point to call attention to what the League has accomplished, despite the abstention of the United States, in furthering international coöperation.

Before 1914 there were a number of international commissions, and some definite and permanent international organizations, notably the Postal Union. An International Opium Commission had been function-

ing for fifteen years. There had been two conferences at the Hague, in 1899 and 1907, which had discussed in detail causes of friction that led to war, moot points of international law, and better machinery for arbitrating disputes among nations. The deliberations of the Hague Conferences had resulted in definite conventions and the erection of the machinery for the arbitration of international disputes. When the League began to function at Geneva, in 1920, it took over the international commissions, with the exception of the Postal Union which remained at Berne; and it started in to draft the rules for the Permanent Court of International Justice, which was finally established in 1923. The advantage of this court over the former Hague Tribunal was its permanency. The antebellum organization was simply the machinery for convening a court. In each instance, judges from the panel had to be chosen by diplomatic negotiation and to be brought to The Hague for a particular case.

No one can deny that the grouping of international organizations of a social—or rather non-political—nature at Geneva has facilitated international coöperation. Even though the United States is not a member of the League of Nations, we have sent delegates to take part in the deliberations of the non-political commissions. The Covenant provided for an International Labor Bureau, which has done splendid work in securing uniform legislation throughout the world for hours of labor and conditions of work. To one who sits down to think it out the rôle of such an organization appears

tremendous. One of the most potent factors in creating an international spirit and free international intercourse is the social levelling or equalization of conditions of labor throughout the world. Every proposal or recommendation of this branch of the League of Nations, when it is adopted by the member countries, brings them nearer to the standards of living and the conditions of labor in the United States, and will have a bearing later on the revision or abolition of tariffs.

It had not been in existence two years when the League of Nations realized the necessity of world-wide intellectual coöperation. As nations have become literate the influence of higher education, newspapers, magazines, public lecture courses, and books has become greater. For better or for worse university professors, publicists, and men of letters have shaped public opinion. In fact their influence upon the thought of the masses is what that of the Church used to be before the eighteenth century. The League of Nations realized that internationalism—I mean internationalism in the sense of closer coöperation for the general good—could gain ground only through fuller international intellectual coöperation. A bureau for this purpose, established in Paris, has developed interesting and valuable contacts throughout the world.

In its political work, the League has not had an easy time. It was a mistake to make it overseer of the administration of the Saar and Dantzig, and to entrust it with the plebiscite in Upper Silesia. It should never have become involved in the supervision of German

armaments. Its rôle in the exacting of an accounting for mandate administration has been disappointing. And the successive September assemblies have proved dull and futile, although questions vital to permanent world peace have frequently been raised by the delegates.

The power of the League is in the hands of the Council, and its authority is exercised by the permanent Secretariat. For several years the Council was completely controlled by British and French, in the sense that when the foreign ministers of these two Powers were agreed, the Council did what they said. But that has changed since Fascism gained control in Italy and since the admission of Germany to a permanent seat on the Council. Mussolini has asserted the dignity of Italy by threatening to exercise from time to time the prerogative of veto. Germany has made herself, for obvious reasons, the spokesman of minorities and mandated territories. Then, too, the Council has been enlarged. It is more representatively international than it used to be. When Brazil was a member of the Council, she voted against the admission of Germany, thus creating a great scandal.

While the Council has escaped from the domination of its creators, the Secretariat still remains predominantly Anglo-French. The Secretary-general and the chief of the economic section are Englishmen, while the heads of the two bureaus whose important work is stressed above—Labor and International Coöperation—are Frenchmen. The languages of international ma-

chinery are English and French. Since the Germans have entered the League, on a footing of equality, they are becoming more insistent upon having their full share of the offices and upon the use of the German language. Mussolini every now and then declares that Italy is not properly represented in the League's executive machinery.

In this he is right. The Spanish are also right in complaining that they were given the small end of the horn at Geneva. Spanish is the language of more members of the League than use any other medium. There are more Spanish-speaking people in the New World than the whole population of France. Then up pops Brazil declaring that she, as well as Spain, has a right to a permanent seat on the Council. The thirty million Brazilians are more than all the rest of South Americans put together. Since the United States did not exercise her privilege under the Treaty of Versailles, there is no permanent member of the Council from the New World. And how about China? There are at least five times as many Chinese as there are Japanese. China, in fact, claims to contain one quarter of the world's population. Why should she not have a permanent seat?

Nowhere more than at Geneva is there so frequent a *reductio ad absurdum* in an argument. If the League of Nations served no other purpose, it would at least be a warning of the almost insurmountable difficulties of creating a fair and representative administrative organ of international coöperation. There are many nations.

All have their pride, and, if we take population and extent of territory alone, Spain, Brazil, and China would seem to have as much right to permanent membership in the Council and to a large representation in the Secretariat as British, French, Germans, and Italians. And then we must remember that three countries, each in its own sphere the largest of its kind, have as yet no part in the League. Russia has not only the greatest extent of territory of any country in the world, but she is the largest unit of the white race; the United States has more English-speaking population than the British Empire and is the wealthiest country in the world; and Mexico is the most populous of the Spanish-American republics. Argentina, most powerful of Spanish-American countries and wealthier than Mother Spain, has never had more than a lukewarm interest in the League.

These statements are not made in the spirit of captious or destructive criticism. Facts are facts: we must face them. The League of Nations is a great conception. It has within it the hope of a closely-knit and universal organization for international coöperation. But if we consider the total abstention of the United States, Russia and Mexico; the indifference of Argentina; the withdrawal of Brazil; the inferior position of China; and the equivocal participation of India, we cannot in all fairness regard the League, as at present constituted, as a thoroughly representative and inclusive international organization.

Before leaving the League of Nations, we must speak

of its effort toward a limitation of armaments. As far as the League machinery is concerned, the effort has been an honest one. But there has been a lack of sincerity on the part of its dominant members that does not as yet give much hope for tangible results. The World War should have been a great lesson to all the nations involved in it. In the Treaty of Versailles, the dictated disarmament of Germany was justified by a promise that the other nations would take concerted steps to limit similarly their own armaments. Lord Asquith, commenting upon this undertaking in a public speech in England, said that unilateral disarmament of a temporarily helpless foe would prove to be a constructive step toward world peace only if it were followed by universal limitation of armaments. The League of Nations recognized the truth of this statement, as did the President of the United States, by calling a conference to discuss armament limitation.

One of the first acts of President Harding was to issue invitations for a conference to meet in Washington on the third anniversary of the armistice. The agenda was wisely limited in scope. It was decided that five Powers—those who had navies—should endeavor to reduce by treaty the number of capital ships, and that four other powers should be invited to participate with the five naval Powers in the discussion of questions relating to the Pacific, especially to China.

The Washington Conference made a distinct contribution to world peace in the Five-Power Treaty, establishing a ratio of 5-5-3-1.75-1.75 for ten years in the

capital ships of Great Britain, the United States, Japan, France, and Italy. The detailed proposal, as outlined by Secretary Hughes, was a practical one. It was adopted because the other Powers realized that the United States, if her ship-building program then in progress was not interrupted, would soon have the superiority in capital ships. War burdens were heavy upon the taxpayers of all the countries involved, and they knew that they could not compete with the United States. The undertaking not to increase existing naval fortifications in the Pacific was also a constructive achievement.

The Nine-Power Treaties stabilizing conditions in the Far East, reiterating the open door principle in regard to China, abolishing foreign post offices in China, and promising negotiations for restoring Chinese tariff autonomy, were not so successful. The Chinese civil war was an excuse for delaying the carrying out of the tariff autonomy promise; and the fact that Russia and Germany did not participate in the treaties vitiated them. The Chinese situation is still uncertain. As a precedent for later action, however, these treaties were a contribution to world peace and to the realization of China's legitimate aspirations.

What was accomplished at Washington encouraged the League of Nations to hold naval and land disarmament conferences. So far, the naval conferences have come to nothing because of the unwillingness of Great Britain to admit the principle of limitation of naval armaments other than capital ships on the basis of

equality with other Powers. The old idea of being mistress of the seas dies hard. It will have to await the partial completion of a cruiser-building program by the United States, such as we undertook in capital ships during the years following 1916. Land armaments interest chiefly the continental European states. Little progress has been made here because of France's unwillingness to accept any scheme of limitation that will mean her losing the military hegemony of Europe.

In the economic field two great problems have engaged the attention of the nations since the World War: tariffs and international financial obligations arising from the war.

An economic conference was held at Genoa in 1922, in which Russia and Germany as well as the victorious powers participated. Many practical questions of interchange in commerce and of international communications and credits were discussed. Political considerations prevented tangible results. It became evident during the course of the conference that the grave economic problems that prevented European rehabilitation could not be solved in a gathering in which so many conflicting interests were at stake and in which the attitude towards Russia and Germany was still that of suspicion and actual hostility. The two ostracized powers made things worse by announcing the conclusion of a commercial treaty between themselves.

But France had to live in the same continent with Russia and Germany. Realizing this, she eventually recognized Soviet Russia, after direct negotiations, and

renewed diplomatic relations with her. Similarly, the French and German foreign ministers held direct conversations, and finally came to an agreement with each other, which was subscribed to by Great Britain and Italy, at Locarno, after France's punitive expedition in the Ruhr had brought no positive result except an alarming further depreciation of French currency. Locarno was a step toward world peace because Germany recognized the permanency of the western frontier with France, agreed to negotiate a commercial treaty with France, to enter the League of Nations as a permanent member of the Council, and to abide by the decision of a committee of experts in settlement of the reparations question.

International financial obligations have retarded the normal rapprochment among the nations engaged in the war far more than any other problem. The settlement of international debts has kept Europe from recovering financial equilibrium, and has put a wedge between the European peoples and the Americans.

By the Treaty of Versailles Germany bound herself to pay the war losses of the victors, including pensions. No definite amount was fixed. Germany was to pay all she could, and she recognized (in the treaty!) that the utmost limit of her capacity to pay would not compensate the victors for the damage they had suffered on land and sea, and their budget charges for pensions. The idea of the framers of the treaty was to put Germany juridically in a position where, no matter what she paid, she would still owe more, and would thus

remain in bondage to the victors. At any time, say fifty years, after the treaty had been signed, its terms would still enable the victors to argue that Germany had not even paid the interest on her obligations, and actually owed them more than she did when the war ended.

For this reason Germany tried to get a definite sum of indemnities written into the treaty; and ever since the war she kept asking that the global sum be stipulated. Negotiations came to nothing, as far as fixing the total of German indebtedness was concerned, because the victors insisted that whatever Germany paid would not acquit her of her obligation. Therefore they had the right to wait and assess the annual indemnities on the basis of Germany's capacity to pay. From the viewpoint of international relations the uncertainty that this attitude created was deplorable. Despite the better feeling between France and Germany, following Locarno and the signing of a commercial treaty, the failure to present a definite bill to Germany, on the payment of which she would be quit of reparations obligations, retarded coöperation for the economic rehabilitation of Europe. It gave France the excuse, also, to maintain an army of occupation in the Rhineland. This abnormal situation, long years after the war has ended, prevented the restoration of peace for a decade after the war ended. Until the Young Plan was adopted in 1929, we were still in a provision era—under an armistice, one might say.

More disastrous in its effect upon the growth of the

international spirit than the fact of indemnities is the theory of reparations held by the victors in the World War. They have always claimed that they are not exacting an indemnity, but that they are making Germany pay for losses incurred in the war for which Germany had been solely responsible. In the spring of 1922, when he was still premier, Lloyd George declared that German war guilt was the basis of and justification for reparations. In the Treaty of Versailles Germany had acknowledged her sole guilt: it was *une chose jugée* (a case that had been decided) and could never be reopened. The world was expected to accept as final the verdict of the Paris Conference, where the accusers were both judge and jury, and where the accused was not allowed to speak in his defense or be represented by counsel. To this we must add that the evidence upon which the verdict was rendered was incomplete and partial—some of it indeed questionable—and was not of a character that either a civil law court or any group of historians or international lawyers, even of the Entente countries, would have accepted as conclusive or final.

Such a proceeding was unique in history. To maintain the validity of the war guilt clause of the Treaty of Versailles, and the reparations argument based upon it, is preposterous, even if we do believe ourselves that the chief responsibility in precipitating the war was Germany's. Fortunately, historians of Allied countries have refused to accept the verdict of Versailles. Among scholars, who have no bias or axe to grind, German

war guilt is far from being, as Lloyd George said, *une chose jugée*. Many statesmen, notably Italian and American, either never accepted or have abandoned the theory of Germany's sole responsibility. I think I have not met a well-informed Englishman, even during the war, who thought the Germans were solely responsible for starting the war. Eminently fair-minded, many of my British friends, up to the rank of men commanding armies, were disposed to take a broad view of many of the violations of the laws of war of which the Germans were accused. I knew a French admiral, who stoutly maintained that had Great Britain or France been in the position of Germany they would have used submarines in the same way.

Most of the extreme passion and bitterness, most of the charges, were made and persisted in by those who were far from the battle front. This was true on both sides. The official attitude of Allied governments as to war guilt has not changed, because of political reasons. But the Germans know by this time that people whose opinions count in all Allied countries admit the untenable nature of the contention that Germany's sole responsibility for the World War was definitely established in 1919, and that the war guilt article in the Treaty of Versailles stands unaltered for all time. Were this not so, we could have no hope in our generation of seeing anything approaching an international spirit in Europe.

Germans are a unit in repudiating the war guilt verdict of Versailles. But they admit the necessity—

and to a certain extent the justice—of their obligation to pay a large indemnity for the damage done in France and Belgium by the invasion of their armies and on sea by the activities of their submarines. They philosophically accept the fact that they lost the war. They wanted to have the reparations question settled as soon as possible so that they could get the French out of the Rhineland and have a solid basis under their feet for internal economic rehabilitation and for international financial relations. The French claimed that the invasion of the Ruhr was necessary to make German public opinion realize the necessity of a reparations settlement. That may be true. We must not forget the existence in Germany of the irreconcilable element. But it was equally true that the Ruhr business opened the eyes of the French to the need of making reparations a question for financial experts rather than politicians if they ever wanted to see any real money.

Hence the Dawes Commission. We cannot go into the story of its formation and the plan that it devised. It was unable to accomplish everything that it thought necessary to be done. It was limited in its powers—even in the scope of its discussions. Had the experts been given a free hand, they would certainly have settled once for all the problem of German reparations by bargaining with the German Government on the total sum. Then, having fixed the global amount, the terms of its payment could have been arranged. As it was, they did the best they could by deciding upon a sliding scale of payments for five years, to be received

by a non-political Reparations Commission permanently located in Berlin, which was to have a supervision of the revenues guaranteeing the payments and by agreeing that no sums should be withdrawn from Germany that would upset her recently-acquired financial stability. Because of the protection thus promised German currency, the Government accepted the Dawes Plan. But it stated that it was not sure that the maximum sum set could be paid. That was for the future to decide.

In German reparations and the Dawes Commission, with the only partial success attained, some observers saw nationalism at work, in its destructive mood. They pointed out German recalcitrancy and French insistence upon the pound of flesh. They showed how politics limited the work of the experts. The real reason for France's attitude on reparations, they told us, was the desire to hold firmly to the occupation of the Rhineland by making it impossible for Germany not to default on her payments. Germany was painted in France as a potential menace—a wild animal whose claws had to be kept clipped. On the other hand, German nationalists, fishing in these troubled waters, preached the impossibility of ever satisfying France and the inevitable new recourse to the God of battles.

But if we look beneath the surface we see that the Dawes Commission marked a step forward in international coöperation. My exceptionally close contacts with men who have molded and who are still molding public opinion in France and Germany have given me

an impression quite different from what one gets who pays heed to the noisy manifestations of superpatriots. Since the Ruhr invasion France and Germany are bound together, rather than separated, by the reparations question. More than that, other countries have become more closely linked in vital interests with both France and Germany. The work of the Dawes Commission—an international group—and the splendid spirit exhibited in following its recommendations were due to international coöperation, not to German good faith or to French acceptance of modifications alone.

Before the end of 1929 political exigencies yielded to practical common sense in the settlement—once and for all—of the German reparations question. The Dawes Plan was only a compromise—a provisional *modus vivendi*. It was intended that another meeting of experts would convene after the plan had been given a trial. This financial conference, in whose councils bankers predominated, was held in Paris in the spring of 1929. It decided upon definite German annuities for fifty-seven years, after which the debtor would be free, and for payment through an international bank, to be created by the interested governments.

The outcome of the deliberations of the experts at the end of the third decade of the twentieth century, ten years after the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, and incorporated in the Young Plan, made more interdependent than ever the basic financial systems of European countries. In 1911, war was said to have been prevented over Agadir because of interlocking financial

interests. But war did come in 1914. How disastrous it was for all nations is only just now being realized. And there is a new influence, not felt in 1911 or 1914, the American bankers, whose participation is essential to a permanent settlement of any international financial problem of Europe. When we think that since the war American investments have increased tremendously in Latin America also, it will readily be seen how the money markets of all the world are interested in German reparations. Once this question was settled, the private investment field in France and Germany, as well as international exchange, benefited materially.

Above I quoted the Scriptural observation, "Where your treasure is, there will your heart be also." It is worth repeating here. His biographers tell us that Julius Caesar's start in public life was due to the amount of money he owed. His creditors could not see him fail. When reparation payments flow naturally, with non-political guaranties, into the coffers of France, Great Britain, and other creditor countries, they will become an accustomed item of budget revenue that cannot be dispensed with. Hence the health of the golden goose will be a matter of importance.

It is the same with private investments of other countries. Germany cannot pay the Young Plan annuities unless she gets a lot of money for her home industries. The golden eggs cannot be laid unless the goose is fed. Every large investment made by Americans or Britishers in Germany binds the three countries more closely together. They have one another's wel-

fare increasingly at heart. This same observation extends to all international loans. You are perforce vitally interested in the well-being and prosperity of your debtors for the same reason that you are interested in the prosperity of companies whose stocks and bonds you hold.

But there is a cloud on the horizon. It has been there ever since the Entente premiers proposed to President Wilson during the Peace Conference that some inter-Allied arrangement should be made, at the time the treaties were signed, concerning the indebtedness of European countries to the United States. Before we entered the war, Entente countries owed considerable sums to American bankers, and they had out large short-term credits in the United States. When we became an associate of the Entente Powers in 1917, we began to lend them large sums of money, at first to protect their credit in this country and then to extend it for the continued and larger buying of supplies. Part of the money Great Britain borrowed from us went to settle purchases of smaller allies which she had guaranteed. Half of what we loaned to France was advanced to her after the armistice to settle outstanding obligations to America to buy foodstuffs, and to finance the purchase of the vast American army stocks in France. To help win the war we loaned money to virtually all of the states banded against Germany, including some, like Armenia, that did not exist, and others, like Liberia, that were not contributing directly to the military effort. At the end of 1917, the Kerensky Gov-

ernment was overthrown in Russia. But we continued to lend its ambassador in this country large sums, although he had been definitely dismissed by the new government that exercised effective administrative control at Petrograd and Moscow.

These loans, which amounted to about ten billions of dollars, were between governments. Congress authorized them. The money to make them was raised by bonds sold by popular subscription throughout the United States, and was paid to the Allied Governments by the American treasury, which took the receipt of the agents of the countries concerned. From the beginning the American Government regarded these loans like any other transactions among Allies. They were obligations, to be met within a reasonable time or to be allowed to run with reasonable interest. But ever since the Peace Conference European countries, notably France, took the stand that the moneys advanced by the United States were contributions to the common cause, and did not balance what they had expended in blood and treasure, and what they had suffered from devastation and loss of revenues through enemy invasion and occupation. The French, for instance, pointed out that they had lost three million dead and wounded, and that one sixth of their country (from the viewpoint of revenue and population) had been in the hands of the Germans for four years. The American Government however, sustained by public opinion, took the ground that the loan had been ordinary commercial transactions.

War debts became a burning question. Our government finally "invited" the debtor governments to pay or fund their obligations. Commissions came over here, and you know how acrimonious were the discussions over terms of settlement. At first it looked as if we were bidding for the rôle of Shylock. But finally Congress authorized the Debt Funding Commission to make sweeping reductions in interest charges. A settlement was made first with Great Britain, and then with every other debtor except France. The Franco-American agreement was not ratified by the Chamber of Deputies until the summer of 1929, and only then after the French Government made a last-minute desperate effort at Washington to secure modification of the terms of the settlement.

Aside from the fact that the French think that they do not owe us this money, the obstacles to acceptance by French public opinion of the debt settlement are the reparations question and the debt owed by France to Great Britain. The British have told the French that they will ask from them only as much as they (the British) are bound to pay to the Americans; and that if the Americans ever forego the money owed them, they (the British) will forego their claims against France. The French say that they are willing to pay the United States so long as Germany pays them; but that they cannot be expected to bind themselves to continue to pay the United States should Germany default on the Young annuities. The United States refuses to see any connection between German reparations and

the French debt to us. There it will rest, an academic question so long as Germany pays her obligations under the Young Plan. But every year the growing generation in France will like Americans less.

I have tried to present a clear, if not detailed, picture of the war debt problem. It is important that we have this question in mind, and link it up with the reparations—as European peoples do—in order that we can grasp the full implications arising today in the world from the existence of these huge international obligations. Private debts, between individuals of two nations, or between a nation and private interests of another nation, have always existed, and are generally taken care of (except in backward or defaulting countries) by the ordinary banking processes. But these are debts between states, and they cannot come under general commercial rules. How are the sums due in interest and amortization to be transferred each year without upsetting exchanges? More than that, is it possible at all to transfer them in any other way than by goods and services? What is going to happen if they are not paid? What precedents will be created? How are international relations, economic and political, affected? What social implications arise from the contracting of a certain form of economic servitude by one nation to another to extend for two generations beyond the time the money was borrowed and spent?

Reluctantly—for the subject is fascinating—we must forego the temptation to discuss these problems. Of two only shall we speak, because of their influence upon

international coöperation: (1) affording facilities of payment, and (2) the long term of the payment contract.

We have said that there seems to be no means known to economists other than goods and services whereby enormous sums can be transferred from one country to another year after year without upsetting exchanges. Most countries import foodstuffs or raw materials, or both, and certain types of machinery and fuel. To pay these bills they have to export. To export means having markets that will take your goods. The only sums available for the payment of back debts are those that accrue to the credit of the country abroad through an excess of exports over imports. In the balance of trade, a favorable balance can be created also by the sale of services. This means insurance, maritime transport, the use of laborers most of whose earnings are sent back home, or catering to tourist traffic.

While the Dawes Plan was in operation, Germany borrowed so much from the United States that she had available credits abroad for the transfer of indemnity payments. Because France wanted large public works completed, Germany was able to acquit a part of her annual payments by services rendered in French ports and highways. But both these sources of payment will soon come to a natural end. France therefore must send an enormous number of tourists to Germany, and she must buy lots of German goods. The same with Great Britain, if she wants lots of money from Germany. Similarly, if France is to pay great sums to the

United States, and what she does for tourists is not sufficient, she must export to the United States. She has no laborers to send there. But have we not by our prohibition and our high tariff on silks, perfumes, and *articles de Paris* limited the market for France in the United States? Our immigration law deprives Italy of the large sums that used to accrue to her in the trade balance with us through laborers' remittances. How are France and Italy to pay us? That is the practical question.

France has one other way, and that is to transfer to us directly the reparations annuities coming from Germany. This has been frequently proposed. It could be done by assigning to us the payments under the Young Plan, or by funding the German reparations, and having American investors buy the bonds. This would not solve the problem, as far as we are concerned, of how we are going to get our money. If it was to come from Germany instead of France, the same question would arise: do we want German goods or services? Another inconvenience to this scheme, from the American viewpoint, would be that we should become for two generations Germany's taskmaster. You know how the publican is regarded! In a case like this it would be no different in our day than in Matthew's.

It seems like a hopeless problem, does it not, the double problem of reparations and war debts? But it has its bright side, its very bright side, when we view it from the standpoint of international coöperation. For

whatever solution is found, it is bound to tend toward a broader internationalism.

It is impossible to envisage the cancellation of inter-Allied debts unless it is accompanied by a sweeping reduction of German reparations. Considering the attitude of the Administration and of public opinion, cancellation or radical reduction of war debt settlements seems unlikely. And if we go on collecting from the British, as there is every reason to believe that we shall do, they will go collecting from the French and the Germans and others. British commerce with Central Europe means a lot. Private American interests have invested sums of great magnitude in Germany since the war. If the British and ourselves, therefore, should agree to excuse the continental European debtors from inter-Allied debts, we should stipulate their waiving reparations. It hardly sounds possible, given conditions as they are today. But if it did happen, the improvement in international relations, material as well as moral, would be immeasurable.

Now if we continue, on the other hand, to exact repayment, and if the Entente Powers continue to exact reparations, things will happen exceedingly helpful to the cause of international coöperation. Whatever scheme of payment is devised is in itself a form of international coöperation. We shall find, of course, that considerably lower tariffs are essential, and we may come to a modification of our immigration policy. We shall have to give special facilities, too, to the shipping of our debtors, and patronize it liberally, so that they

will have credit balances to pay us the annual sums they owe us. French and British, in turn, will have to establish intimate trade relationships with Germans, and treat them as we shall have to treat our debtors.

War debts and reparations may turn out to be a blessing in disguise. Anything that calls the world's attention to the evils of artificial restriction of trade hastens the coming of world peace. For reasons already explained, measures enacted to enhance the exclusive privileges of one national group at the expense of another make for war. There are circumstances under which tariffs and immigration restriction laws seem reasonable. They do appear to be to the advantage of the United States at the present moment. But is there any way that we can get our ten billion dollars back plus interest, and maintain these barriers? The war debts, in the course of the next decade, are bound to give the American people furiously to think. High tariff? Severe immigration restriction?

The "best minds" among American bankers, executives of great corporations, and merchants, studied the post-bellum situation in Europe several years ago. They came to the conclusion that the division of the continent into many states, made worse by the results of the war, each with its own vexatious tariff schedules and passport regulations, was the most serious impediment to economic rehabilitation and constituted a menace to world peace. So they issued a manifesto, with an impressive list of signatures. What did they advise? The breaking down of tariff barriers, and freedom of transit

and of entry and exit. Free trade and unrestricted intercourse of peoples formed their remedy for the ills from which Europe was suffering.

Given the eminence of its signers and the conservative Republican views of many of them, the manifesto created a sensation on both sides of the Atlantic. Some of the signers hastened to come out with declarations of their belief in severe immigration restriction and high tariff for the United States We did not need, in their opinion, the medicine prescribed for Europe. But if we take a world-wide view of international relations, why not? The signers of the manifesto were interested in the quick rehabilitation of European countries because they were debtors both to the American Government and to the American interests over which these gentlemen presided. Thank God for the debts, if they can open our eyes to the folly and danger of artificial barriers between nations!

The second point is the long period of time for which creditors ask debtors to commit their countries. A thoughtful Frenchman, for whose opinion I have the greatest respect, said to me recently at dinner in his home in Paris that the most iniquitous feature of the Mellon-Berenger agreement was that it committed France to payments over two generations, with the burden of the heaviest payment falling on a generation yet unborn. "Think of the social implication," he said. "The children born in France during the next thirty years will grow to manhood with the burden of a heavy tribute to be paid to your children's children, to which

the French nation was committed by men who died long before they were born. If such an agreement holds, it will poison the relations between our two nations. It will make the French hate the Americans with a holy hatred, and this will not be a very pleasant country for Americans to visit after the burden of these payments has been weighing down on one generation and automatically increases for the next."

I agreed, but added immediately that this same social argument would seem to hold equally forcefully in reparations. Was not France trying to get Germany to agree to a reparations schedule with increasing payments for sixty-two years, amounting to nearly five times per annum the sum that my friend believed would be a heavy burden on the French nation?

"Ah! Please remember that the Germans are paying for their sins, while we will be paying to a comrade-in-arms, for whom we held the trenches three years before he came along to defend himself," he replied.

I did not answer this: nor did I press the analogy between long-term war debt payment and reparations. It would have been no use. The Frenchman has a juridic mind: he sees technicalities: he holds to the text, to the letter of the law when it suits him, and builds up a brief on moral grounds, when that is more to his interest. We all try to do that; only the French are cleverer, and they hold more tenaciously to a stand they have once taken. They lack imagination when it comes to seeing themselves as others see them in the family of nations. The French who are alive today, who have

suffered in the war, have every reason for feeling deeply about it. But their children will be as far removed from it as my generation is from the Civil War. The present generation in Germany repudiates war guilt, and the present generation in the United States does not think that France saved us from destruction in the World War. Irreconcilable attitudes!

Now there is no doubt that in the year 1950 a German is not going to think any differently about paying money to France than a Frenchman is going to think about paying money to the United States. Neither will give much thought to why the obligation exists. The fact of it will be enough to make the debtor see red. If the nations have not repudiated these obligations before that time, or if they do not do so then, it will be only because of military or economic pressure successfully brought to bear upon them by the creditor.

At the very least it will mean white-heat nationalism, kept at that point by the sense of a great injustice. It will probably mean war.

However, things are not likely to go that far. The Entente Powers will be ready some day to modify the Young Plan payments, and then agree to accept a lump sum, which Germany will fund commercially and pay, to get rid of the past. Similarly, the United States will make a drastic reduction in the funding agreements with her European debtors. In the meantime, the working out of the *modus vivendi* of payments all around, with the aid of international financiers, will bring debtor and creditor nations together more closely

than ever before. Their interdependence will be accentuated.

So we see the silver lining in the clouds. While one could say that it is astonishing that so many unsolved problems remain, so many unsettled questions, after all these years of peace, it is equally possible to say that amazing and unexpected progress has been made in bringing the world back to normal after what was an iconoclastic world crisis.

Now we are coming to the end. Nationalism has its place in the scheme of things. That has been clearly proved. It is something concrete and tangible, and is not ever going to be replaced by internationalism. At heart we are all nationalists. We love our own country. We live for her. We would die for her. European nationalism has longer and stronger roots than American. The nationalism of non-Caucasian peoples has not yet taken the same form that it has taken in Europe, in the British Dominions, in the United States and in Latin America. But as the Orient becomes more completely bound up with our economic system, its nationalism will have the symptoms of ours and will express itself in our way, as it has done in Japan. We have to expect that, and face the day when our political control will end in Asia and Africa.

If we have not as yet developed in America the strong national consciousness of most European countries, we are on the way to it. Even at our present stage there is more civic intelligence, more community spirit, more appreciation of the value and more knowledge of the functions of national government, in the United States than in any other country. I speak not of the élite, but

of the general average. The American primary school, working on good material that lives under favorable economic conditions, is responsible for our high standard of citizenship.

But is that the only reason? Is not American nationalism an experiment in internationalism? The impossibility of arriving at a fair approximation of national origins in 1790 has been acknowledged by the commission entrusted with the task of revising quotas under the new immigration law. In the successive decades of the nineteenth century all Europe sent us immigrants. The American of today has either sixteen or sixty-four direct ancestors who were living in 1790. In almost every case some of them were still in Europe, and the man would be rash indeed who would undertake to prove that all his blood came from one stock. Even Americans of unmixed colonial ancestry have been subject throughout their lives, as their parents were before them, to a constantly changing cultural and economic environment of a kind that the Old World knows nothing about. With the exception of negroes and Orientals, ethnic and religious minorities in the United States have not experienced political disabilities or economic handicaps. In most places they have not been discriminated against socially. All this has helped toward assimilation. But that assimilation is a kind of international product.

The people of the United States, too, have changed their habitation in successive generations. They have gone from North to South, from East to West, from plain to mountain, from hinterland to sea. They have experienced pioneer conditions and have moved from

one climate to another. But on their way they met no frontiers on the other side of which were people owing allegiance to another sovereignty and grouping themselves in another nation. From the beginning of the republic there have been no tariff barriers. Raw materials, foodstuffs, and manufactured articles have moved freely in the greatest free trade area in the world. Some years before the World War the volume of trade inside the United States was as great as the international commerce of the whole world.

It is generally assumed that nationalism is *per se* antagonistic to internationalism. But are the two incompatible? I think not. Throughout our review of the evolution of nationalism we have seen how internationalism is the complement of nationalism. Internationalism will never replace nationalism. Each exists because the other is. One cannot be understood without the other. It is like a blackboard and chalk. One needs both in order to write.

Pacifists get curiously muddled when they talk about the United States of Europe, and then the United States of the World. They have a vague idea that there will some day be a common world citizenship. They say that if we do not recognize the obligation to serve a particular nation or flag, the brotherhood of man will be advanced. I have even heard them argue that if we would all refuse to fight there would be no war, no friction between man and man. How can any man or woman who has raised a family take this stand? All mothers, and some fathers, know that war begins in the nursery. And if there is anything harder for a man

to get along with than a woman, I suppose it is for a woman to get along with a man!

Is it paradoxical to say that peace is born of a conflict of wills? Not if we realize that individuality means more to every human being than clothes. The happiest families are those in which the members, parents and children, stoutly keep their individuality. It entails a certain amount of clashing, sometimes fighting, but it is fighting for peace. Families in relation to other families are the same way. Then we have the larger groups, on up to nations in relation to other nations. Communities assert their rights, and states resist the encroachment of the Federal Government. It is the same all over the world.

The Good Lord put us in a certain country in the same way that he put us in a certain family. We are with our kin, and we are bound to them as they are bound to us by common interests. We share both responsibilities and privileges. Being a good family man, looking after your own before others; being a good booster for your city; being a jealous defender of local rights; does not make you less of a patriot. In fact, the one helps the other. Is it not so with the larger world citizenship? International coöperation has best been exemplified in the world so far by practical achievements of countries with a vigorous national life. Nationalists ought to be the best internationalists. The hope of internationalism lies in nationalism.

When Jesus gave the message that was to send his teachings throughout the world, he told his disciples to go out into all the world and proclaim the Gospel. But he added that they were to begin at Jerusalem.

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A Monthly Magazine
interpreting the spirit of the new age

JOHN HERMAN RANDALL, *Editor*
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